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omo STATE LAW JOURNAL 
Volume 56, Number 2, 1995 
Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: 
Risk-Based Representation and Equitable 
Compensation 
BRADFORD C. MANK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent articles have argued that existing environmental laws work to the 
disadvantage of minorities or the poor and have used shorthand expressions 
such as "environmental racism." "environmental justice" or "environmental 
equity" to refer to a wide range of distributional issues.1 It is fair to say that an 
* Assistant Professor of Law. University of Cincinnati; B.A .• Harvard University. 
1983; J.D •• Yale Law School. 1987. I wish to thank Joe Tomain. John Applegate. Gordon 
Christenson. and Paul Schwartz for their comments on earlier drafts. Jennifer Tecson 
provided able research assistance. I also wish to thank law librarian Jim Hart for his 
assistance in obtaining various government documents and other hard-to-find sources. All 
errors or omissions are my responsibility. 
1 See, e.g .• Vicki Been. Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: 
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics? 103 YALE LJ. 1383 (1994) [hereinafter 
Been. Market Dynamics]; Vicki Been. Wllats Fairness Got To Do with It? Environmental 
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses. 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) 
[hereinafter Been. Fairness]; Richard J. Lazarus. Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The 
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993). 
Commentators have defined environmental equity. environmental justice, and 
environmental racism in slightly different ways: 
Environmental racism is the intentional or unintentional practice of racially 
discriminatory siting. Environmental equity involves evenly balancing the siting of 
potentially environmentally hazardous facilities among communities of all backgrounds. 
Environmental justice, on the other hand, has emerged as a movement to relieve all 
communities of the burden of emissions by curtailing waste generation and preventing 
all pollution. 
Charles J. McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 689, 689 (1994). Rae Zimmerman says: 
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"environmental justice movement" now exists, including both activists and 
scholars. This movement frequently argues that people of color and the poor 
are exposed to greater environmental risks than are whites and wealthier 
Americans at least in part because of racism and classism in the siting of 
environmental risks, the promulgation of environmental laws and regulations, 
the enforcement of environmental laws, and the attention given to the cleanup 
of polluted areas.2 In response to charges of class and racial bias, Carol 
Browner, Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), has identified the elimination of environmental racism as one of her top 
priorities.3 President Clinton, in an Earth Day speech, called environmental 
justice an important domestic priority,4 and on February 11, 1994, he issued 
Executive Order 12,898, S which requires all federal agencies to investigate to 
Equity typically refers to the distribution of amenities and disadvantages across 
individuals and groups. Justice, however, focuses more on procedures to ensure fair 
distnbution. Fairness refers to where one group or individual disproportionately bears 
the burdens of an action. 
Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Oassificotion in Envirorunental Equity: How We Manage Is How 
We Measure, 21 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 633, 633 n.1 (1994). Many scholars prefer the terms 
"environmental justice" or "equity" to the more negative and divisive shorthand of 
"environmental racism." Lazarus, supra, at 790. This Article uses the expression 
"environmental justice" because it refers to a range of issues broader than racism. 
2 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1384 (discussing the environmental 
justice movement). 
3 Stephen C. Jones, EPA Targets 'Envirorunental Racism', NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, 
at 28, 34 (citing Carol M. Browner, Address at the District of Columbia Bar Association 
Luncheon, National Press Club, (June 25, 1993». Under the Clinton Administration and the 
leadership of Carol Browner, the EPA has taken a more activist approach to environmental 
equity issues than the EPA did under the Bush Administration and EPA Administrator 
William K. Reilly. In 1992, after the National lAw Journal released a study finding 
significant racial disparities in the agency's enforcement and remedy selection policies, EPA 
officials stated that more sophisticated studies were needed. Marianne Lavelle, EPA 
Responds to Concerns of Minorities on Oeanups, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1994, at A12. By 
contrast, in 1994, Elliott P. Laws, the EPA's assistant administrator in charge of waste 
programs, argued that citizen groups concerned with environmental justice issues have been 
waiting for years for action and therefore that the Clinton Administration would not wait 
until more research is done. Id. 
4 Steven Keeva, A Breath of Justice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 88, 88. 
S Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994), Earlier, President Clinton had 
issued Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), which requires agencies to "design its 
regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. In doing 
so, each agency shall consider incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the 
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what extent their policies may create environmental inequities in minority or 
low-income populations. 
There is conflicting evidence about whether it is the initial siting decision 
or subsequent events attributable to market dynamics that cause disparities 
between the risks borne by whites and minorities, or by rich and poor.6 It is 
important to understand the causes of such disparities because different 
remedies may be appropriate. Siting discrimination suits can address only 
disparities caused by the initial siting decision, but ongoing compensation or 
broad redistributive policies can at least partially redress the impact of market 
dynamics. 
Siting discrimination suits under the Equal Protection Clause have 
generally failed because of that Clause's discriminatory intent requirement.7 
Many commentators propose a "disparate impact approach," which would 
allow a finding of discrimination without the need to prove discriminatory 
intent, contending that the intent requirement fails to address indirect racial 
discrimination resulting from past practices or unconscious attitudes. 8 
This Article disagrees with environmental justice advocates who would 
find discrimination whenever there are disparate impacts. The intent 
requirement legitimately distinguishes between intentional conduct perpetrated 
by bad actors and unintentional conduct that may have disparate impacts but is 
motivated by neutral decisionmaking criteria that serve legitimate business 
interests. The disparate impact approach raises troubling issues in defining 
what is statistically significant discrimination, what is the relevant geographical 
area affected by a facility, and which persons should be classified as belonging 
to a racial minority group.9 
Courts applying the Equal Protection Clause should focus on whether 
minorities are adequately represented in the siting decisionmaking process 
rather than on the substantive merits of the siting decision.1O A siting 
costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated entities, and the public), 
flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity. " ld. at 639. Although the objectives of 
Executive Order 12,866 are laudatory, it provides no guidance on how agencies should 
choose among these goals if they conflict. 
6 See generally Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1398-1407 (discussing 
market dynamics theory and presenting conflicting empirical evidence); see also infra notes 
55-58 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting studies). 
7 See generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 828-33 (citing sources and discussing four 
losing equal protection cases); infra notes 293-301 and accompanying text. 
8 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 825-26; see also Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The 
Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 EcoLOGY L.Q. 721, 733-34; infra notes 307-13 and 
accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 363-74 and accompanying text. 
10 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
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representation and compensation process should insure fair representation for 
minorities and make equal protection challenges irrelevant. 
A "compensation approach" that fairly represents those at greatest risk, 
including minorities, is sufficient to address disparate impacts and does so 
without stigmatizing developers and government officials motivated by neutral 
decisionmaking criteria that serve legitimate business purposes. Compensation 
can at least partially address disparities that arise subsequent to the initial siting 
decision as a result of market dynamics. Disparate impact suits are ill-suited to 
addressing whether the benefits of a facility outweigh its costs. Moreover, 
eliminating all environmental disparities may be too costly in some cases.11 
Unlike job discrimination, the siting of a polluting or disposal facility 
brings both costs and benefits to any community. Disparate impact challenges 
may actually harm a minority group if they block the siting of a project that 
brings to a community employment and tax benefits that outweigh the risks.12 
Minorities are likely to lose more than whites if legislative measures designed 
to reduce environmental inequities reduce the incentive for businesses to 
relocate into poor and minority' areas. 13 The dangers of poverty and 
unemployment are often much greater than the risks associated with waste 
disposal facilities and industrial plants.14 Indeed, in a number of siting disputes 
in which environmental justice groups challenged the siting of a particular 
facility, other well-established minority groups such as the local chapter of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
REvIEw, 87, 181 & passim (1980) (proposing theory of representation-reinforcing review 
and arguing that central purpose of Equal Protection Clause is protecting minority political 
participation, not preventing substantive injustices). Ely's theory has generated enormous 
controversy. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The PuaJing Resistance to Political 
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 747 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, The PuaJing Persistence 
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Halt Ely to Constitutional 
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Symposium, Judicial Review Ver.\"us Democracy, 42 
Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Ron Replogle, Note, The Scope of Representation-Reinforcing 
Judicial Review, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1592 (1992). Regardless of the validity of Ely's 
theory of judicial review, his theory offers an appropriate analogy for a statutory proposal 
that emphasizes the adequate representation of minorities rather than equality of results. 
11 See generally Kent E. Portney, Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Is There a 
Critical Nexus in the Case of Waste Disposal or Treatment Facility Siting?, 21 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 827, 832-39 (1994); see also A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The 
Potential Misfit Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 871 (1992) (discussing 
need to balance environmental equity and efficiency). 
12 See infra notes 13-15, 406-07 and accompanying text. 
13 CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT, ENVIRONMENfALJUSTICE? 6 (1994). 
141d. 
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 333 
supported construction of the facility .15 
Developers can redress a facility's externalities by compensating affected 
groups. Existing compensation practices, however, do not sufficiently address 
distributional and representational issues. A number of states have some form 
of compensation system, but no system is designed to make sure that those at 
greatest risk receive roughly proportionate representation and compensation.16 
This Article proposes a new risk-based approach to representing and 
compensating not only minorities but any person affected by a siting decision. 
This proposal would create a formal mechanism for achieving the desire of 
many environmental justice advocates to empower those local residents most 
affected by a siting decisionP The EPA or state siting agencies, however, 
would provide a technocratic framework for assessing the scope of risks, 
despite the limitations of risk and cost-benefit analysis;18 would set limits on 
the maximum amount of risk in any community; and would specify the 
minimum compensation required from a developer. Immediate neighbors, 
political residents in the siting community, and regional residents would have a 
varying degree of input into the siting and compensation process depending 
upon the risk they bear from a facility. 
After the EPA or siting board established minimum safety standards and 
determined the minimum compensation, a siting negotiation and compensation 
committee, elected by a risk-weighted voting system, would negotiate with a 
developer concerning both the amount and the distribution of compensation. 
Compensation would go to those who are at greatest risk rather than to local 
politicians and unrelated municipal service needs such as schools. The 
compensation process could take into account harms caused by both the initial 
15Id. at 13-14 (discussing proposed site in Brooksville, Mississippi and controversial 
Emelle Landfill in Sumter County, Alabama). 
16 See infra notes 159, 188-205 and accompanying text. 
17 See generally Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black. Brown. Poor & Poisoned: 
Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Questfor Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PuB. 
POL'y 69, 71-79 (1991) (discussing and praising minority grassroots environmental 
movement); Luke W. Cole, Empowennent as the Key to Environmental Protection: The 
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 EcoLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Robert W. Collin, 
Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. 
ENVrL. LJ. 495 (1992) (advocating environmental planning at local level where 
detrimental impact ofwaste siting decisions is greatest). 
18 There are serious limitations in assessing the risks of carcinogens and especially 
noncarcinogens. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Mat Comes After Technology: Using an 
"Exceptions Process» to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 
STAN. ENVrL. LJ. 263, 281-84 (1994); James H. Colopy, Comment, The Road Less 
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Tule VI of the Ovil Rights Act of 1964, 
13 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 125, 137-39 (1994); infra notes 386-401 and accompanying text. 
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siting process and subsequent ongoing or ex post risks. The compensation 
process would also determine the relative allocation of monies for remedial, 
preventive, and incentive purposes. 
Part n of this Article discusses the empirical evidence regarding whether 
minorities are disproportionately affected by pollution and examines whether 
disparities are caused by the initial siting decision or by subsequent events 
attributable to market dynamics. Part ill(A) reviews current siting practices and 
proposed environmental justice legislation. Part ill(B) discusses the limitations 
of current compensation practices. Part ill(C) explores the question of to what 
extent the public should participate in environmental decisionmaking. Part IV 
discusses recent equal protection challenges to allegedly discriminatory siting 
decisions and scrutinizes proposals by other commentators to allow for 
broadened disparate impact claims. Part V argues that equal protection suits 
should be allowed only when there is evidence of intentional discrimination. 
Disparate impact suits should be allowed only when there is statistically 
significant evidence of such impacts, the costs of discrimination outweigh the 
benefits of a proposed project to an affected group, and there is no adequate 
compensation process. Part VI presents a "risk-based" committee system that 
would give greater representation to those most at risk from locally undesirable 
land uses and would be the fairest system for compensating those who are at 
risk from locally undesirable land uses. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" 
There is conflicting empirical evidence about the extent of environmental 
inequities, but there are some disparities at some sites. 19 A more difficult 
question is whether disparities are primarily caused by discriminatory initial 
siting decisions or by subsequent events attributable to market dynamics, which 
lead poor people to move toward undesirable facilities when property values 
fal1.20 It is important to understand the causes of disparities because the 
remedies for correcting them will differ accordingly. 
A. Evidence of Environmental Inequities 
In theory, it is probably to be expected that some segments of society will 
receive fewer environmental benefits and bear greater environmental burdens, 
19 See generally Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1398-1406 (reviewing 
environmental justice literature and criticizing sc:veraI studies purporting to find 
environmental inequities); infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
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and a considerable literature has developed about this observation.21 The 
existence of at least some environmental racial disparities in a society in which 
there are significant differences among minorities and whites in income levels, 
education, residential patterns, and access to political power is not surprising. 
Even if the government's enforcement and cleanup policies are the same in 
minority and white neighborhoods and in rich and poor neighborhoods, 
generally poor enforcement efforts by the EPA or delayed and inept cleanups 
may still disproportionately harm minority or poor neighborhoods if there are 
more such sites in these communities.22 Furthermore, pollution prevention 
schemes that reduce the overall amount of pollution may simultaneously 
increase pollution for certain populations.23 
Because minorities and poor people disproportionately live closer to 
polluting industries than do nonminorities,24 minorities or the poor should 
obtain disproportionately larger benefits from any across-the-board reduction in 
pollution or increase in occupational safety.25 It is not clear, however, that 
minorities or poor people, especially those living in urban areas, have in fact 
received proportionately larger increases,26 and there is some evidence that 
greater benefits have gone to people living in nonurban areas.27 
21 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 792-94. Environmental protection laws tend to 
redistribute risks because the use of pollution control devices to reduce certain risks-for 
instance, air pollution scrubbers or municipal wastewater treatment facilities to reduce air or 
water pollution-frequently creates other types of pollution, such as sludge, that impose 
risks on a segment of the population different from the segment that would have been 
exposed to the initial pollution. See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating 17wughtways: Re-
Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 463-69 & passim; Lazarus, supra 
note 1, at 794-95. 
22 See generally Colopy, supra note 18, at 139-40. 
23 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 794-95. 
24 See infra notes 28-29,32-36,41-44 and accompanying text. 
25 See E. Donald Elliott, A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional 
Consequences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 !<AN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5, 7 
(1991) ("In my judgment, minorities and the poor probably benefit disproportionately from 
environmental protection measures."); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798; William K. Reilly, 
Environmental Equity: EPA's Position, EPA J., Mar.!Apr. 1992, at 18, 22 ("It is 
undeniable that minorities usually benefit from-are, indeed, the chief beneficiaries of-
more general efforts to protect the environment. "). 
26 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798-99; i1!fra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
There is some evidence that uniform technology-based regulation of air pollution has 
resulted in higher-income persons receiving larger absolute benefits in pollution reduction 
compared to lower-income persons. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798-99 (citing studies). 
Higher-income individuals may even receive greater benefits from programs aimed at 
improving urban air quality. See id. 
27 As a result, there has been significant progress since 1970 in improving air quality 
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National uniform regulation in some circumstances does not effectively 
address localized concentrations of pollution, called "hot-spots, "28 which often 
disproportionately impact minorities or poor people because they are more 
likely to breathe polluted urban air or eat contaminated fish.29 Although there 
are significant differences between technology-based and market-based 
regulatory approaches,30 neither type of regulation is especially adept at 
addressing localized hot-Spots.31 
as measured by the national ambient air quality standards for criteria pollutants such as 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and particulates. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 814 n.l09 
(arguing that greater progress has been made in improving general ambient air quality 
criteria than in reducing toxic air emissions and citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPoRT 17 (1986). But relatively less progress has been 
made in reducing emissions of hazardous air pollutants, which often are of greater concern 
to neighbors, disproportionately minorities, of the toxic polluting source. See id. at 814. In 
another article, this author questioned how effectively the two-stage approach to regulating 
hazardous air pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments will work at reducing 
overall emissions of hazardous air pollutants and in particular "hot-spots" that may 
disproportionately affect minorities and the poor. See generally Mank, supra note 18. 
Because a larger proportion of racial minorities reside in metropolitan areas, higher 
percentages of African-Americans and Hispanics, compared to white Americans, live in air 
nonattainment areas for partiCUlate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and 
lead. See 1 ENVTL. EQUITY WORKGRoup, OFFlCEOFPOLICY, PLANNING, ANDEVALUATION, 
U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REoUCINGRIsKFOR ALL COMMUNITIES, WORKGRoup 
REPoRT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 13-14 (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL 
EQUITY REPoRT]. 
28 See Mank, supra note 18, at 290-91 (discussing hot-spots). See generally California 
Air Taxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 1987, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 44300-44384 (West SUpp. 1995) (legislation providing for the collection of 
information and assessment of health risks regarding emissions of hazardous air pollutants 
that may cause hot-spots). Some pollutants, such as volatile organic compounds, do not 
have significant site-specific impacts, but other pollutants create localized pollution 
problems around the emitting source. Carbon monoxide, for example, can create hot-spots 
in and near tunnels and around major intersections where motor vehicle traffic is heaviest. 
See Mank, supra note 18, at 290 n.l2!. 
29 Minority groups' relative lack of political power at the national level may explain 
why air pollution control efforts typically focus on general ambient air quality concerns for 
an entire metropolitan region rather than on toxic hot-spots in anyone partiCUlar area. See 
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 814; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 290-91 (discussing hot-
spots). 
30 There has been an extensive academic debate about the relative merits of 
technology-based and economic incentive-based regulation. See generally Mank, supra note 
18, at 297-99. 
31 Because the first major wave of environmental regulation in the 1970s relied 
primarily upon technology-based approaches, there is more evidence that such systems of 
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The real issue, however, is an empirical one: Are minorities or poor 
persons disproportionately disadvantaged by environmental laws? Several 
major studies have found that hazardous waste sites, solid waste dumps, 
polluting factories, and other locally undesirable land uses are located in areas 
that contain, on average, a higher percentage of racial minorities and are poorer 
than nonhost communities. In 1983, the United States General Accounting 
Office (GAO) examined the racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
communities surrounding four offsite hazardous waste landfills located in the 
eight southeastern states that make up the EPA's Region IV and found that 
"[b]lacks make up the majority of the population in three of the four 
communities where the landfills are located. "32 In 1987, the United Church of 
Christ Commission for Racial Justice published what was then the most 
comprehensive study, involving the location of all 415 commercial hazardous 
waste facilities in the contiguous United States that could be identified through 
the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Management System, and concluded that 
"[a]lthough socioeconomic status appeared to play an important role in the 
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more 
significant. "33 In 1994, an updated study by the United Church of Christ found 
regulation have in many cases failed to achieve equitable reductions in the amount of 
pollution. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 798-99, 814-15 (discussing various regulatory 
programs that may have had neutral or even regressive distributional impacts); infra notes 
41-44 and accompanying text. Marketable permit systems, however, are not necessarily 
more effective than technology-based forms of regulation in reducing hot-spots. See TOM H. 
TlETENBERG, EMIssIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFoRMING POLLUTION POLICY 71 
(1985) ("Neither the command-and-control nor the emissions permit policy considers source 
location in assigning control responsibility."). Market permit systems can even exacerbate 
pollution concentrations more so than uniform regulations because the distribution of 
pollution under a market system of transferable pollution rights will tend to replicate 
existing income and property distributions, which themselves may be the product of racial 
inequities. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 849; Manley W. Roberts, Comment, A Remedy for 
the Victims of Pollution Pennit Markets, 92 YALE L.J. 1022, 1027-28 & n.40 (1983). 
Incentive-based systems of regulation are no better than uniform standards in taking into 
account the actual amount of harm caused at a particular site, because there is a complex 
relationship between emission levels and "[t]he polluting effect of a given emission, [which] 
depends upon weather, season, air and water flow, and a host of other factors." STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFoRM 276 (1982). Site-specific regulatory approaches, 
including variances or exceptions from otherwise nationally uniform legislation, can address 
hot-spots and can deal with local inequities generally. See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 
313-26 &passim. 
32 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAzARDous WASTE LANDFll..LS AND 
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND EcoNOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1 
(1983). 
33 UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE 
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that the location of hazardous waste facilities reflects a national pattern of racial 
inequality that has grown worse during the past decade.34 Professor Robert 
Bullard, a sociologist, found that although African-Americans made up only 
twenty-eight percent of the Houston population in 1980, six of Houston's eight 
incinerators and mini-incinerators and fifteen of seventeen landfills were located 
in predominantly African-American neighborhoods.35 Other studies have 
questioned whether there are disparities between minorities and whites in the 
siting of solid and hazardous waste facilities or whether such disparities are 
caused by events subsequent to the initial siting procesS.36 
There is evidence that the EPA and state agencies do not enforce 
environmental laws equally in white and minority areas. In 1992, the National 
Law Journal published a special issue on environmental racism that examined 
all Resource Recovery and Conservation Act civil penalty cases in the federal 
courts from 1985 through 1991 and concluded that race rather than income 
caused disparities in toxic waste penalties.37 The same National Law Journal 
IN TIlE UNITEDS'rATES xiii (1987). 
34 See generally BENJAMIN A. GoLDMAN & LAURA FrITON, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE 
REvIsITED (1994). 
35 See Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste and the Black Houston Community, 53 Soc. 
INQUIRY 273, 279-83 (1983); Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1395 n.49. 
36 See infra part II.B. 
37 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 
1992, at S2, 52. The study found that penalties at sites having the greatest white popUlation 
were about 500% higher than penalties at sites with the greatest minority popUlation, 
averaging $335,566 for the white areas, compared to $55,318 for minority areas. On the 
other hand, there was no evidence of significant disparities between rich and poor areas for 
hazardous waste civil penalties. The average penalty in areas with the lowest median 
incomes was $113,491, which was three percent more than the $109,606 average penalty in 
areas with the highest median incomes. The study also examined all civil cases concluded 
from 1985 through 1991 under federal air, water, and waste laws and found disparities 
based upon both race and income. Penalties in white communities were 46 % higher than in 
minority communities, $153,067 compared to $105,028, and penalties were 54% higher in 
high-income areas than in low-income areas, $146,993 compared to $95,664. Id. at S2, S4, 
S6. But see William K. Reilly, EPA ~ Reilly Replies to 'Unequal Protection " NAT'L L.J., 
Jan. 25, 1993, at 16. Reilly, then Administrator of the EPA, criticized the study on the 
ground that the 
analysis was limited to a small, unrepresentative sample of the agency's enforcement 
actions-civil judicial suits for penalties-without regard to the many enforcement 
actions brought as administrative actions or criminal prosecutions. 
More important, the measure of enforcement effectiveness is not just how much 
money someone is penalized, but whether and how effectively the underlying 
environmental problem is corrected. 
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study found that, under the Superfund cleanup program, it took twenty percent 
longer in minority areas to have the EPA place a site on the national priority 
action list, 5.6 years from the date of discovery to the date of listing compared 
to 4.7 years in white areas, and ten percent longer in poor areas than in rich 
areas, 5.3 years compared to 4.8 years.38 Congress has launched investigations 
into the EPA's enforcement and cleanup practices.39 The United States 
Commission on Civil Rights is also currently investigating the EPA's 
enforcement and toxic waste cleanup decisions.4O 
There is also evidence that the poor and racial minorities are more likely to 
live near sources of air pollution and to drink polluted water.41 Proponents of 
the environmental justice movement often argue that there has been greater 
progress in improving air and water quality in nonurban areas.42 Although 
ld. at 18. 
38 Marianne Lavelle, The Minorities Equation, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. At 
the "minority sites," the EPA chose "containment," the capping or walling off of a 
hazardous waste dump site, seven percent more frequently than it did permanent 
"treatment," the cleanup method preferred under § 121 of the Superfund statute. Seventy-
five sites were "contained"; 70 were "treated." Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 37, at S2, S6. 
At "white sites," the EPA ordered treatment 22 % more often than it did containment, 88 
treated sites compared to 72 contained sites. Id. Although § 121(b) of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) favors permanent 
treatment solutions, § 121(a) gives the EPA considerable discretion in weighing costs and 
other factors when determining cleanup levels. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a), (b) (1988). 
39 See Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Racism Targeted, NAT'L LJ., Mar. I, 1993, 
at 3; Marianne Lavelle, Discrimination Probe Planned: House Committee to Investigate 
Environmental Racism, NAT'LLJ., Sept. 28, 1992, at 1. 
40 See Marianne Lavelle, EPA Eriforcement to be Probed, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, 
at3,34. 
41 See generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 796-806. There is evidence that African-
Americans and Hispanics are more likely than the poor population in general to live in 
urban areas that are not in compliance with federal Clean Air Act requirements for 
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and lead. 1 EPA 
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 13-14 (stressing that measurements of 
environmental contaminants represent the "potential" for exposure and not "actual" 
exposure); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 805; D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing 
Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed, EPA J. Mar.lApr. 1992, at 16, 
17. Over 67% of African-American inner-city children suffer from excessive blood lead 
levels. See Jane Perkins, Recognizing and Attacking Environmental Racism, 26 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 389, 394 (1992) (citing 1990 study by the Environmental Defense 
Fund); Colopy, supra note 18, at 132. 
42 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 815. For example, significant financial resources have 
been devoted to nonurban issues such as the prevention of significant deteriorations in air 
quality, the reduction of "acid rain," and the protection of visibility in national parks and 
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programs designed to reduce pollution in areas often possess great merit, 
proponents of the environmental justice movement have contended that 
pollution control programs aimed at poor and minority urban areas, such as 
programs to reduce lead pollution, may yield greater returns in terms of overall 
public health per dollar invested.43 On the other hand, it is important to 
recognize that our society has spent considerable resources to reduce urban 
pollution. "[B]etween 1970 and 1990 the United States expended more than $1 
trillion on environmental protection, the vast majority spent controlling 
pollution in cities from industry, municipal facilities, and cars. "44 
The work activities of minorities also expose them to disproportionate 
environmental risks.45 There is substantial evidence that minorities occupy 
significantly more environmentally hazardous jobs and, as a result, suffer a 
disproportionately higher number of environmentally related injuries.46 For 
instance, epidemiologists found that ninety percent of steelworkers most 
heavily exposed to certain organic pollutants were nonwhite and that these 
persons suffered from respiratory cancer at a rate eight times greater than 
expected.47 As many as 1,000 farmworkers, eighty to ninety percent of whom 
are minorities, primarily African-Americans or Hispanics, die, and over 
300,000 experience pesticide-related illnesses each year from direct pesticide 
exposure.48 
wilderness areas. Id. In addition, Congress has directed substantial resources to improve 
water quality in nonurban areas. Id. Professor Lazarus acknowledges that the Clean Water 
Act's constructions grants program, which authorizes federal grants for municipal 
wastewater treatment, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-99 (1988), may be an exception to the pattern of 
relative neglect of urban areas that he sees in the Act, but he points out that the effectiveness 
of the grants program has long been controversial. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 815. 
43 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 815-16. 
44 See Michel Gelobter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 841, 841 (1994) (citing COUNCIL ON ENVI'L. QUALITY, EXECUfIVE OFFlCE OF THE 
PREsIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TwENTIETH ANNuAL REPoRT 430 (1990) (fable 
7». 
45 See generally George Friedman-Jimenez, Achieving Environmental Justice: The 
Role of Occupational Health, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605 (1994). 
46 See id. at 608-10; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 796-98 n.37. 
471 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 17 (citing OFFlCE OF 
HEALTH AND ENVI'L. AssESSMENT, U.S. EPA, CARCINOGEN AssESSMENT OF COKE OVEN 
EMISSIONS (1984». A study of long-tenn, full-time, topside coke oven workers found that 
they had a ten-fold increase in lung cancer and that 88 % were nonwhites. Friedman-
Jimenez, supra note 45, at 610 (citing Carol K. Redmond et al., Long-Temz Mortality Study 
of Steelworkers, 14 J. OccuPATIONALMED. 621, 621 (1972». 
48 See 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 16-17; Ivette 
Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Famz Workers: Among the Least Protected, EPA J., 
Mar.lApr. 1992, at 13, 13-14; Colopy, supra note 18, at 132 (citing Paul M. Ong & 
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The EPA is just beginning to address important fish consumption issues 
that may cause toxic hot-spots to be especially dangerous to racial minorities.49 
Uniform water quality standards have failed to address the fact that some 
populations, such as subsistence fishers and some racial groups, consume more 
fish than the average population. 50 It is critical that water quality standards take 
into account the range of fish consumption among various subpopulations 
rather than just average fish consumption patterns because polychlorinated 
biphenyls, dioxins, furans, and many other chemicals can bioaccumulate in fish 
tissues to high concentrations, even when water concentrations of these 
chemicals are below detection limits.51 The EPA Environmental Equity Report 
concluded that further study of the potential for contaminant exposure through 
fish ingestion was needed,52 and EPA Administrator Carol Browner has 
specifically pledged to examine the fish consumption patterns of Native 
Americans.53 There is some evidence that certain subpopulation groups are 
more sensitive to certain pollutants than is the general population.54 
Evelyn Blumenberg, An Unnatural Trade-Off: lAtinos and Environmental Justice, in 
LATINOS IN A CHANGING U.S. EcoNOMY 207, 215 (Rebecca Morales & Frank Bonilla eds., 
1993». 
49 At least some minority groups, including African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and 
Native Americans, eat disproportionate amounts of fish, which may contain dangerous 
bioaccumuIations of such chemicals as polychlorinated biphenyls, dioxins, and furans, and 
minorities also tend to prepare fish for eating in a manner in which more contaminants will 
be consumed, by including skin and trimming less fat. See 1 EPA ENVIRONMENrAL EQUITY 
REPoRT, supra note 27, at 15-16; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806 n.75. 
501 EPA ENVIRONMENrAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 15. In addition to the 
quantitative rate of fish consumption, fish preparation and species of fish eaten also can 
affect exposure to contaminants and may vary by socioeconomic factors. Id. at 16. As part 
of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress recognized that uniform 
technology-based pollution control standards did not adequately address the problem of 
toxic hot-spots and enacted legislation requiring states to adopt "individual control 
strategies." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(C) (1988); Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic 
Pollutants Under the Qean Water Act, [21 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,528, 10,547-48 (Sept. 1991). 
51 1 EPA ENVIRONMENrAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 15. 
52Id. 
53 See Mank, supra note 18, at 336 n.341 (citing Pollution Targeted: Protection of 
Poor, Minorities Ordered, CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb. 12, 1993, at A3). 
54 There are uncertainties about whether risks applicable to the average white male in 
the United States apply to members of minorities who may eat different foods or prepare the 
same food in different ways, may have a high incidence of substance abuse, and may be 
frequently exposed to toxins in the workplace. 1 EPA ENVIRONMENrAL EQUITY REPoRT, 
supra note 27, at 3,22; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806; Mank, supra note 18, at 282,336-
37; Colopy, supra note 18, at 137-39. According to the EPA, there is reason to believe that 
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B. Market Dynamics and Evidence Contradicting the Discrimination 
Hypothesis 
1. Market Dynamics 
Professor Vicki Been observes that most studies supporting the 
environmental inequity hypothesis compare the current socioeconomic 
characteristics of communities that host locally undesirable land uses to those of 
areas that do not host such undesirables.55 She argues that these studies do not 
account for the possibility that the sites were chosen fairly in the sense that 
there was no disproportionate effect upon the poor or people of color at the 
time the sites were chosen, and that subsequent events attributable to market 
dynamics produced the current disproportionate siting by leading poor people 
to move toward a noxious site when property values fell. 56 Professor Been re-
examined a subgroup of the sites that were the subject of Professor Bullard's 
1983 study and found that the facilities in Houston were sited somewhat 
disproportionately in poor or minority communities, but that after the sitings, 
the levels of poverty and the percentages of African-Americans increased, and 
the property values in the neighborhoods declined. 57 On the other hand, 
Professor Been's extension of the General Accounting Office study of four 
hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United States found a correlation 
between neighborhood demographics and initial siting decisions, but no 
evidence that market dynamics are leading the poor or people of color to 
"several population groups identified as being sensitive to the health effects of air pollution 
seem to be disproportionately composed of low-income or racial minority individuals 
compared to the general population." 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 
27, at 22; see also Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806. 
55 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1384-85; see also Lazarus, supra note 
1, at 802 n.56 (stating that the United Church of Christ study relied on present demographic 
data); James T. Hamilton, Politics and Sodal Costs: Estimating the Impact on Collective 
Action on Hazardous Waste Sites, 24 RAND J. ECON. 101, 110 (1993) (examining initial 
siting versus subsequent developments). 
56 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1385-92. 
57 Professor Been eliminated data about unpermitted municipal landfills and 
incinerators that had ceased to operate by the 1970s and thus avoided "double-counting" 
problems in Professor Bullard's study. Id. at 1400-01. But see Robert D. Bullard, A New 
"Chicken-or-Egg" Debate: Which Came First-The Neighborhood, or the Toxic Dump?, 19 
THE WORKBOOK, Summer 1994, at 60-61 (challenging Been's exclusion of sites included in 
his earlier study). Professor Been used census tracts as the unit of analysis whereas 
Professor Bullard relied on his own "ethnographic" study and "field observations" to define 
the "neighborhoods" surrounding the sites even if the census tract data indicated that an 
area was predominantly white. Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1401 n.72. 
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"come to the nuisance."58 
Part VI of this Article proposes a new approach to compensation that 
addresses the concerns of both residents present during the initial siting 
decision and those who later move to the area as a result of market dynamics 
and other factors. 
2. Evidence Suggesting No Significant Racial Disparities 
Some commentators have challenged claims that plants specializing in the 
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste are more apt to be found in 
minority neighborhoods. In 1994, University of Massachusetts researchers 
released a study that examined 550 hazardous waste treatment, storage, and 
disposal facilities across the country and concluded that the census tracts in 
which these facilities were located generally did not have a greater number of 
minority residents.59 Some studies since the National Law Journal report6o 
have found no evidence of prosecutorial discrimination in the enforcement of 
environmental laws or even higher fines in poor and minority neighborhoods.61 
58 Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1398-1400, 1405. 
59 See generally Douglas Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Environmental 
Equity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REv. 123 (1994). While the United 
Church of Christ study looked at affected areas by zip codes, the University of 
Massachusetts study broke up the neighborhoods by census tracts. Id. at 127-29, 131. 
Charles Lee, coordinator of the United Church of Christ study, and Robert Bullard have 
each questioned the significance of the University of Massachusetts study, in part because 
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., the world's largest waste disposal company, provided 
funding. See Bullard, supra note 57, at 61 (criticizing University of Massachusetts study 
because of industry funding and failure to include nonmetropolitan sites such as Emelle, 
Alabama and Kettleman City, California facilities); Two Reports Dispute Qaims That Siting 
of Conunercial Facilities Discriminatory, [24 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 
2100, 2101 (Apr. 15, 1994) (reporting Charles Lee's criticism of University of 
Massachusetts study). 
60 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
61 See, e.g., John A. Bird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of SuperfUnd, 
12 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMf. 323, 337 (1993) (finding no relationship between pace at 
which sites are cleaned up and host county's socioeconomic characteristics); Colopy, supra 
note 18, at 131-32 n.17. Colopy cites an unpublished May 26, 1993 study by the 
Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources of 80 
hazardous waste sites in Georgia from 1984 through March 1993, which examined the race 
of residents living within one-half mile of these sites and found that fines were higher in 
both minority and poor neighborhoods. The average fine was $33,844 in white areas and 
$45,626 in minority areas, and fines collected in areas with an annual household income of 
less than $20,000 were twice as large as the fines collected in areas with incomes over 
$30,000. 
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C. Some Disparities Probably Exist 
It is difficult to assess precisely the extent to which environmental 
inequities exist. The government's records contain conflicting information even 
on the location of hazardous waste sites.62 One cannot necessarily equate the 
siting of toxic sites with actual exposure to toxic releases.63 Moreover, society 
has only a limited scientific understanding of the relationship between exposure 
to toxic chemicals and the development of disease.64 Although some studies 
have found no evidence of disparities in the siting of hazardous facilities, it is 
difficult to discount the more numerous studies finding such evidence.65 
In 1992, an EPA working group issued its "Environmental Equity" 
report,66 which surveyed and evaluated pre-existing data regarding the extent to 
which minorities may bear a disproportionate share of environmental risks67 
and concluded that "available information suggests that racial minorities may 
have a greater potenJial for exposure to some pollutants because they tend to 
live in urban areas, are more likely to live near a waste site, or exhibit a greater 
tendency to rely on subsistence fishing for dietary protein. "68 
Despite the conflicting evidence, there is enough evidence of environmental 
inequities to support policies designed to reduce such disparities. It is important 
to understand, however, that polluting or disposal facilities bring benefits as 
well as risks and that siting disparities should not be reduced at the expense of 
jobs or the opportunity to earn compensation from developers in a fair and 
well-informed compensation process. 
III. SITING, COMPENSATION, AND PUBUC PARTICIPATION 
States are generally free to locate solid and hazardous waste sites where 
they wish without much federal supervision.69 Environmental justice 
62 See Lavelle, supra note 3, at 12. An April 28, 1994 report by the EPA stated that a 
preliminary analysis of 300 Superfund sites showed a "slightly" higher-than-average 
minority population in the communities around those sites. [d. 
63 See infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text. 
64 See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text. 
65 See supra notes 32-38, 41, 45-54 and accompanying text. 
66 1-2 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27. 
67 The report did not provide any new research on this issue. See 2 EPA 
ENVIRONMENTALEQurryREPORT, supra note 27, at 107 (comments of Professor Robert D. 
Bullard). 
68 2 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 15. 
69 The Resources Conservation and Recovery Act gives states primary siting 
responsibility and authorizes them to initiate their own hazardous waste programs. See 42 
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commentators have argued that state siting processes often neglect minority 
interests.70 Several proposed bills in Congress would limit the siting discretion 
of states and impose siting restrictions designed to protect minorities.71 
One possible approach to reduce siting disparities would involve having the 
federal government police a state's political process to insure that minorities are 
adequately represented in the political process under the Voting Rights Act,72 
but current efforts along those lines have not eliminated controversy about 
disproportionate siting of undesirable land uses in minority areas. This Article 
proposes a more focused approach to improve the representation of high-risk 
and minority groups in the siting process. 
Many developers of solid or hazardous waste facilities pay compensation to 
local communities, and several states require such compensation.73 There are 
several different ways to pay compensation.74 Greater attention needs to be 
paid to how compensation is distributed among neighbors of a facility. Siting 
and compensation legislation raises broader issues about the relative role 
experts in administrative agencies and the general public should play in such 
matters. 
A. Current Siting Law and Proposed Environmental Justice Reforms 
In part because of pollution prevention and source reduction efforts, earlier 
projections of a shortage of hazardous waste facilities have given way to the 
U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988); Edward P. Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of 
Racism, Environmental Discrimination, and the Argwnent for Modernizing Equal Protection 
Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REv. 937, 971-73 (1993). 
70 See generally Boyle, supra note 70, at 971-79; Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying 
Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 403-08 (1991); Audrey Wright, Comment, 
Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Reviewing the Evidence on 
Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 
1725, 1731-38 (1993) (noting that states seek to limit ability oflocal communities to block 
siting of hazardous waste facilities and that minority communities often lack resources to 
stage successful protest against developers). 
71 See infra notes 115, 119-54 and accompanying text. 
72 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988); LAN! GUINlER, THE TYRANNY OF THE 
MAJORITY: FuNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (discussing 
different approaches to achieve genuine minority participation and representation in 
democracy); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Questfor Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1643 (1993) (arguing current judicial doctrines are 
inadequate to control partisan misuse of the reapportionment process). 
73 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. 
74 See infra notes 170-87 and accompanying text. 
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problem of excess capacity for at least the near future. 75 Even in an era of 
excess hazardous waste capacity, however, some new facilities are needed to 
meet demand or replace old, substandard, leaking disposal units,76 and there is 
still a serious problem in siting high- or low-level radioactive waste disposal 
sites.77 
"[E]ven new, 'state-of-the-art' [hazardous waste] facilities pose real 
environmental hazards, "78 and the public is often unwilling to bear the risks of 
new facilities despite their benefits. A powerful Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) 
movement has developed.79 Increasingly, local communities have used their 
zoning and environmental ordinances to exclude locally undesirable land use 
projects, and state governments sometimes oppose controversial national or 
regional projects.80 In some cases, local communities are likely to oppose the 
siting of locally undesirable land uses that have net positive benefits because 
"[s]iting of noxious facilities tends to concentrate costs within an area 
proximate to the site while providing diffuse benefits over a wide area. "81 
75 See generally Jeff Bailey, Slump at Hazardous-Waste Dumps Raises Concerns, 
WALL Sr. J., Aug. 5, 1994, at B3 (noting that declining demand for hazardous waste 
disposal space between 1992 and 1994 has led to overcapacity but that there will continue to 
be a market for such landfills); Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of 
Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived 
Crisis, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1047, 1050-55 & passim (1994) (arguing that the "shortage of 
disposal facilities is actually far less severe and more localized than usually portrayed" but 
proposing an approach to facilitate siting of needed facilities); National Capacity for Waste 
Management SlfIficient Through 2013, Drqft Report Says, [25 Current Developments] Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1473, 1473-74 (Nov. 25, 1994) (discussing EPA draft report indicating excess 
hazardous waste capacity through the year 2013). 
76 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1050-55. 
77 See generally Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It TIme to Pay 
Attention?, 21 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 787, 800-10 (1994); Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1074-
83. 
78 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1054. 
79 See generally Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY. and the Problem of 
Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENVI'L. AFF. L. REv. 437 (1988); Bradford C. Mank, The 
Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Qeaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic 
Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 B.C. ENVI'L. AFF. L. REv. 239, 272-85 
(discussing NIMBY problem and possible solutions); Peter Margulies, Building 
Communities of Virtue: Political Theory, Land Use Policy, and the "Not In My Backyardn 
Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSEL. REv. 945 (1992). 
80 See generally Been, supra note 77, at 800-08 (discussing Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act and actual results); Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1162 (noting that state 
governments often block siting of hazardous or radioactive waste facilities even when local 
residents are willing to accept them); Mank, supra note 79, at 272-85. 
81 DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAzARDOUS WASTE FAcn..rrlES: 
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NIMBY opposition is much more likely to block disposal facilities that employ 
relatively few people than to stop the siting of polluting factories that pose 
equal or greater dangers but employ more people.82 
On the other hand, urban governments, whether led by whites or 
minorities, must compete to keep business from relocating to suburban areas 
and therefore have little power to reject any business that promises more tax 
revenues or jobs, even if it is environmentally risky.83 The economic 
constraints on urban politics, including the ability to impose land use exactions 
or require compensation for the siting of undesirable land uses, are structural 
and derive from the multiplicity of local governments and the mobility of 
people and businesses.84 Urban sites, however, tend to be more expensive than 
rural sites, especially because many urban sites are already contaminated from 
prior use and must be remediated before they can be reused, but there have 
been recent efforts to facilitate inner-city site cleanup as a way to create jobs in 
urban areas.85 In addition, impoverished rural areas, including many with 
significant minority populations, may be attractive, low-cost sites for hazardous 
LocAL OpPOSmON AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 167 (1982) (advocating use of 
compensation to local communities to overcome inequities); see also Been, supra note 77, 
at 789-90; Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1153. In other cases, local communities may have an 
incentive to allow environmentally risky development in fragile "critical areas," such as 
coastal zones, shorelands, and wetlands. Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1153 n.677. "These are 
areas where the benefits of development, in terms of new jobs or an expanded tax base, will 
be enjoyed by local residents, while the environmental losses will be felt statewide." 
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REv. 1,65 (1990). 
82 On-site storage of nuclear or hazardous waste by nuclear power plants and chemical 
companies usually generates little controversy because of familiarity, absence of 
transportation risk, and the fact that the firms often create significant employment 
opportunities; by contrast, off-site facilities tend not to create many jobs and therefore are 
less able to mobilize local support. See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1146-48; see also Been, 
Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044 (discussing difficulties in balancing employment gains to 
residents against damages to residents). 
83 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REv. 346, 409-12 (1990). 
84 See generally Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: 
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506-28 
(1991) (discussing competition as a constraint on government); Briffault, supra note 83, at 
399-403 (discussing Tiebout hypothesis that the large number of local governments and the 
relative ease of individual movement from one locality to another fosters efficiency); 
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416-18 
(1956) (same). 
85 See generally James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Qeanup and Inner 
QtyJobs: Indiana's Urban In-Fill Incentives, 11 YALEJ. ON REG. 43 (1994). 
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waste facilities, may desperately need jobs at any cost, and therefore may be at 
risk for exploitation.86 
States have set up hazardous waste management programs to either 
overcome or bypass local opposition.87 States have taken three major 
procedural approaches in siting facilities: super review, site designation, and 
local control. 88 In addition, several states have adopted compensated siting as 
part of their hazardous waste siting programs. 89 None of the current 
approaches, however, insures adequate representation for high-risk or minority 
residents. 
1. Super Review 
Under super review, the most common approach to siting hazardous 
facilities, the developer of a hazardous waste facility selects a possible site and 
applies for a permit with the authorizing agency, typically a state EPA or 
Department of Natural Resources.9o If the state EPA decides to issue a permit 
after evaluating potential environmental impacts, the state appoints a special 
administrative board whose explicit role is to allow the public to participate in 
the site selection process.91 These special siting boards usually have some 
expert or technical members and some local representatives, but the 
composition of the boards and methods for selecting local representatives vary 
from state to state.92 Often the implicit purpose of siting boards is to quell 
public opposition, minimize the issue of political expediency, and emphasize 
the safety of the proposal.93 
86 See generally Conner Bailey & Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism and avil 
Rights in Swnter County, Alabama (providing data suggesting that poor African-Americans 
in rural Alabama had no real choice in accepting Emelle Landfill in exchange for 
compensation), in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDs: A TIME FOR 
DISCOURSE 140-43 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Robert B. Wiygul et al., 
Environmental Justice in Rural Communities, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 405, 441-48 (1993) 
(discussing location of hazardous waste sites in rural Alsen, Louisiana). 
87 Godsil, supra note 70, at 403. 
88 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 403. 
89 See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
90 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Boyle, supra note 69, at 973; Godsil, supra note 70, 
at 403. 
91 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 403. 
92 See Godsil, supra note 70, at 404. See generally Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste 
Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 375, 
447-67 (1994) (proposing two separate committees, a "technical review board" containing 
members from technical fields and a "local review board" of local residents). 
93 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 403. 
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 349 
All of the states using a super review approach have preemption clauses 
that permit the siting of a facility despite community resistance.94 Attempts to 
use federal or state preemptive laws to eliminate the ability of local 
communities to oppose undesired facilities, however, often lead to more intense 
local opposition and the use of political and other extralegal means to delay a 
project until it becomes economically futile to build.95 
The super review approach may fail to prevent disparate siting because 
developers have an incentive to select sites in areas with low land values, which 
are often inhabited by the poor, especially poor minorities.96 Developers may 
avoid wealthy or politically powerful communities that can "use their informal 
connections in state government to prevent the operation of a preemption 
statute, or resort to civil disobedience. "97 
2. Site Designation 
Under the site designation approach to siting hazardous facilities, the state, 
not the private developer, creates an inventory of possible sites.98 Techniques 
for developing the inventory vary from state to state.99 Because site designation 
eliminates the developer's natural tendency to choose the least expensive site 
and provides a statewide data gathering mechanism that can inform future 
environmental decisionmaking to make sure no area is overburdened, site 
designation may lead, at least in theory, to a more equitable distribution of sites 
than does super review.loo On the other hand, states or counties may choose 
geographically unsuitable sites if they wish to avoid siting unpopular facilities 
such as a low-level radioactive waste depository, 101 or politicians from 
politically powerful communities may lobby to remove their communities from 
the list.102 In addition, the community may litigate against the facility or 
94 Collin, supra note 17, at 511; Godsil, supra note 70, at 404. 
95 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1052 (noting that opponents of facilities have 
defeated elected officials and even engaged in civil disobedience involving vandalism and 
other illegal acts); Mank, supra note 79, at 274 (noting that local officials can influence state 
legislature and that citizens may engage in civil disobedience). 
96 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 973; Godsil, supra note 70, at 405; see also Mank, 
supra note 79, at 274. 
97 Godsil, supra note 70, at 405; Boyle, supra note 69, at 973; see also Mank, supra 
note 79, at 274. 
98 Collin, supra note 17, at 512; Godsil, supra note 70, at 405-06. 
99 Collin, supra note 17, at 512; Godsil, supra note 70, at 405-06. 
100 Collin, supra note 17, at 512; Godsil, supra note 70, at 406. 
101 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1033. 
102 See Godsil, supra note 70, at 406. 
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otherwise try to delay the siting, and the prospect of such delays may lead an 
agency to choose the least politically or economically powerful community, 
which often means a poor or minority community .103 
3. Local Control 
Only two states, California and Florida, continue to apply a de jure local 
control model in which local land use regulations are not preempted by a state 
hazardous waste management plan and a local community may impose strict 
land use regulations to block any hazardous waste site.104 Politically or 
economically powerful communities, however, have exercised de facto local 
control in many cases to block or delay facilities until a developer abandoned a 
proposed site. lOS 
Community control over siting has often disproportionately benefited 
wealthy suburbs and resulted in more undesirable facilities being located in 
poor or minority neighborhoods.106 Dissatisfaction over the disparate abilities 
of communities to block the siting of locally undesirable land uses has 
contributed to the rise of the environmental justice movement.107 Wealthy or 
politically weU-organized communities may have an advantage in blocking 
projects through expensive litigation or lobbying techniques, and as a result 
such sites may be placed in less wealthy or politically powerful 
neighborhoods. lOS While there are some potential advantages to local control 
for both whites and minorities, local decisionmaking is often less representative 
or effective than is national policymaking.109 
103 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 973-74; Godsil, supra note 70, at 406. 
104 Godsil, supra note 70, at 406-07. 
lOS See supra notes 97, 102-03 and accompanying text; infra notes 106-08 and 
accompanying text. 
106 Environmental justice proponents often argue that middle-class neighborhoods have 
long blocked the siting of unwanted facilities and as a result more such facilities have been 
sited in poor and minority neighborhoods. See Cole, supra note 17, at 646-47 (arguing that 
NIMBY results in pmBY, "Place in Blacks' Back Yard"); Foster, supra note 8, at 747 
(same). 
107 See Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 71-74; Been, supra note 77, at 789. 
lOS See Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 71-74; Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 
1047-52 (discussing difficulties in free-market society (or, indeed, any society) to force 
equal allocation of society's burdens); Mank:, supra note 18, at 343. 
109 Local political control does not necessarily result in grassroots public participation. 
See Briffault, supra note 83, at 412-15,453. In theory, shifting authority to local or smaller 
units of government should enhance opportunities for public participation; however, the 
empirical evidence for that assumption is inconclusive. See ro. at 393-99 (discussing 
relationship between local governance and public participation). People in a highly mobile 
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 351 
Yet most advocates of environmental justice are in favor of greater 
community control over the siting of locally undesirable land uses.110 Many 
environmental justice advocates have suggested that the movement seeks to 
block the siting of virtually all polluting or risky facilities. 1 1 1 They believe that 
current pollution control approaches are insufficiently protective, and they 
would like to eliminate risk to the greatest extent possible.112 Eliminating all 
pollution is a politically appealing slogan, but society should reduce pollution 
only to the extent it is reasonably cost-effective to do SO.113 While 
environmental justice advocates may hope that greater community control will 
empower minority and poor neighborhoods, the results may simply be to give 
the rich more leverage over siting. 
4. Proposed Environmental Justice Siting Legislation 
Several recent proposals in Congress address alleged siting inequities. On 
the whole, they would make it more difficult to site new facilities in certain 
high-pollution or minority areas. These proposals represent a fourth approach 
to addressing siting issues. The congressional proposals generally seek to limit 
the number of sites in a particular area, but often do so through overly 
expensive moratorium strategies. These proposals fail to address the 
fundamental issue of increasing minority representation. 
In 1992, Representative Henry Waxman held the first congressional 
society work, shop, go to school, or have other important affiliations outside their 
residential jurisdiction and may not identify exclusively with that jurisdiction. Id. at 413-14. 
Many people do not identify with their residential municipality as a "community" of shared 
interests. Id. at 414. While the ideal of local community involvement and control is 
theoretically attractive, local control can result in isolation of poor areas from wealthy 
suburbs rather than empowerment of the poor. Id. at 453. 
110 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 852. 
111 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 7-8 (quoting several prominent 
environmental justice advocates whose goal is total elimination of all waste); Cole, supra 
note 17, at 644-4~ (arguing for pollution prevention by blocking the siting of new facilities); 
Foster, supra note 8, at 748-49 (suggesting NIMBY should be expanded to "Not in 
Anybody's Backyard"). 
112 See Cole, supra note 17, at 642-45 (criticizing traditional focus of environmental 
law on control of pollutants to "safe" level and arguing for preventive approach); Foster, 
supra note 8, at 741-44 (challenging EPA's use of risk assessment to address only hazards 
that present a demonstrable link between exposure and measurable health effects). 
113 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 9. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, 
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECfNE RIsK REGULATION (1993); infra notes 
402-05 and accompanying text. 
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hearing on environmental equity issues.114 A number of congressional bills 
targeting environmental justice issues are now pending.115 In the past, 
minorities were very underrepresented in Congress, especially in committees 
and subcommittees with jurisdiction over environmental issues.116 In 1992, 
however, there was a significant increase in the number of minority 
representatives elected to the House of Representatives,117 and minority 
representatives have recently become more active on environmental issues as 
environmental justice concerns have become more prominent.118 In the 1994 
elections, however, the Republican Party gained control of the House and 
Senate. Minority representatives, who are overwhelmingly Democrats, may 
lose whatever power they had recently gained. 
Proposed procedural legislation that would require the EPA to consider 
distributional impactsl19 and to gather more information about possible racial 
and class disparities120 would be advantageous, but there is no evidence the 
114 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 790 n.12 (citing Disproportionate Impact of Lead 
Poisoning on Minority Co11U7lUnities: Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on Health and the 
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Conunerce, 102<1 Cong., 2d Sess. (1992». 
115 See Catalina Camia, Poor, Minorities Want Voice in Environmental Owices, 51 
CONGo Q. 2257, 2257-60 (1993) (discussing proposed environmental justice legislation in 
Congress); Keeva, supra note 4, at 88 ("Currently [February 1994], at least nine bills 
before Congress-including the Environmental Justice Act and a bill to elevate the 
Environmental Protection Agency to Cabinet level-contain environmental justice-related 
provisions. "). 
116 See generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 820-21; supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. 
117 In 1991, there were 31 minority representatives in the House, with 26 being 
members of the congressional black caucus. See 1 1991 CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY 
(Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991). In 1992, however, the number of African-Americans in 
Congress increased to 39 with the addition of 16 new members. Jeffrey L. Katz, Growing 
Black Caucus May Have New Voice, 51 CONGo Q. 5 (1993). Voters elected nine new 
Hispanic representatives for a record total of 19, including representatives from Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. VIrgin Islands. See Ines Pinto Alicea, Hispanics Gain Members, 51 CONGo Q. 
7 (1993). 
118 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 821 nn.142-43 (discussing specific minority 
representatives). 
119 Senator Glenn and Representatives Synar and Clinger have proposed legislation to 
require the preparation of a community information statement assessing the demographic 
characteristics near proposed hazardous waste facilities. See S. 533, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 1 (1993); H.R. 495, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1993). 
120 For instance, the Environmental Health Equity Information Act of 1993 would 
have required the EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to collect 
additional data on the race, age, gender, ethnic origin, income level, and educational level 
of persons living in communities adjacent to toxic substance contamination. See H.R. 1925, 
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impact statement approach would affect the distribution of new facilities. 121 
There is the danger, however, that proposed substantive legislation will be 
overly restrictive, inefficient, and apply to areas that are not truly poor or 
significantly different in racial or ethnic composition from the rest of America. 
In 1992, Representative John Lewis, a Georgia Democrat, and Senator, 
now Vice President, AI Gore introduced similar legislation entitled the 
"Environmental Justice Act of 1992,"122 which would have required the 
identification of "environmental high impact areas" in the 100 counties or 
"other appropriate geographic unit[s]" with the highest total weight of toxic 
chemicals in the air, water, and soil during the past five years. The bills would 
have imposed, with certain exceptions, a moratorium on the siting or 
permitting of any new toxic chemical facility in an area identified as "high 
impact" under specified circumstances. l23 
Moratorium proposals are flawed because they avoid the fundamental 
question of whether a proposed facility will provide greater benefits than 
harms. It would make more sense for the EPA or a state to evaluate the siting 
of new projects on a case-by-case basis using cost-benefit analysis and scientific 
risk assessment procedures. 124 
The use in the Gore and Lewis bills of 100 environmental high-impact 
areas to trigger more agency scrutiny and to place the areas high on the EPA's 
priority list for pollution reduction is an example of appropriate congressional 
priority setting that recognizes that the EPA cannot solve every inequity 
problem immediately.l25 Focusing on counties with the heaviest pollution 
burdens is a reasonable place to start. The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments126 
divide ozone nonattainment areas into categories from marginal to extreme 
nonattainment and impose different requirements and deadlines depending upon 
the severity of the ozone pollution problem in a given area. 127 On the other 
hand, the Clean Air Act allows the siting of new sources if their increase in 
pollution is offset by an equal or greater reduction in the amount of pollution 
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993). 
121 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1071-74. 
122 H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
123 See S. 2806, supra note 122, § 9; H.R. 5326, supra note 122, § 402. 
124 See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 266, 313-15, 326-45 (proposing 
individualized "exceptions process" for granting permits to sources of hazardous air 
pollutants). 
125 See infra notes 390-92 and accompanying text (discussing priority-setting 
approaches to regulation). 
126 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511d (Supp. V 1993). 
127 There are also special provisions for moderate and serious carbon monoxide areas, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7512-7512a (Supp. V 1993), and moderate and serious PM-lO (particulate 
matter) areas, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7513-7513a (Supp. V 1993). 
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from existing sources.128 The Gore and Lewis bills would have been more 
efficient if they had allowed exceptions for offsetting or other market-based 
approaches. 
Another problem with the moratorium approach is that arbitrary 
geographical divisions such as county lines or the "other appropriate 
geographic unit[s]" in the Gore and Lewis bills may not take into account the 
population density in an area or the effects of spillover into other counties or 
states.129 A more refined approach might regulate the loo worst hot-spots 
within a smaller geographical area such as a two-mile radius,130 a census 
tract,131 or zip code area, or look at the actual risk posed by a proposed site.132 
The Gore and Lewis proposals do nothing for the area that is 101st on the list 
and indeed might create an incentive to locate in that area, which may have a 
much higher population than some areas on the top loo list.133 
The moratorium approach in the Gore and Lewis bills could prove to be 
either overly stringent or lenient because the proposed exceptions are vague. 134 
The moratorium on construction would continue until the Administrator of the 
EPA concluded that the area has achieved "health-based levels" sufficient "to 
avoid adverse impacts on human health," a vague standard that could be 
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring offset of at least 1.5 to 1 in 
"extreme" ozone nonattainment areas). 
129 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1070-71 (criticizing use of arbitrary areas in 
"dispersion" statutes); Colin Crawford, Strategies for Environmental Justice: Rethinking 
CERCLA Medical MOnitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REv. 267, 294 (1994) (criticizing use of 
arbitrary geographical areas); infra notes 363, 483-84, 533-34 and accompanying text. 
130 Even a two-mile radius can be arbitrary. See Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437. 
131 See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra notes 485-89 and accompanying text. 
133 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1070-71. 
134 The version of the Lewis bill introduced in the 103rd Congress in 1993 would have 
allowed exceptions to the moratorium only if: "(1) the need for the activity is shown to the 
Secretary [of Health and Human Services]; (2) the owner or operator of the facility 
demonstrates that the facility will develop a plan and maintain a comprehensive pollution 
prevention program; and (3) the facility demonstrates that it will minimize uncontrolled 
releases into the environment." H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1993); see 
Crawford, supra note 129, at 294 (arguing that exceptions under Environmental Justice Act 
may "give companies considerable leeway that may permit future siting of facilities in poor 
communities of color" and that hazardous waste managers will vigorously pursue 
exceptions). The legislation introduced in 1992 did not contain exception (2) for 
comprehensive pollution prevention. See S. 2806, supra note 122, § 10; H.R. 5326, supra 
note 122, § 403. Exceptions or emissions trading may pose their own dangers through the 
creation of hot-spots and should be carefully regulated. See supra notes 27-29, 31 and 
accompanying text. 
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impossible to achieve given the nonthreshold nature of many carcinogens.135 
In 1993, Senator Baucus and Representative Lewis reintroduced legislation 
entitled the "Environmental Justice Act. "136 The Baucus proposal was more 
flexible than the moratorium approach in the Gore and Lewis bills. Under the 
Baucus proposal, a new or modified facility would have been able to obtain a 
permit if there were "a net reduction in the release of any toxic chemical 
determined to cause such significant adverse impacts on human health in that 
area. "137 The Baucus bill would have been more efficient than the Gore and 
Lewis bills because it would have allowed a source to offset increases in the 
emissions of a pollutant with reductions from another source. 138 One potential 
objection is that offsetting would not address potential hot-spots within a small 
area in the county, but neither the Gore nor the Lewis proposals addressed that 
issue. 
Representative Collins sponsored the Environmental Equal Rights Act of 
1993,139 which would have amended Subtitle G of the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act140 to allow petitions to be submitted to prevent certain waste facilities from 
being constructed in environmentally disadvantaged communities-defined as 
(1) those areas within two miles of the site that already have at least one active 
or inactive hazardous waste facility and have a higher percentage of minorities 
135 See H.R. 2105, supra note 134, §§ 401(5), 403. Congress should avoid the use of 
unattainable health-based standards like "adverse impacts on human health" and instead 
aspire to reduce pollution until there is no statistically significant risk to a human 
subpopulation group. See infra notes 363-74 and accompanying text. At the individual plant 
level, the Gore and Lewis proposals recognize the need to trigger the moratorium only at a 
significant threshold of risk. The moratorium would apply only to sources emitting "toxic 
chemicals in quantities found to cause significant adverse impacts on human health." H.R. 
2105, supra note 134, § 403. Realistically, an area would have a better chance of escaping 
such a moratorium if it is dropped from the top 100 list when the list is revised every five 
years than achieving the no "adverse impacts on human health" standard. See id. § 102 
(requiring revision and repUblication of list of environmental high-impact areas every five 
years). 
136 S. 1161, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2105, supra note 134; see Legislation 
Would Require Emission Freezes in 100 Most-Polluted Areas of U.s., Baucus Says, [24 
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 392 (July 2, 1993). 
137 S. 1161, supra note 136, § 6. 
138 The Bush Administration adopted on a limited basis an even more favorable 
approach to business, involving emissions-averaging of different hazardous air pollutants. 
But there are serious methodological problems with comparing the toxicity of different types 
of toxic chemicals such as carcinogens and noncarcinogens. See Mank, supra note 18, at 
284-88. 
139 H.R. 1924, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
140 Pub. L. No. 94-580, §§ 7001-7009, 90 Stat. 2795, 2824-28 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971n-6979b (1988». 
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than the state or national average, or (2) areas that have twenty percent or more 
persons below the poverty line or a per capita income of eighty percent or less 
of the national average.141 The bill would have required an administrative law 
judge to hold a public hearing and grant a petition seeking the prohibition of a 
facility unless the judge found that there were no less risky alternative sites in 
the state and that the proposed facility would not release contaminants or 
increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on any residents of the 
environmentally disadvantaged community .142 
The Collins proposal should be rejected because it does not require 
consideration of the relative costs and benefits of a proposed facility. Indeed, a 
single challenger could block a project that is overwhelmingly popular.143 A 
judge or agency should be able to block the siting of a proposed project only if 
it poses a discernible risk to a statistically significant subpopulation and if the 
costs, as measured by conservative but realistic risk assessment procedures, 
outweigh the benefits to that subpopulation.l44 
The Collins proposal was both more and less inclusive than the 1992 
Environmental Justice Act proposals because it would have potentially covered 
a much larger area of the country rather than concentrated resources on a 
relatively small number of high-impact areas, but would have applied to only a 
two-mile radius rather than to an entire county .145 The Collins bill did not 
protect communities without any facilities or against the expansion of existing 
ones. l46 Furthermore, the bill did not require an examination of relative risk 
before designating a community as an environmentally disadvantaged area and 
did not require that the percentage of the minority or poor population be 
significantly higher than the national average.147 Nor was there any 
141 See H.R. 1924, supra note 139, § 3. 
142 See itl. § 3(a). Crawford argues that the lack of criteria for determining whether 
alternative locations may be acceptable would allow firms to obtain siting waivers based on 
the argument that the site has unique geographical characteristics. See Crawford, supra note 
129, at 295. Similarly, Crawford worries that there are no standards for whether a proposed 
facility releases contaminants or will increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on a 
community. [d. While Crawford worries that the lack of standards will make it too easy to 
site new facilities, their absence will probably make it more difficult to site new facilities. 
143 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at II. 
144 See infra notes 363-74,402-07 and accompanying text. 
145 A two-mile radius is a better test for determining which residents are at high risk 
than is a county-wide criterion, but even a two-mile radius is a rather arbitrary measure 
compared to an actual site-specific risk assessment. See Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437 
(criticizing use of arbitrary two-mile radius). 
146 See itl. 
147 See generally Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1084 (criticizing Collins proposal 
for ignoring relative burden imposed by proposed site and for limiting remedy to poor and 
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requirement that the challenger be personally at risk.148 Finally, only citizens 
residing in the state where the new facility would be sited would have been able 
to object,149 which might have further encouraged the "state line syndrome," 
in which waste disposal facilities are proposed for political subdivisions 
bordering another state. ISO 
Collins also was a co-sponsor of the Pollution Prevention and Incineration 
Alternatives Act of 1993, which would have prohibited the siting of new solid 
waste incinerators until 1997.151 Beginning in 1997, applicants would have had 
to meet numerous requirements, including a "demonstrat[ion] that the location 
of the facility will not have a disproportionate impact on minority or low-
income communities. "152 A ban on all incinerators until some arbitrary date is 
unwise because such a moratorium is inefficient unless there are exceptions for 
new sources to replace existing sources.1S3 The proposed Act does not define 
critical terms such as "disproportionate impact" and "minority or low-income 
communities." These terms can have widely divergent meanings. IS4 
A more flexible approach to siting regulation is needed than has emerged 
from Congress. Because hazardous waste facilities can provide greater benefits 
than costs, it makes more sense to require proportionate compensation for a 
facility's externalities than to ban all new facilities. The proposed legislation 
does not grapple very well with the complex problem of balancing public 
participation with expert decisionmaking. 
B. The Compensation Approach 
Commentators have proposed various ways in which a developer might 
provide compensation as a means to win public approval of new facilities by 
making the benefits of the facility outweigh the costs. ISS Because locally 
minority neighborhoods when evidence does not support racial or class-based prejudice). 
148 See BoERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 11. 
149 H.R. 1924, supra note 139, § 3(a). 
ISO See Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437-38. 
151 H.R. 2488, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1993). 
IS2Id. 
153 See supra notes 130, 139-40 and accompanying text. 
154 See infra notes 363-65, 371-74 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in 
defining race, ethnicity, and geographical boundaries); infra notes 386-401, 482-93 and 
accompanying text (discussing complexities associated with defining risk to community). 
155 See Been, supra note 77, at 789-91 (discussing justifications for compensation 
proposals); Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1196-99 (proposing reverse auction in which 
developer bids to pay community to accept new hazardous waste facility); Herbert Inhaber, 
Of LULUs, NIMBYs, NIMIOOs, 107 PuB. INTEREST 52, 60-63 (1992) (proposing a 
"reverse Dutch auction," in which government or industry would raise compensation until a 
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undesirable land uses typically concentrate costs in one community while 
providing benefits to a much larger area, proponents argue that compensation is 
an equitable solution where it would be impractical to equitably distribute risks 
physically or spatially, and that compensation can make siting decisions more 
efficient by forcing the facility's developer to internalize the cost of the 
facility .156 While compensation at first blush may appear to be the equivalent 
of a bribe and to pose dangers to political minorities, compensation is 
consistent with the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause if minorities are 
adequately represented in the negotiation process. 157 
It is now common for solid waste firms to pay compensation to site 
landfills and incinerators, although it is not clear whether such programs have 
solved the shortage of disposal space in some areas of the country .158 Several 
states have begun to require that developers of hazardous waste facilities pay 
compensation to host communities in an effort to eliminate local opposition.159 
Compensation programs have had a mixed record of success,160 but they may 
still be the best approach to induce communities to accept otherwise undesirable 
land uses.161 Studies show that risks that a community assumes voluntarily are 
more likely to be accepted than those imposed upon a community .162 
By "voluntary," proponents of compensation generally mean that a 
municipality's political leadership or a majority of its voters have accepted a 
proposed project. Some environmental justice advocates believe that no 
hazardous waste project is safe and that acceptance by a poor or minority 
community is involuntary when induced by incentives.163 Under the proposal 
in Part VI of this Article, compensation in exchange for siting an undesirable 
community volunteered to accept an otherwise environmentally unacceptable facility); 
Mank, supra note 79, at 241, 274-77, 282-85 (discussing use of compensation to site 
facilities and proposing risk substitution approach, in which developer remediates 
contaminated site in exchange for building new, safer facility). 
156 See Been, supra note 77, at 791. 
157 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 428, 497 and accompanying 
text. 
158 See Been, supra note 77, at 822-23. 
159 See id. at 794-95 nn.45-47 (citing state compensation statutes); Godsil, supra note 
73, at 407-08; infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing whether compensation 
actually reduces public opposition). 
160 The use of compensation to induce communities to volunteer to site low-level 
radioactive waste disposal facilities has generally been unsuccessful. See Been, supra note 
77, at 800-08. 
161 See id. at 824. 
162 Been, supra note 77, at 791-92 n.24 (citing sources). 
163 See Cole, supra note 17, at 642-45 (arguing that pollution prevention, rather than 
safety, should be the goal); Bailey & Faupel, supra note 86, at 140-43. 
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project may be accepted if minorities and high-risk residents are adequately 
represented in the siting negotiation process. 
The effectiveness of compensated siting programs varies because whether a 
developer is successful in siting a facility often depends on particular local 
circumstances. 164 There has been controversy about how effective 
compensation is at changing the minds of those who are initially opposed to a 
facility. Some public opinion surveys suggest that compensation may make 
potential neighbors more willing to accept hazardous waste facilities. Professor 
Been believes that "at least those compensation methods that guarantee local 
monitoring and control may sway a significant number of people to accept a 
facility. The studies also suggest that while compensation measures may not be 
sufficient to secure acceptance, they nevertheless may be necessary to gain 
sufficient support for the facility. "165 Michael Gerrard, however, believes that 
surveys suggesting that compensation can overcome public safety fears "do not 
seem to be translated into actual behavior. "166 
In an earlier article, the author suggested that beyond simply providing 
compensation, developers need to convince the local public about the overall 
safety of a project so that the community does not perceive the compensation as 
a bribe. 167 Gerrard argues that "compensation works when, and only when, the 
community does not believe the proposed facility poses an undue hazard."168 
Creating representation procedures that allow those at greatest risk to negotiate 
the terms of compensation may be crucial in convincing a community to accept 
a project. 169 The proposal in Part VI of this Article addresses the need for both 
compensation and special safety measures designed to reduce public fears. 
Residents at greatest risk must have the most input into the siting or cleanup 
decisionmaking. To protect the public safety and prevent exploitation of 
vulnerable groups, the EPA or a state siting agency should set minimum health 
standards and levels of compensation. 
1. Remedial, Preventive, and Incentive Compensation 
Compensation may serve as a remedy to make a community whole for 
damages it will suffer as a result of a facility, as a preventive measure to reduce 
the harm the facility will cause, or as a reward to the community for accepting 
164 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1209-10. 
165 Been, supra note 77, at 800. 
166 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1155 n.692. 
167 See ManIc, supra note 79, at 675. 
168 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1155. 
169 See infra notes 458-75 and accompanying text. 
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the facility by providing benefits in excess of a make-whole remedy)7o A 
developer might compensate neighbors by agreeing to pay, either monetarily or 
in-kind, for any decrease in the market value of their homes caused by the 
facility.l71 Preventive measures might include buffer zones between a facility 
and its residential neighbors,l72 monitoring equipment or leakage barriers 
beyond that required by law, or additional emergency equipment.173 Rewards, 
which are sometimes referred to as incentives, might include the payment of 
taxes or a percentage of the facility's gross or net profits to the host 
municipality .174 
2. Ex Ante, Ongoing, and Ex Post Compensation 
Compensation may be ex ante, before the facility is constructed; ongoing; 
or ex post, after the facility causes harm.175 Ex ante grants might be technical 
assistance grants from the developer or the government to allow a host 
community or citizens group to hire its own experts to evaluate the proposed 
facility.176 The author and others have discussed a special form of ex ante 
compensation, risk substitution, in which a developer would clean up all or 
some of a community's existing toxic waste sites in exchange for approval of 
the new facility .177 Ex ante compensation can redress injuries suffered by those 
170 See MORELL & MAOORIAN, supra note 81, at 164-75; Been, supra note 77, at 792; 
ManIc, supra note 79, at 276-77. 
171 See Been, supra note 77, at 792; Bernard Holznagel, Negotiation and Mediation: 
The Newest Approach to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 13 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 
329, 356 (1986) (arguing that a developer might compensate for loss of recreational land by 
providing other land); Mank, supra note 79, at 276. Guaranteeing property values, 
however, can be very expensive, and developers are likely to place limits on their liability. 
See ManIc, supra note 79, at 276. 
172 See Bradford C. ManIc, Preventi.ng Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk 
Index Taxes, 53 Omo ST. L.r. 761, 763-64, 781-91, 802-04 (1992) (proposing use of 
buffer zones to minimize consequences of catastrophic releases of extremely hazardous 
chemicals). 
173 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93; Mank, supra note 79, at 276. 
174 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93; ManIc, supra note 79, at 276-77. 
175 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93. 
176 See iff. at 793; ManIc, supra note 18, at 340-43 (proposing expanded technical 
assistance grants to citizen groups). 
177 See KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAzARDous WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES: THE 
NIMBY SYNDROME 137-59 (1991) (proposing existing risky facilities such as chemical 
plants, ammunition factories, and nuclear power plants be purchased, shut down, and 
replaced by new hazardous waste sites posing equal risk); Mank, supra note 79, at 282-85. 
But see Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1163-64 (arguing that for psychological reasons people 
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present at the time of the initial siting decision but cannot address injuries that 
will be suffered subsequent to the siting.178 
Ongoing compensation often takes the form of special taxes or fees the 
facility regularly pays to the community, or services the facility regularly 
provides the community .179 Ongoing measures may include mitigation of a 
facility's negative impacts and benefits to the local economy, such as jobs for 
local residents, purchases from local businesses, or contributions to charity .180 
Ongoing benefits may take the form of continuing opportunities for community 
participation in the management of the facility, such as site monitoring, 
deciding whether to close a facility, emergency response questions, or 
representation on the facility's governing board.181 Ongoing compensation can 
at least partially redress injuries suffered by persons who move to a community 
after the initial siting process. 182 
Ex post compensation may include commitments to pay for, or insure 
against, future damages through property value guarantees,183 indemnification 
agreements, or funds to compensate victims in the case of an accident. 184 
Firms, however, may have an incentive to under-insure or to under-capitalize 
against future accidents, especially if bankruptcy laws limit their liability, and 
there is some empirical evidence that hazardous waste firms do SO.185 Current 
insurance and financial responsibility requirements tend to be inadequate to 
are unlikely to accept the trade of an old risk for a new one, and that if people are 
concerned about an existing risk, they may demand that it be abated regardless of any plans 
for new facilities); Stephen T. Washington & Robert H. Harris, Necessary Evils, 8 IssUES 
SCI. & TEcH. 86, 87 (1991) (reviewing PORTNEY, supra, and arguing that risk substitution 
may devote resources to cleanups that are not the most socially desirable). My earlier article 
emphasized the difficulties of inducing people to accept new risks in exchange for any form 
of compensation, cautioned that a number of different compensation approaches should be 
tried, and bluntly stated that risk substitution would fail in many cases. See Mank, supra 
note 79, at 272-85. There are no panaceas for siting locally undesirable land uses. Because 
not all proposed facilities ought to be sited, the fact that psychological factors may lead 
some attempts at risk substitution to fail does not mean that my proposal cannot be 
successful on other occasions. 
178 See infra notes 179-87,500-19 and accompanying text. 
179 See Been, supra note 77, at 793; Mank, supra note 79, at 276-77. 
180 See Been, supra note 77, at 792-93; Mank, supra note 79, at 276-77. 
181 See Been, supra note 77, at 794. 
182 See infra note 516 and accompanying text. 
183 See Mank, supra note 79, at 276 (noting that developers are often reluctant to 
provide full property value insurance). 
184 See Been, supra note 77, at 794. 
185 See Mank, supra note 172, at 791-95. 
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force firms to fully internalize the risks posed by hazardous substances. 186 
Nevertheless, appropriate ex post compensation can redress injuries that occur 
long after the initial siting decision.187 
3. Procedures for Detennining Compensation 
There are at least five major ways in which a state may determine 
compensation: (1) legislative formulas, (2) administrative determinations, (3) 
negotiations, (4) reverse auctions, and (5) lotteries.188 First, a legislature can 
establish a formula such as Indiana's tax of $11.50 per ton on commercial 
hazardous waste facilities, twenty-five percent of which goes to the host 
county.189 There is a serious question, however, whether legislative formulas 
based upon a fixed percentage of receipts are flexible enough to adapt to 
varying circumstances190 or to compensate those individuals most at risk from 
a facility .191 
Second, a statute could authorize a statewide siting board to make a case-
by-case administrative determination of the amount of compensation.192 It is 
186 See id. at 796-97; Steven W. Black, Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Financial 
Responsibility for Hazardous Waste Management, 17 ECOLOGYL.Q. 581, 581, 584 (1990). 
187 See infra notes 517-19 and accompanying text. 
188 See MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PuBLIC OpPOSmoN 84-86 
(1983) (discussing legislative formulas, administrative determinations, and negotiations); 
Been, supra note 77, at 794-95 (discussing all five); HoIznagel, supra note 171, at 373-74 
(discussing legislative formulas and negotiations); Mank, supra note 79, at 243-84 
(discussing legislative formulas, administrative determinations, and negotiations). 
189 See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-6-6.6-2, -3 (West 1989); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 22A-128 (limit of 2.5% of quarterly gross receipts over $2,500,000) (West 1985); 
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 68.178(3) (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1994) (county may levy up to 
5% of gross receipts of hazardous waste facility); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1319-
R(4) (West Supp. 1994) (host municipality may levy up to 2% of a commercial hazardous 
waste facility's annual billings). 
190 See O'HARE ET AL., supra note 188, at 84-85; Mank, supra note 79, at 277. 
191 See infra notes 480-520 and accompanying text. 
192 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-11 (West 1990) (administrative body may 
assess fee to hazardous waste facility if it determines that facility creates a need to educate 
and train local officials and employees regarding emergency response measures); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-80 (West Supp. 1994) (host municipality may levy up to 5% of 
receipts of hazardous waste facility, but amount may be increased or decreased by 
administrative agency); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-152.1 (1991) (host county may levy tax 
on hazardous waste facility to compensate for additional costs it incurs as a result of facility, 
but facility may appeal to administrative body and to courts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-
211.1 (1994) (host city may levy tax on hazardous waste facility to compensate for 
additional costs it incurs as a result of facility, but facility may appeal to administrative body 
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difficult, however, for the government to set values in the absence of a free 
market, and administrative determinations may involve high transaction 
costs. 193 
Third, the facility developer and community can negotiate a mutually 
satisfactory paclcage.194 A key question is how to elect representatives to serve 
on a negotiation committee. Part ill(C)(2) of this Article discusses current 
approaches to electing representatives, and Part VI proposes a more equitable 
representation process. 
A fourth approach to determining compensation is to auction the facility to 
the community willing to accept the least compensation.195 Herbert Inhaber has 
proposed a reverse auction system in which a siting authority announces the 
facility it wishes to site, the environmental and safety criteria it will use to 
determine appropriate sites, and its initial bid for the site.196 Any community 
that believes it has an appropriate site and wishes to accept the siting 
authority's bid may offer the site for consideration. If no community steps 
forward, the siting authority continues to raise its bid until the facility would no 
longer be cost-effective or until a community steps forward, whichever comes 
first. If a community accepts a bid, some percentage of the compensation is 
transferred to a trust fund for the community, where it is held until the 
proffered site is approved on environmental and safety grounds. If the siting 
authority disapproves a site, the trust fund returns the monies to the developer 
and the auction continues.l97 
Reverse auctions are inadequate because they do not address how 
compensation should be distributed among individuals, whether the 
compensation should be used for remedial or preventive purposes, or whether 
the compensation should be ex ante, ongoing, or ex post. To prevent poor 
communities that may lack the technical expertise to evaluate a facility from 
and to courts); see Been, supra note 77, at 794; Mank, supra note 79, at 277. 
193 See O'HAREET AL., supra note 188, at 85: Mank, supra note 79, at 277. 
194 See. e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22A-128 CWest 1985): MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 299.520(6) CWest Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.191(5) CWest Supp. 
1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19.7-8 (1989): VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1442 (Michie 1993); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(8) CWest 1989); see O'HARE ET AL., supra note 188, at 85-86; 
Been, supra note 77, at 794-95; Holznagel, supra note 171, at 374; Mank, supra note 79, 
at 277. 
195 See. e.g., Been, supra note 77, at 795; Herbert Inhaber, A Market-Based Solution 
to the Problem of Nuclear and Toxic Waste Disposal, 41 J. AIR & WftSfE MGMf. Ass'N 
808, 812-15 (1991); Howard Kunreuther et al., A Compensation Medumism for Siting 
Noxious Fadlities: Theory and Experimental Design, 14 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMf. 371, 
375 (1987). 
196 Inhaber, supra note 155, at 60-62; Inhaber, supra note 195, at 811-13. 
197 Inhaber, supra note 155, at 60-62; Inhaber, supra note 195, at 811-13. 
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being exploited, the EPA or a state agency should require a minimum level of 
compensation,198 and the developer or government should provide technical 
assistance grants to communities to enhance their ability to evaluate the risks 
and benefits of a proposed facility .199 
Fifth, economist Arthur M. Sullivan has proposed a lottery scheme in 
which the siting government asks all citizens in a region to submit to the results 
of a lottery to pick the site for the facility, with the understanding that those 
who live in the areas spared the facility will be taxed to compensate those who 
live in the host community.200 The compensation is the amount the government 
must promise its voters to secure unanimous consent for the lottery. Sullivan 
offers a two-city economic model to show that the compensation necessary to 
secure unanimous consent to the lottery will be lower than the compensation 
required to site facilities through negotiation.201 
One must be skeptical of any proposal that requires unanimous consent 
because of the potential for holdout problems and strategic bargaining, 
especially where there are a limited number of suitable sites.202 Sullivan's 
proposal would require a degree of regional cooperation that seldom has been 
achieved. Proposals requiring such cooperation have faced daunting political 
odds in light of the highly decentralized nature of American politics.203 
Sullivan's lottery scheme also fails to address the distribution of the 
compensation.204 
The proposal in Part VI of this Article calls for determining compensation 
by negotiation, because it is the best method for taking into consideration 
unique, site-specific circumstances; allowing public participation; and 
addressing distributional issues. Reverse auctions and lotteries may in theory be 
more efficient than negotiations, but no state has adopted either scheme.205 
Negotiations between a developer and a community-based negotiation 
committee can provide nonmonetary communitarian benefits in the form of 
democratic participation and republican community that a purely economic 
198 See infra notes 409-10,450-57 and accompanying text. 
199 See infra notes 468, 474 and accompanying text. 
200 See Arthur M. Sullivan, Siting Noxious Facilities, 31 J. URB. EcoN. 360, 360-61 
(1992). 
201 See id. at 363-66. 
202 See infra notes 459-62 and accompanying text. 
203 See infra part VI.B.s. 
204 Sullivan does state that in principle it is possible to provide greater compensation to 
residents who suffer greater property damage from a facility, but he does not offer any 
procedure for achieving this result. See Sullivan, supra note 200, at 373. 
205 See Been, supra note 77, at 794-95 (citing states that have adopted legislative, 
administrative, and negotiation-based compensation strategies, but none that has adopted a 
reverse auction or lottery scheme). 
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approach does not provide. Both the reverse auction and lottery systems 
include some limited democratic decisionmaking, but neither addresses 
distributional considerations. Legislative and administrative solutions are too 
crude and inflexible to take into account local conditions and do not generally 
allow for significant community-based representation, although an 
administrative board could allow for some local representatives. None of the 
five approaches guarantees that those most at risk will receive proportionate 
compensation, but the negotiation approach has the greatest potential for 
addressing this problem. 
4. Equitable Issues in Detennining Compensation 
Compensation proposals raise at least four moral questions: (1) Do 
compensation programs inappropriately make marketable commodities out of 
health and safety risks? (2) Are compensated siting proposals fair and voluntary 
to a poor community that cannot afford to say no? (3) Do compensated siting 
programs allow a community to trade away the rights of future generations, 
who are not represented at the bargaining table? (4) Are such schemes 
voluntary when local governments and citizens lack sufficient information and 
expertise to assess risky projects?206 
Environmental justice advocates have suggested that compensation 
programs may harm the poor or minorities because they are especially 
vulnerable to economic exploitation by developers offering jobs or 
compensation to a disadvantaged community.207 Yet, in Los Angeles 
community fears about dioxin from a proposed hazardous waste facility led to 
its defeat despite the developer's offer of $10,000,000 in compensation and the 
support of a key African-American city councilman.208 But in other cases, 
minority groups have accepted projects bringing jobs or compensation despite 
206 See id. at 824-25. 
207 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 808 (arguing that minority communities are 
vulnerable to "environmental blackmail," when developers of locally undesirable land uses 
offer short-term economic relief in exchange for accepting long-term risk); Boyle, supra 
note 69, at 973-75 (arguing that communities may not fully understand health risks of 
project until it has been built and may fear losing jobs if residents voice safety concerns). 
One solution would be to allocate vouchers to poor or minority communities to allow them 
to bargain more effectively within the pollution rights market, but communities with fewer 
resources might stilI lack meaningful choice. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 849. For a 
discussion of compensated siting proposals, see supra notes 170-205 and accompanying 
text. 
208 See Anthony R. Chase, Assessing and Addressing Problems Posed by 
Environmental Racism, 45 RurGERS L. REv. 335, 346 (1993). 
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the opposition of an environmental justice coalition, presumably because the 
community decided that the benefits outweighed the risks.209 
There is no simple way to measure the fairness of a siting process. Perhaps 
the best way to measure fairness is by the level of representation of minority 
groups in the process of selecting a community's siting negotiation 
committee.210 One factor that may influence a community's perception of 
fairness is whether the community has volunteered to accept a facility or rather 
a developer has selected the community. Whether a siting process is voluntary 
depends upon the adequacy with which minorities and high-risk residents are 
represented in the siting negotiation process and their access to information 
about the relevant risks. 
Many commentators have proposed that mediators assist in the negotiation 
of compensation.211 According to one scholar's count, "Nineteen states have 
procedures for negotiation or mediation between facility developers and 
proposed host communities. "212 Some commentators, however, have argued 
that mediation, and especially mandatory arbitration, are inappropriate ways to 
resolve siting disputes because they do not address the potential problems of 
unequal bargaining power and informational asymmetries between a 
community and developer.213 
In 1980, Massachusetts adopted a Hazardous Waste Siting Act,214 which 
209 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text; infra notes 413-28 and 
accompanying text. 
210 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 428,497 and accompanying 
text. 
211 See generally Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1156 n.694 (citing sources); HoIznagel, 
supra note 171, at 364-66; Mank, supra note 79, at 274-82 (discussing advantages and 
disadvantages of mediated compensation); John C. Sassaman, Jr., Comment, Siting Witlwut 
Fighting: The Role of Mediation in Enhancing Public Participation in Siting Radioactive 
Waste Facilities, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 207, 223-24 (1992) (arguing mediation can 
enhance public participation). But see DoUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENfAL 
MEDIATION 149-53, 189-90, 216-19 (1987) (arguing that mediated siting schemes can be 
coercive and inadequately representative, and can result in unsafe sites). 
212 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1156. 
213 See generally AMY, supra note 211, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19 (criticizing 
environmental mediation and arbitration); Mank, supra note 79, at 277-82 (discussing 
criticisms of mediation, arbitration, and negotiated compensation). 
214 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981); see Been, supra note 77, 
at 811-19 (discussing Massachusetts statute and attempts to site hazardous waste facilities 
under the statute); Mank, supra note 79, at 274-78 (same); Michael Wheeler, Negotiating 
NIMBY's: Learningfrom the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 
241,255-80 (1994) (same). 
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has served as a model for other states.21S The Massachusetts statute allows a 
developer to select a community, limits the ability of a municipality to pass 
local ordinances designed to block the proposed facility, requires the developer 
and community to negotiate concerning a broad range of compensation issues, 
and allows a state siting council to require the parties to submit to binding 
arbitration if negotiations reach an impasse.216 Some commentators have 
criticized the Massachusetts negotiated compensation model on the grounds that 
it is coercive, does not adequately represent local citizens, and fails to address 
safety concerns.217 Massachusetts has had, at best, a mixed record of success in 
using compensation in overcoming community opposition.21S Wisconsin, 
which provides for voluntary mediation and then for binding arbitration by a 
waste facility siting board,219 has probably enjoyed the greatest success of any 
state with a compensated siting program, although the measure of success 
depends upon whether one counts only actual sited facilities or siting 
agreements.220 
For both equitable and practical reasons, mandatory arbitration should be 
avoided unless there is a pressing national or regional demand for a certain type 
of facility and no other alternative sites exist. Preemptive statutes often increase 
215 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-114 to 34r (West 1985) (providing 
communities with choice between fixed assessment and negotiated compensation with 
ceiling on the amount of total compensation, and providing arbitration if negotiations fail); 
R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-19.7-1 to -15 (1989) (providing negotiation and arbitration); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43-.445 (West 1989) (providing voluntary mediation and binding 
arbitration by waste facility siting board if negotiations fail). 
216 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21D, §§ 1-19 (West 1981); Been, supra note 77, 
at 811-19; ManIc, supra note 79, at 274-78; Wheeler, supra note 214, at 255-80. 
217 See, e.g., AMY, supra note 211, at 149-53, 189-90, 216-19; Brion, supra note 
79, at 447-52. 
21S See generally Been, supra note 77, at 811-19; Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1157 
(arguing that Massachusetts experiment has failed because all six serious attempts at siting 
hazardous waste facilities between 1980 and 1992 failed); ManIc, supra note 79, at 274-78; 
Wheeler, supra note 214, at 278-80. 
219 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (West 1989); Been, supra note 77, at 819-22; 
Arthur J. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation in 
WISconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 223, 262-66 (1983); Mary Beth Arnett, Comment, Down in 
the Dumps and Wasted: The Need Determination in the WISconsin lAndfill Siting Process, 
1987 WIS. L. REv. 543, 547-49. 
220 Compare Been, supra note 77, at 821 ("By the end of 1993, siting agreements had 
been entered into for five hazardous waste sites and forty-one solid waste sites [in 
WISConsin]. ") with Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1157 ("In Wisconsin, thirty-four solid waste 
facilities, but not a single new hazardous waste disposal facility, have been sited using 
negotiation. "). 
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community opposition to a facility,221 and there is the danger that politically 
weak communities, which tend to contain a disproportionate share of poor 
people or minorities, will be targeted by siting boards even when those boards 
have the authority to site a facility in a politically powerful area.222 Mediation 
is less coercive and therefore better than mandatory arbitration. Mediation, 
however, generally does not redress inequities in bargaining power caused by 
the usually superior financial and infonnational resources available to industry 
compared to citizens or local governments.223 The representation and 
compensation scheme proposed in Part VI of this Article includes ways to 
improve the mediation process so that citizens and local governments can 
effectively bargain with developers. 
C. Public Participation 
A fundamental question in siting decisions is the relative role career 
employees in a state or federal agency should play in comparison to the general 
public. The answer should depend, at least in part, upon the extent to which an 
administrative agency can claim technocratic expertise in generating and 
evaluating reliable scientific infonnation that is inaccessible to most members 
of the general public and the extent to which the public can understand risk 
assessments and cost-benefit analysis. Some proponents of the' environmental 
justice movement have suggested or clearly stated an intention to replace 
technocratic decisionmaking, by expert agencies, with community 
empowennent.224 Technocratic decisionmaking, however, should guide and 
enhance public participation in siting negotiation and compensation decisions 
because technocratic tools are needed to identify high-risk residents and to give 
them proportionately greater votes in electing a siting negotiation committee. 
Developers would like to know whether experts or the public are more 
willing on average to approve a siting proposal. Increased public participation 
in the siting process can either increase or decrease opposition to siting new 
facilities depending upon the particular facts and whether the facility is 
perceived as threatening.225 Increased public access to infonnation tends to 
increase the public's perception of risk and seldom decreases that perception.226 
221 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text. 
223 See AMY, supra note 211, at 149-53, i89-90, 216-19; Mank, supra note 79, at 
280; infra notes 467-68 and accompanying text. 
224 See generally Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 75-76; Cole, supra note 17, at 
662-63. 
225 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1158. 
226Id. at 1159. 
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Local residents, however, have been more willing than state governments to 
accept hazardous or radioactive waste facilities.227 
If administrative agencies could make siting decisions without regard to 
public opinion, their staff probably would, on average, be more willing to 
grant permits to facilities based upon cost-benefit and risk assessment analysis 
than would the general public.228 From the standpoint of democratic theory and 
moral legitimacy, however, only a system that combines administrative 
expertise and participation is likely to be successful. 
Environmental justice commentators generally favor increased public 
participation in the siting process.229 On the other hand, from a public choice 
perspective,23o "organized, well-informed, resource-rich, politically connected 
neighborhood groups benefit from sitings of facilities in unorganized, 
uninformed, resource-lacking, politically powerless areas. "231 Because wealthy 
people have greater access to lawyers, lobbyists, and the media, a key question 
is whether any siting process that incorporates public opinion can temper the 
tendency to site facilities where people are relatively politically powerless. 
1. Public Panicipation Theory 
There are conflicting views about the value of public participation in 
environmental decisionmaking. Study after study shows that the public's 
evaluation of environmental and safety risks differs radically from any 
consensus of experts in the field.232 Conflicts between expert and public views 
of policy questions occur in other fields such as the provision of medical 
services.233 Cognitive error theory has demonstrated that individuals often 
2271d. at 1161-62. 
228 See irifTa note 476 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
230 "Public choice models often treat the legislative process as a microeconomic 
system in which interest groups manipUlate the political process to obtain 'rents' in the form 
of tax relief, subsidies or favorable regulation to increase their wealth in excess of what the 
group could achieve in the marketplace without legislation. " Mank, supra note 18, at 304-
05; see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. 
L. REv. 873, 878 (1987). Public choice theory suggests that politically influential 
municipalities might manipulate the political process to lessen the likelihood that locally 
undesirable land uses will be located in their communities. 
231 Boyle, supra note 69, at 978 n.222. 
232 BREYER, supra note 113, at 33; see also CARNEGIE COMM'N, RIsK AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 92-93 (1993) (discussing 
causes of divergence between "expert" and "public" beliefs about risk). 
233 Oregon uses a ranking of Medicaid services to reflect comparative benefits and 
denies payment for services below a certain ranking. See David Stipp, Prevention May Be 
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reach inconsistent conclusions about risky options solely as a function of the 
way these options are framed.234 The question is whether society should base 
its policies on expert evaluations or public perceptions of risk. 
Most commentators, including the author, have argued in favor of 
increased public participation in environmental decisionmaking primarily 
because such participation is consistent with democratic values and because 
administrative decisionmaking has its own limitations.235 Expert risk 
assessment can be excessively narrow in scope and may not adequately 
consider values that the public considers important, such as voluntariness of 
risk.236 Proponents of environmental justice generally believe that the limited 
Costlier 1han a Cure, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at Bl, B4. But public hearings on 
Oregon's ranking system for Medicaid services led to decreasing weight on cost-
effectiveness between 1990 and 1993. After public hearings, the Oregon Health Services 
Commission revised the rankings of about 400 of the 696 items on the final priority list 
because the Commission found that a list based upon cost-effectiveness alone did not follow 
the general public intuition of how to rank priorities. Id. at B4. 
234 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 606 (1992). Professor Hornstein, 
however, believes that society should not rely upon expert decisionmaking, despite the 
implications of cognitive error theory, because expert decisionmaking has its own 
limitations, and more fundamentally because "a fully synoptic system of comparative risk 
analysis would lack legitimacy because its decisions would be despised as undemocratic." 
Id. at 611. 
235 See generally Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Supetfond Cleanup Process, 
18 EcoLOGY L.Q. 173, 213-20 (1991); Bruce C. French, More Effective Qtizen 
Participation in Environmental Decision-Making, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 389, 391-415 
(1993); Mank, supra note 18, at 338-43. 
236 Many commentators favoring a public approach to risk have argued that 
environmental decisionmaking and regulation are ultimately based upon political factors 
rather than upon technical or analytical processes such as cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., 
Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REv. 
1021, 1043 (1989) ("[Clost-benefit analysis is misused to provide technocratic solutions to 
fundamentally political questions .••• "); Mank, supra note 18, at 280-81, 306-09 
(contrasting public and technocratic approaches to risk regulation); Joseph P. Tomain, 
Distributional Consequences of Environmental Regulation: Economics, Politics, and 
Environmental Policymoking, 1 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 101, 110 (1991) (arguing that 
cost-benefit analysis is deficient because it obscures sociopolitical norms). A number of 
commentators have argued that formal cost-benefit analysis overemphasizes the costs, which 
are more easily quantifiable, and underemphasizes health concerns, which are difficult to 
quantify. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 EcoLOGY 
L.Q. 233, 248 (1990). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So 
Paradoxical: The Rationalefor Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 731-
36, 741. The bias toward emphasizing costs may be exacerbated by informational biases 
because industry generally has the best information about the costs and feasibility of 
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involvement of minorities in environmental decisionmaking has led agencies to 
ignore or underestimate risks that especially affect minorities.237 Environmental 
justice proponents often contend that members of minority groups must be 
placed in key environmental policy roles so that they can set the environmental 
priorities for their communities.238 
On the other side, there is a technocratic school of thought that generally 
prefers that Congress and the public take a limited role in setting broad policy 
goals and delegate most decisions to the discretion of expert administrative 
agencies.239 Judge, now Justice, Stephen Breyer, in his 1993 book Breaking 
the Vicious Orc/e, argues that the public often overreacts to risks, that 
Congress responds to such public pressures, and that because Congress lacks 
expertise it is incapable of addressing risk comprehensively.24O Breyer 
acknowledges that the public may legitimately take into account such factors as 
voluntariness of risk or whether the risk is likely to be accompanied by pain or 
dread,241 but he argues that in many cases public perceptions about risk differ 
pollution controls. See Dwyer, supra, at 248. Critics of the expert approach and of formal 
cost-benefit analysis suggest that the analytical methods of the technical approach may make 
it risk-preferring, in contrast to the public's risk aversion. See Clayton P. Gillette & James 
E. Krier, Risk. Courts. and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1060-61 (1990). 
237 Proponents of environmental justice have suggested that limited public involvement 
in cleanup decisions may explain why the National Law Journal study, supra note 37, found 
that cleanups took longer in minority and low-income communities. See Deeohn Ferris, 
Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Qeanup: Expanding Public Participation in the 
Federal Superfund Program, 21 FORDHAMURB. LJ. 671, 675 (1994). 
238 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 850-52; Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and 
DemocraticJustice, 21 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 431, 453-54 (1994). 
239 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & Wn..LIAM T. HAssLER, CLEAN CoALIDmTY 
Am. (OR How THE CLEAN Am. Acr BECAME A MULTmn..LION-DoLLAR BAll..-Our FOR HIGH 
SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DoNE ABour IT) 5 (1981) (arguing that 
Congress should provide only the "most general kinds of policy guidance" to free the 
agency to engage in rationalist decisionmaking processes); John S. Applegate, Worst Things 
First: Risk. Information. and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. 
ON REG. 2TI, 296-98 (1992) (discussing rationalist models of regulation that emphasize 
agency discretion and limit congressional role to broad goal setting); Mank, supra note 18, 
at 307 n.203 (citing sources); CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 232, at 118-19 (arguing that 
when divergence between public and expert risk assessments cannot be overcome through 
education, experts, rather than public, should reconsider). 
240 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 33-42; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 307-08 
(discussing Breyer's argument). 
241 BREYER, supra note 113, at 33-35. Proponents of a public approach to risk 
assessment generally believe that it is important to look at numerous factors in assessing risk 
and most importantly to rely heavily upon public perceptions of risk, such as voluntariness 
or dread of worst case potential accidents. See generally James F. Freeman & Rachel D. 
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from expert opinions simply because the public misunderstands the actual risks 
involved.242 Breyer is skeptical that better "risk communications" will improve 
public understanding of risk,243 distrusts the ability of Congress to write an 
effective agency agenda for addressing risk,244 and believes that the 
combination of uncertainties about risk and political pressures often lead to 
regulatory overkill by agencies.245 In Breyer's view, greater knowledge and 
public awareness do not necessarily lead to better regulation.246 Breyer's 
solution is to create an elite reviewing body of civil servants within the 
executive branch to coordinate risk regulation.247 This bureaucratic elite would 
have interagency jurisdiction, political insulation, prestige, and authority 
unprecedented in American history. 248 
In another article, the author argued that although Breyer's assessment of 
how well the public and Congress have handled risk assessment issues in the 
past has considerable merit, his solution, as well as that of many other 
technocrats, underplays the need for public legitimacy249 and participation.25o 
Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community Perceptions into Environmental Risk 
Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.r. 547, 575 (1994) ("For the federal government to 
effect meaningful change in the siting process and waste management generally, it must do 
more to incorporate citizens' risk perceptions into its risk calculations and its regulations. "); 
Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-73; Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-615. By 
contrast, technocratic experts tend to rely upon quantifiable, formal cost-benefit analysis and 
"body counts" of expected excess fatalities caused by different risks. See generally Gillette 
& Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-85 (arguing that experts tend to focus simply upon the 
expected annual fatalities, or "body count," caused by a chemical, whereas the lay person is 
also concerned with additional factors); Hornstein, supra note 234, at 585-87, 604-06 
(contrasting expert and public perceptions of risk). 
242 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 33-39. 
243 Id. at 38-39. But see CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 232, at 92-93 (arguing that 
the public will substantially change its views on many but not all risk issues if exposed to 
full and balanced discussion that acknowledges uncertainty and presents framework of 
choices). 
244 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 39-42. 
245 See id. at 42-51. 
246 Seeid. 
247 See id. at 59-60. 
248 See David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a 
Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REv. 365, 372 (1994). As examples, Breyer points to the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the United States Office of 
Management and Budget and the Conseil d'Etat in France, but neither has authority to 
determine substantive regulatory priorities. See BREYER, supra note 113, at 68-72; Dana, 
supra, at 372. 
249 See Douglas R. Williams, Environmental Law and Democratic Legitimacy, 4 DUKE 
ENVfL. L. & POL'y. F. 1, 6-31 (1994) (discussing two contending views of democratic 
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Congress needs to make the basic policy choices about how to regulate 
pollution and what level of risk is acceptable.251 Public participation is 
important as a value in itself, a means of developing a broader administrative 
record, and a means of lessening the risk that special interests will capture the 
EPA.252 Breyer's proposal does not sufficiently acknowledge the uncertainties 
in risk assessment, especially when comparing different types of risk.253 
Although democratic policymakers must give weight to public opinion, 
administrative agencies should consider the interests of future generations and 
take a longer view than the latest opinion polls or market reports.254 A 
combination of technocratic decisionmaking and public participation should 
insure that risks are fairly compensated for both present and future 
generations.25S 
2. Public Participation Statutes and Regulations 
Congress, states, and the EPA have often sought to encourage public 
participation in environmental decisionmaking.256 Public participation in siting 
legitimacy, liberal economic theory and civic republican theory). 
250 See Mank, supra note 18, at 307-08. 
251 Craig Gannett, Congress and the Reform of Risk Regulation, 107 HARv. L. REv. 
2095, 21~ (1994) (arguing that Breyer missed the new willingness of Congress to 
address risk issues and that the political branches of government must play a role in risk 
regulation); Mank, supra note 18, at 308. 
252 The EPA has not been captured by industry interests, in part because it regulates so 
many different industries and is subject to countervailing pressures by pollution-control 
industries, but mainly because of strong public interest in promoting environmental goals. 
See Dwyer, supra note 236, at 309-10; Mank, supra note 18, at 302-04; Bradford C. 
Mank, Supeifund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVfL. LJ. 34, 34-35, 49-
54 (1993). 
253 See Dana, supra note 248, at 381-83 (criticizing Breyer's proposal for 
underestimating value judgments inherent in risk assessment). 
254 See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: 
Discount Rates. Later Generations. and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267, 271 
(1993). 
25S See infra notes 480-520 and accompanying text. 
256 Congress has adopted a technical assistance grant program providing funds to 
citizen groups so they can challenge proposed cleanup strategies for Superfund sites put 
forward by either the EPA or potentially responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e) 
(1988); Folk, supra note 235, at 194-95; see also Mank, supra note 18, at 340-43 
(proposing technical assistance grants to allow neighbors of plants emitting significant 
amounts of hazardous air pollutants to seek more stringent permit conditions). On June 2, 
1994, the EPA proposed a rule to increase public involvement early in the process for 
permitting hazardous waste facilities. The EPA has acknowledged that it must improve 
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or permit decisions runs the gamut from provisions for public hearings, the use 
of citizen advisory committees, and membership on state siting boards.257 The 
EPA has begun creating Superfund Advisory Committees.258 Superfund reform 
legislation proposed in the last Congress, House Bill 3800, would have allowed 
the EPA to consider future use in consultation with advisory community 
working groups.259 Senator Specter introduced Senate Bill 443, which would 
have given developers a preference for state siting approval if they won support 
from a host community advisory committee.260 
A potential problem with a siting committee or board is that, because only 
a limited number of community representatives can serve, many parties 
potentially affected by a siting or cleanup may be excluded.261 A single 
community representative on a siting committee is unlikely to represent all of 
the interests of the host community. 262 On the other hand, there are practical 
limits to how many members can effectively serve on a siting committee. 
House Bill 3800 would have limited each community working group to twenty 
members.263 
Statutes often provide only vague criteria for selecting representatives of 
siting or other environmental committees. For example, House Bill 3800 stated 
that "[s]pecial efforts shall be made to ensure that the composition of CWG's 
[Community Working Groups] reflects a balanced representation of all those 
public participation in the Superfund cleanup process arid that the agency "must achieve 
earlier and more effective community involvement at each site." U.S. EPA, FINAL REPoRT, 
SUPERFUND ADMINISTRATIVE lMPRoVEMENfs 31 (1993); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OmCE, EPA's COMMUNITY RELATIONS COULD BE MORE EFFECfIVE (1994) (arguing that 
the EPA's Superfund community relations program is generally effective but that the 
Agency should do more to increase public involvement). Proposed Superfund reform 
legislation would have expanded the availability of such grants to include state registry sites. 
Richard E. Bartelt & David E. Polter, Swnmtlry of the Proposed Superfund Refonn Act of 
1994, [25 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 608, 610-11 (July 29, 1994). 
257 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1158. 
258 See Torres, supra note 238, at 454 n.137. 
259 See H.R. 3800 (first version), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102, 103, 502, 503 (1994); 
S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102, 103, 502, 503 (1994). Elliott Laws, the EPA's 
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, has suggested that the 
remedy selection process "could be amended to give community work groups great 
deference in remedy selection: the agency would have to make a 'strong showing' to ignore 
the community's recommendation." Mary Bryant, Environmental Justice Forum, 
SONREEL NEWS, July/Aug. 1994, at 8 (reporting speech by Elliott Laws on April 29, 
1994 at Environmental Justice Forum in Dallas). 
260 See S. 443, 100d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(4) (1993). 
261 See Sassaman, supra note 211, at 220. 
2621d. 
263 See H.R. 3800, supra note 259, § 103(i)(4). 
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interested in facility representation. "264 
Despite the potential unrepresentativeness of siting committees, other 
methods of incorporating public input have their own flaws. Public hearings 
are often held after a siting commission has made its decision about where to 
locate a facility, and frequently such hearings are viewed as a ritual to obtain a 
stamp of approval rather than an effective way to solicit comments from the 
public.265 The effectiveness of public hearings can be increased through the 
provision of technical assistance grants to citizens to enable them to challenge 
an applicant's data, requiring states to prepare detailed fact sheets, and the use 
of formal adjudicative procedures including the right to cross examination.266 
But it may be less necessary to hold expensive, formal public hearings if a 
representative siting committee has already had a chance to examine a siting or 
remedy selection proposal in depth and has convinced the community of the 
soundness of the committee's decision. Some commentators have argued that a 
binding or nonbinding referendum of the entire electorate is the best 
approach,267 but such an approach does not give more weight to residents who 
bear greater risks. 
Compensated siting programs typically rely upon elected officials or a 
bargaining committee, and in some cases allow a community referendum on the 
siting agreement. 268 But according to Professor Vicki Been, "none of the 
programs distinguishes between the interests of those who are most affected by 
the siting and those who are least affected. "269 A referendum process for 
ratifying a proposed compensation agreement raises serious questions about 
2641d. The bill provided that it is "appropriate" for the President to include 
representation from the following groups: (A) persons who are adjacent residents or directly 
affected by releases from the facility; (B) persons who are not physically close to the facility 
but who may be potentially affected by releases from the facility; (C) long-term residents 
who have resided in the community for at least five years and who are members of the 
medical community; CD) representatives of Indian tribes; (E) representatives of resident 
citizen groups; (F) local government officials; (G) workers at the facility who will be 
involved in actual cleanup operations; (H) persons at the facility during response actions; (l) 
facility owners and significant potentially responsible parties; and (J) members of the local 
business community. Id. The main problem with the bill is that it does not define how many 
persons from each group ought to serve on the CWG, except for a poorly worded reference 
to "a minimum of one representative of the recipient a grant [sic] for technical assistance, if 
any, awarded under subsection (e)." Id. 
265 See Sassaman, supra note 211, at 220. 
266 Mank, supra note 18, at 338-43. 
267 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1198 (proposing referenda at both the county and 
municipal levels); Inhaber, supra note 155, at 61-62 (proposing a county-wide referendum). 
268 See Been, supra note 77, at 826. 
2691d. 
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who could vote and the percentage required to ratify an agreement. 270 An 
administrative or judicial process rather than negotiation could determine 
compensation, "[b]ut problems of accountability, expertise, conflicts of 
interest, and special interest influence are likely to vex any such process. "271 
Instead, representation should be based on the amount of risk that a site poses 
to surrounding residents. 
IV. SITING, INTENTIONAL DISCRIMlNATION, AND DISPARATE IMPACTS 
Proponents of the environmental justice movement generally believe that 
environmental inequities are produced at least in part by conscious or 
unconscious racist attitudes.272 Advocates of environmental justice have 
frequently suggested that the government and large corporations consciously 
select sites for undesirable facilities in poor or minority neighborhoods because 
such localities are less likely to have political clout. 273 Those responsible for 
siting decisions, however, usually disavow any efforts to select politically 
disadvantaged communities and argue that a particular siting decision was 
based upon cost, convenience, or sound geological reasons.274 
Most litigants have invoked the Equal Protection Clause to challenge the 
siting of a facility in a predominantly minority community on the grounds that 
the government decisionmaker was racially discriminatory in selecting the site, 
but some recent academic commentators have argued that Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 provides a broader disparate impact approach.275 Usually, 
270 Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045; see MARy R. ENGLISH, SITING Low-LEVEL 
RADIOACI1VEWASTEDISPOSALFACILITlES 74,138-39 (1992). 
271 Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045; see Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 
1088-99. 
272 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806-07. 
273 See Austin & Schill, supra note 17, at 71-74; supra notes 106-12 and 
accompanying text. 
274 See, e.g., Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting oj ConunerciaJ Waste Facilities: An 
Evolution oj Community lAnd Use Decisions, 1 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 83, 84 (1991) 
("The waste industry's criteria for identifYing attractive sites has [sic] evolved over the last 
several decades, from considerations that were primarily financial to considerations that 
reflect the priority of protecting human health and the environment. "); McDermott, supra 
note 1, at 697 (arguing that WMX's Emelle Landfill in predominantly African-American 
Sumter County, Alabama was chosen because of its good transportation, aridity, sparse 
population, and, most importantly, its location atop the Selma chalk formation). But see 
Foster, supra note 8, at 729 (criticizing use of race-neutral grounds by private industry and 
suggesting they may be a cover for racism). 
275 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 835-39; Colopy, supra 
note 18, at 128-29, 156-88. 
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plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the siting of a facility, 
but Title VI may allow for a damages remedy where an existing facility has 
harmed a plaintiff.276 While it is important in some cases to prevent the siting 
of a facility, minority residents and society as a whole would often be better off 
if a developer receives a siting permit but negotiates with a representative 
community siting committee to pay compensation for the external harms 
resulting from a facility. 
When plaintiffs have challenged the granting of a permit to a developer, 
courts usually have found sufficient state action by a state or local siting board, 
either on its own or in ratifying the actions of developers, to allow a suit to go 
forward.277 Equal protection suits alleging discriminatory siting of hazardous 
waste facilities have generally failed because courts have required evidence of 
discriminatory intent, which is difficult to obtain. Some commentators have 
argued that courts should abandon or weaken the intent requirement. 278 Other 
commentators have suggested that plaintiffs bring disparate impact suits based 
upon civil rights statutes such as Title VI,279 which bans discrimination by 
federally funded programs and does not require proof of intentional 
discrimination. 280 Yet others have proposed that Congress enact a new statute 
276 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836; Colopy, supra note 18, at 165-66. 
277 See, e.g., Bean v. Southwestern Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 
1979), qff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). The district court did not find it necessary to 
reach the issue of whether the actions of the developers were so intertwined with the state as 
to constitute state action. 
278 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 980-81 (proposing intermediate standard of review if 
plaintiff meets certain conditions). 
279 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 835-39 (discussing and 
advocating use of Title VI in environmental cases); Colopy, supra note 18, at 128-29, 156-
88 (same). 
280 Title VI is one of several theories to address environmental inequities that have not 
been fully explored. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 829,834-42 (discussing Equal Protection 
Clause, Title VI, Title vm, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Omar Saleem, Overcoming 
Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice 
Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVfL. L. 211, 228-29 (1994) 
(same); Colopy, supra note 18, at 128-29 (Title VI). Proponents of environmental justice 
have argued that the federal government should begin enforcing civil rights laws that 
prohibit discrimination in programs receiving federal money. Solutions: lWuzt Can Be 
Done, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S12. Others have proposed using substantive 
environmental statutes to reduce inequities. See Crawford, supra note 129, at 273 (arguing 
that civil rights lawsuits have failed to address environmental justice problems and 
advocating use of CERCLA medical monitoring lawsuits); Foster, supra note 8, at 725 
("Environmental law and policy, because they are preventative in nature, are free from the 
constraints of strict remedial and causation requirements that characterize civil rights law. to); 
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 842-49; Saleem, supra, at 229-30 (discussing substantive 
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allowing the use of disparate impacts to establish discrimination in siting 
cases.281 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the fundamental focus should be on 
ensuring adequate representation for minority groups rather than on the 
impossible task of achieving equality of substantive results.282 If minorities are 
adequately represented in the political process, the legislative process is better 
suited to addressing broad questions of political and economic inequality than 
are courts in lawsuits alleging that state siting officials are placing a 
disproportionate number of hazardous waste facilities in minority 
neighborhoods. The proposal in Part VI of this Article is designed to provide 
adequate representation for those at greatest risk and for minority groups.283 If 
minority groups are adequately represented in the siting process, courts 
generally should ignore environmental disparities because such disparities 
probably are the result of economic or historical factors beyond the control of 
environmental decisionmakers. In some cases, decisionmakers consciously use 
environmental quality arguments to discriminate against minorities,284 but in 
most cases environmental disparities are probably the indirect product of 
differences in income, residential patterns, diet, or occupation.285 
Assuming adequate representation of minority interests in selecting a 
negotiating committee and assuming that the committee has access to all 
relevant information about the risks of the projects and to the technical 
expertise needed to understand those risks, a compensation process is sufficient 
to address disparate impacts without stigmatizing developers and government 
officials who are motivated by neutral decisionmaking criteria that serve a 
legitimate business purpose. Courts should issue an injunction barring the 
construction of a facility approved by both a state regulatory agency and a 
community only when plaintiffs can prove intentional discrimination by the 
siting board or developer, or when the process for electing representatives to 
the siting board is so fundamentally unfair to minorities as to exclude them 
environmental statutes and tort law). 
281 Godsil, supra note 70, at 421-25. 
282 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
283 See infra notes 430, 502 and accompanying text. 
284 It is often alleged that environmental quality measures in local zoning laws are 
really aimed at excluding minorities or the poor. See Foster, supra note 8, at 737. 
285 See 1 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPoRT, supra note 27, at 12 ("All of these 
differences in exposures are complex and deeply rooted in many aspects of society, such as 
historical residence, politics, commerce, geography, state and local land use decisions and 
other socioeconomic factors that affect where people live and work. "). But see Foster, 
supra note 8, at 736-37 (criticizing EPA Environmental Equity Report for failing to 
recognize "the social context and structural dynamics that influence the choices, mobility, 
and employment of people of color"). 
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from the decisionmaking process. Discriminatory intent is difficult to prove and 
presents a substantial barrier to plaintiffs bringing equal protection challenges 
to allegedly discriminatory siting practices. It is inappropriate, however, to 
stigmatize government decisionmakers who intend to act in racially neutral 
ways, even if they are subtly influenced by unconscious or structural racism, 
because compensation can redress economic harms to minorities.286 
A better approach than lawsuits seeking to brand government 
decisionmakers as racists is to reform the process of electing representatives to 
siting boards so that high-risk and minority residents are adequately represented 
and have access to the risk information and technical expertise needed to 
interpret the relevant factors. Many may question whether monetary 
compensation is an adequate remedy when a person is exposed to increased risk 
from a hazardous facility, but in a society in which some persons inevitably are 
exposed to higher risks than others, money is the most convenient and effective 
way to compensate high-risk persons. To prevent exploitation, the EPA and 
state siting agencies should set limits on the maximum level of risk acceptable 
for any community or individual.287 
It may be argued that compensation will not eliminate the tendency to place 
locally undesirable land uses in minority and poor neighborhoods because 
wealthy or politically powerful communities will block their siting even if 
compensation is available.288 Siting discrimination suits, however, cannot 
eliminate disparities caused by postsiting events attributable to market 
dynamics.289 On the other hand, ongoing and ex post compensation can at least 
partially redress the injuries of those who move near an existing facility.290 
Ultimately, siting disparities can be addressed only through a profound 
redistribution of income and political power. The increasing political power of 
minorities both at the local level and in Congress291 may in the long run 
286 The Supreme Court has noted that invalidating a decision because of its 
disproportionate impact often would be a remedy disproportionate to the decisionmakers' 
presumably racially neutral act. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976); 
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738, 74+45 (1974). On the other hand, a strong 
argument can be made that the costs to minorities in not considering disproportionate impact 
far outweigh the risks in explicitly considering race. See Charles R. Lawrence ill, The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 
317,320 n.12 (1987). Under the proposal in Part VI of this Article, the EPA would reduce 
disproportionate impacts to minorities whenever it is cost-efficient to do so. 
287 See infra notes 441-61 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text; infra notes 437-41 and 
accompanying text. 
289 See supra notes 20, 55-58, 182, 187 and accompanying text. 
290 See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text. 
291 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
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diminish the impact of current patterns of indirect or structural racism. 
Disparate impact suits should be allowed only when there is substantial 
statistical evidence of disparate impacts, as defined by well-established tests of 
statistical significance; evidence that the harms to the affected class of persons, 
based upon conservative but realistic expert risk assessments, outweigh the 
benefits in jobs and taxes to members of that affected class; and there is no 
adequate compensation process.292 Developers should be able to avoid 
disparate impact suits if those persons at greatest risk are adequately 
represented in the siting negotiations and compensation process. 
A. Antidiscrimination Law and Environmental Justice 
1. Equal Protection 
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp.293 and Washington v. Davis,294 the Supreme Court established the 
requirement that in an equal protection case a plaintiff must demonstrate 
discriminatory intent before a court may invoke its remedial powers. In some 
cases, a plaintiff may use statistical evidence of disparate impacts to establish an 
inference of discriminatory intent,295 but a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant's policies were undertaken at least in part because of and not in spite 
of their adverse effects upon an identifiable group.296 
Even when there have been disparities in the location of hazardous waste 
facilities between minority and white areas, plaintiffs in equal protection cases 
often have been unable to provide statistically significant evidence of disparate 
292 See supra note 15. 
293 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Arlington Heights established five factors in an equal 
protection analysis: (1) "[t]he impact of the official action-whether it 'bears more heavily 
on one race than another, '" id. at 266; (2) the historical background of the decision; (3) "the 
series of events prior to the decision, which could reveal the decisionmaker's purpose; (4) 
any departures, substantive or procedural, from the normal decisionmaking process; and (5) 
the legislative and administrative history of the decision. Id. at 266-68. The Court later 
added the foreseeability of the adverse consequences as a factor. Godsil, supra note 70, at 
410 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 n.25 (1979). 
294 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
295 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (holding that when a "clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even 
when the government legislation appears neutral on its face," a court may find invidious 
racial discrimination using that pattern as circumstantial evidence of intent); Colopy, supra 
note 18, at 146 n.88. 
296 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see Colopy, supra note 
18, at 147 n.92. 
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impact because too few facilities existed in a particular geographical area to 
establish statistical significance.297 Another reason why courts have generally 
failed to find evidence of intentional discrimination is that siting boards and 
developers can almost always offer some race-neutral justification for a site, 
including geological, economical, or transportation characteristics.298 In Bean 
v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,299 the district court did not find 
sufficient evidence to establish discriminatory intent, despite concluding that the 
Texas Department of Health's approach to the siting had been "unfortunate and 
insensitive."300 In R.I.S.E. v. Kay,301 the court found evidence of disparate 
impact, but held that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of 
discriminatory intent to support a finding that the Equal Protection Clause had 
been violated because the latest site chosen in a black community was 
environmentally more suitable for a landfill than the previously proposed site in 
a white community. 
Plaintiffs have been more successful in using evidence of disparate impacts 
to establish an inference of discriminatory intent in cases involving the 
provision of municipal services, and some commentators have argued that 
courts in siting cases ought to apply a similar approach in determining whether 
evidence of disparate impacts creates an inference of discriminatory intent. 302 
297 See Colopy, supra note 18, at 150. 
298 See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding 
no evidence of discriminatory intent in siting of landfill in a predominantly African-
American area despite the fact that three other landfills in the county were in predominantly 
African-American areas), qff'd, 9n F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs 
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 
880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga.), qff'd, 846 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern 
Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 6n-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979), qff'd, 782 F.2d 
1038 (5th Cir. 1986); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982) 
(finding no evidence of discrimination in siting PCB disposal facility in county with highest 
percentage of minority residents in state of North Carolina); In re Genesee Power Station 
Ltd. Partnership, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 to 93-7, 1993 WL 473846, at *2 (EPA Oct. 22, 
1993) (finding no support for charge that Michigan commission acted in a discriminatory 
fashion in approving the air permit in a minority area while denying permit in rural white 
area); see also Colopy, supra note 18 at 145-51. 
299 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), qff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
300 Id. at 680. 
301 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va. 1991), qff'd, 9n F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
302 See. e.g., Dowdell v. Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (finding 
that disparities in water and stormwater drainage between black and white neighborhoods 
was motivated by discriminatory intent), qff'd, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); see 
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 833-34 (arguing that courts have been more willing to infer 
discriminatory intent when there is evidence of disparate provision of government services); 
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Some scholars have suggested that courts have been more reluctant to find 
discriminatory intent in siting cases than in government services cases because 
increasing government services for minority groups is less controversial than 
forcing another community to accept a locally undesirable land use after a court 
has ruled that it may not be sited in a minority neighborhood.303 There is also a 
difference between denying services to minorities and granting a permit to site 
a facility in a minority area that brings both risks and benefits.304 Since the 
Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis305 in 1976, lower courts have 
been less willing, even in municipal services cases, to use evidence of disparate 
impacts to establish discriminatory intent. 306 
Several proponents of environmental justice have sharply criticized cases 
that refused to find intentional discrimination by siting authorities despite 
substantial evidence of disparate impacts on minorities.307 Their criticism is 
part of a larger school of thought challenging the requirement of evidence that 
an individual bad actor had a race-conscious impetuS.308 A number of scholars 
Colopy, supra note 18, at 149; GodsiI, supra note 70, at 416-18 (discussing cases involving 
disparate impact of municipal services and analogizing them to siting cases). Courts may be 
more reluctant to draw an inference of discriminatory intent in siting cases than they are in 
municipal services cases because there are often only a few landfills or waste facilities in a 
geographical area, whereas city governments make countless decisions on how to distribute 
municipal services, which make patterns of long-term discrimination more apparent. 
Colopy, supra note 18, at 150. Developers often can provide apparently neutral criteria 
such as land cost and residential density to justify disproportionate siting. Id. The remedy in 
municipal services cases is simply to provide equal services to blacks and whites, but the 
remedy in a siting case may be to shift the burden to another community, a remedy courts 
may be reluctant to impose. Id. 
303 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 833. 
304 See Crawford, supra note 129, at 293 n.126. 
305 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
306 See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a RighI to 
Protective liming in Low-Income Communities of C%r, 77 MINN. L. REv. 739, 779-82 
(1993). 
307 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 831-33; Saleem, supra note 280, at 225 ("In 
essence, courts narrowly construe the Equal Protection Clause to the detriment of groups 
that unfairly bear the brunt of environmental hazards under the guise of economic 
apportionment. "); Godsil, supra note 70, at 410-16. 
308 See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 958-59 (1993); Alan D. 
Freeman, Legitimati;Jng Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical 
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978) (arguing that 
antidiscrimination law is based upon a model of discrimination that is focused on individual 
actors through a "perpetrator" perspective); Lawrence, supra note 286, at 318-19; Saleem, 
supra note 280, at 225-28. 
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have criticized the intent requirement in Arlington Heights and Washington v. 
Davis because it treats equal protection violations as though they were criminal 
in nature and required a culpable state of mind.309 Because the intent-based test 
addresses only those who are consciously racist, it either ignores unconscious 
racism or treats the problem as being outside the ambit of the Equal Protection 
Clause.310 
Some environmental justice advocates have argued that, even if it is not 
possible to establish a clear connection between racial disparities and intentional 
conduct on the basis of race, one may assume that there are unconscious racist 
attitudes and discriminatory structures that produce environmental disparities. 
Therefore, evidence of disproportionate impacts should be enough to trigger 
corrective measures.311 These scholars often believe that courts have looked 
too narrowly at what constitutes racism. For instance, in East Bibb 'JWiggs 
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Commission,312 the district court looked only at whether the zoning agency 
responsible for the permit decision had a history of discrimination. The court 
refused to accept evidence of the history of state- and city-wide discrimination 
and concluded that there was no evidence of improper racial animuS.313 
While historical and institutional racism are serious problems, minorities 
will benefit more from remedial, preventive, and incentive compensation than 
from a court imposing findings of discrimination on siting boards that have 
applied race-neutral criteria in good faith, especially when a facility has net 
positive benefits for a community. It is inappropriate to so stigmatize a siting 
board or developer when a compensation program can redress any external 
costs imposed by a facility. 
2. Title VI 
Given the difficulties of proving discriminatory intent in equal protection 
cases, a number of commentators have recommended that environmental justice 
plaintiffs bring disparate impact actions under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act,314 which provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
309 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 69, at 961-62. 
310 See id. at 963. 
311 See Foster, supra note 8, at 733-35, 737-38 & nn. 76-77, 79-81 (arguing that 
historical and institutional racism leads more minorities to live in polluted metropolitan 
areas and to work in dangerous occupations). 
312 706 F. Supp. 880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga.), cdfd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989). 
313 [d. at 884. 
314 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53. 
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denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. "315 While Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakk&16 casts some doubt on the holding of Lau v. 
Nichols317 that disparate impact is always enough to win a Title VI action, the 
Supreme Court in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service CommissioJi318 held that 
proof of discriminatory intent is not required in a Title VI action, at least where 
that view had been historically endorsed by federal agency regulations 
implementing the statutory mandate. The historical test of Guardians probably 
applies to the EPA's Title VI regulations, which have consistently embraced a 
discriminatory effects test.319 Title VI applies only to federally funded 
programs, but virtually all federal environmental laws provide assistance to 
state governments.320 Until recently, it appeared that Title VI provided only 
equitable relief, but the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools321 unanimously held that a damages remedy is available in implied 
rights of action brought under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 
1972.322 Because the language of Title IX was expressly modeled after that of 
Title VI and because the Supreme Court has frequently relied on constructions 
of one in interpreting the other, it is likely that a damages remedy is now 
available under Title VI, even absent a showing of discrimination.323 
A plaintiff in a Title VI case must establish a prima facie case of "definite, 
measurable disparate impact" upon the affected community.324 Once a prima 
facie case is established, a defendant can counter the plaintiff's charges with 
"evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. "325 If the 
defendant provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business justification, the 
plaintiff must show that this justification is a pretext and that other selection 
devices would serve the defendant's interests with less discriminatory 
315 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 834-39; Colopy, supra 
note 18, at 128-29 & passim. 
316 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (powell, J., announcing jUdgment); Colopy, supra 
note 18, at 158. 
317 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974); see Lazarus, supra note 1, at 834-35. 
318 463 U.S. 582, 584 & n.2 (1983); see Colopy, supra note 18, at 159. 
319 See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), (c) (1994); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836. 
320 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 835. 
321 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
322 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). 
323 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836. 
324 See NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1332 (3d Cir. 1981); Colopy, 
supra note 18, at 161. 
325 Medical Or., 657 F.2d at 1333; see also Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 
1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Colopy, supra note 18, at 161-
62. 
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impact.326 
There has been controversy regarding whether Title VI was intended to 
cover environmental siting and permitting agencies.327 From 1971 until early 
1993, the EPA maintained that Title VI did not apply to its decisionmaking and 
often avoided enforcing the statute against state or local governments that 
received funding for projects such as sewers.328 More recently, the EPA's 
office of civil rights has been investigating whether Louisiana and Mississippi 
are violating the rights of their African-American citizens under Title VI by 
issuing permits to hazardous waste treatment facilities in minority 
neighborhoods.329 To resolve some of the uncertainties surrounding the scope 
of Title VI and environmental permitting, Senator Paul Wellstone introduced a 
bill, the Public Health and Equity Act of 1994, that would have clearly 
established that discrimination judgments against siting and permit agencies 
could be based solely upon a demonstration of disparate impact.330 
There is the danger that Title VI or other types of disparate impact suits 
based merely upon differences in exposure or location of facilities will 
discourage government officials from permitting and facility owners from 
operating in communities where suits are likely to occur even if there is a net 
social benefit to poor and minority neighborhoods.331 At least in theory, 
compensation is more socially efficient than disparate impact suits because a 
compensation process allows a worthwhile project to go forward and at the 
same time forces the developer to internalize all of the risks and costs of a 
326 See Medical Or., 657 F.2d at 1334-36; Colopy, supra note 18, at 162. A 
discussion of how courts' interpretation of the business justification defense has evolved 
over the years is beyond the scope of this Article. 
327 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 12; see also Saleem, supra note 280, 
at 228 ("However, it is currently unsettled as to whether Title VI applies to EPA decision-
making. "). A number of environmental justice proponents have advocated Title VI claims 
of disparate impact against environmental permitting agencies. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 
834-39; Colopy, supra note 18, at 128-29, 156-89; supra notes 279, 314 and 
accompanying text. 
328 See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 836-38 (discussing the EPA's decision to 
deemphasize its civil rights responsibilities under Title Vl); Saleem, supra note 280, at 228 
(arguing that the EPA's stance that its decisionmaking was exempt from Title VI "lacks 
support from any internal policy or legal precedent"); Colopy, supra note 18, at 180-88 
(discussing history of the EPA's enforcement of its Title VI regulations). 
329 See Marianne Lavelle, Qinton Pushes on Race and Envirorunent, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 
6, 1993, at 1, 41; John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. to Weigh Blacks' Complaints About 
Pollution, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1993, at A16. 
330 See S. 1841, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, 
at 12 (criticizing the bill). 
331 See BoERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 12-13. 
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facility.332 In lieu of disparate impact suits, the proposal in Part VI of this 
Article includes a more equitable process for representing and compensating 
the neighbors of hazardous facilities. 
3. Proposals for Expanded Disparate Impact Claims 
James Colopy has argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991,333 which 
amended Title vn of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to make it easier to prove 
disparate impact, could significantly affect Title VI caselaw.334 According to 
Colopy, under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, once a plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case, the defendant has the affirmative burden of persuasion in 
demonstrating that "the challenged practice is job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity. "335 If the defendant satisfies 
this requirement, the plaintiff can still present evidence that "other test or 
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve 
the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship ... ·336 Colopy proposes that this mechanism of disparate impact 
analysis be adopted for Title VI analysis as well.337 
Assuming that Colopy's interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is 
correct, courts should not apply expansive Title vn analysis to Title VI unless 
Congress explicitly adopts such an approach. Siting decisions are different from 
job discrimination claims because facilities often bring greater tax and 
employment benefits than harms.338 In the siting context, racial disparities 
sometimes benefit minorities. Therefore, a plaintiff should be required to prove 
not only that statistically significant siting disparities exist, but also that the 
harms to the affected subpopulation group exceed the benefits the facility 
provides to that group, using conservative but realistic risk assessments.339 
Rachel Godsil has proposed that Congress enact a statute modeled after 
332 It is difficult to measure the costs and benefits of a facility. See infra notes 407-25 
and accompanying text. 
333 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a) , 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993)). A discussion of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and how courts 
have interpreted its provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. 
334 See Colopy, supra note 18, at 163-64. 
335 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1991); see Colopy, supra note 18, at 163-64. 
336 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)); Colopy, supra note 18, at 164. 
337 See Colopy, supra note 18, at 164. 
338 See infra notes 406-07,414-28 and accompanying text. 
339 See infra notes 406-07, 414-28 and accompanying text. 
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Title VII to outlaw siting discrimination.34O A minority community would have 
to establish that it bore greater burdens than a neighboring white community 
that could have been considered for a proposed site.341 If a minority 
community could establish a prima facie case of disparate impacts and show 
that alternative sites existed, then the burden would shift to the siting agency to 
show that there was an environmental necessity for choosing the minority 
location, such as unique geological conditions.342 
Godsil's proposal is troubling because it would explicitly favor minorities 
at the expense of whites.343 Because of the controversial nature of favoring 
minorities at the expense of whites in the absence of intentional discrimination, 
one commentator has predicted that if Congress enacted the Godsil proposal, it 
would not explicitly address the issue of whether a plaintiff must establish 
discriminatory intent, and courts might impose such a requirement.344 Godsil's 
proposal also fails to consider whether the benefits of a facility, including 
compensation and jobs, outweigh the risks. 
Edward Boyle has argued that restructuring equal protection law to address 
siting disparities is preferable to Godsil's proposal to enact a statute because her 
views are so unlikely to be adopted by Congress.34S Boyle proposes that the 
circuit courts manipulate the Supreme Court's intent test to create an 
intermediate scrutiny approach to equal protection cases involving siting 
issues.346 If a plaintiff could show statistically significant evidence of disparate 
impact, then defendants would have the burden of showing that the affected 
minority group was adequately represented in the decisionmaking process.347 If 
minorities were adequately represented, a court would apply a rational basis 
standard of review, but if minorities were inadequately represented, a court 
would apply intermediate scrutiny.348 
Boyle correctly understands that the Equal Protection Clause is 
fundamentally concerned with whether minorities have been adequately 
represented rather than with substantive results.349 But his attempt to avoid the 
necessity of congressional action by suggesting that circuit courts consciously 
340 See Godsil, supra note 70, at 421-23. 
341 See id. at 422. 
342 See itl. at 422-23. 
343 See Crawford, supra note 129, at 296. 
344 See Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race 
Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REv. 272, 294-96 (1992). 
345 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 979-80 n.228. 
346 See id. at 979-83,988-89. 
347 See id. at 980-83. 
348 See id. at 982. 
349 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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distort Supreme Court precedents is unprincipled and impractical. 
Substantively, his proposal for increased judicial scrutiny is cumbersome 
because it may be difficult for courts to assess the adequacy of minority 
representation if the process nominally gives equal access to minorities, but 
minority groups feel excluded from the majority coalition making the real 
decisions.35o The proposal in Part VI of this Article calls for a statutory scheme 
that would assure adequate minority representation through a weighted, 
cumulative, or proportional voting system, or other measures.351 Boyle is right 
to be concerned about whether minorities are adequately represented in the 
decisionmaking process, but his proposal does not distinguish between those 
minorities who are actually at high risk from a facility and those minorities 
who might be counted as being the victim of disparate impacts because they 
live in a particular geographical area but who are at less risk than many white 
persons. This Article's proposal would assure that all persons who are at high 
risk from a facility, regardless of race or ethnicity, are adequately represented 
in the decisionmaking process. 
B. A Limited Defense of the Intent Requirement 
Proponents of environmental justice goals would have a stronger case for 
placing equity criteria above efficiency concerns if they could establish 
intentional discrimination.352 Legally, and even socially, "racism" has been 
construed to mean intentional or purposeful conduct on the basis of race, or at 
350 See GUINIER, supra note 72, at 4-6 & passim (arguing that minority oppression by 
white majority is possible despite opportunity to vote); Issacharoff, supra note 72, at 1644-
46 (arguing that current judicial doctrines are inadequate to control partisan misuse of the 
reapportionment process). 
351 GUINIER, supra note 72, at 14-16 (discussing cumulative voting as a remedy for 
minority oppression); Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional 
Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1991, 1999-
2015 (1993) (proposing that representatives to United States House of Representatives be 
elected on statewide basis using Hare Single Transferable Vote proportional voting system); 
Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts (discussing cumulative and 
proportional voting systems and arguing that proportional voting is superior), in MINORITY 
VOTE Dn..tmON 249,255-64 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989); John R. Low-Beer, Note, The 
Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, YALE L.J. 163, 187-88 (1985) 
(proposing use of party-list proportional voting system with single-member districting in 
state and local elections); infra notes 429,497 and accompanying text. 
352 By "intentional discrimination," I mean cases in which a plaintiff can establish an 
inference of purposeful intent through statistical evidence, but not cases based solely upon 
disparities, without any evidence of discriminatory intent. See supra notes 295-96 and 
accompanying text. 
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least some consciousness of race as a factor motivating conduct.353 The 
discriminatory intent requirement is based upon the notion that racial 
discrimination is conscious, willful, and morally reprehensible.354 Professor 
Gerald Torres, both a leading critical race and environmental scholar, has 
cautioned against using the term "environmental racism" too loosely because 
"calling something racist when another term might suffice risks subjecting the 
word to a kind of verbal inflation. "355 
Defenders of the intent-based approach to discrimination argue that volition 
is an essential element of race discrimination.356 An intent requirement is a 
bottom-line standard for determining whether or not a person was motivated to 
harm a particular group, whereas a disparate impacts or effects test creates a 
laundry list of factors that can be balanced the way a particular decisionmaker 
wants.357 Commentators have cited four major reasons for not adopting a 
discriminatory impact standard: (1) the impact standard would be too costly for 
the government; (2) under an impact standard, innocent people would bear the 
cost of remedying the harm; (3) the impact standard would be inconsistent with 
traditional equal protection doctrine, because the judicial decisionmaker would 
need to explicitly consider race; and (4) it would be inappropriate for the 
judiciary to remedy the impact of otherwise neutral government action at the 
expense of other legitimate social interests.358 
Critics of the intent approach correctly observe that it does not address 
structural, indirect, or vestigial effects of racism,359 but there are more 
effective ways to redress such issues than through discrimination suits. Broad 
353 See Foster, supra note 8, at 731. See generally Lawrence, supra note 286, at 318-
20, 347-49, 366-76 (explaining establishment of the intent-purpose requirement in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and its further inculcation 
in equal protection-race discrimination jurisprudence as a necessity in establishing actionable 
racism). Because of this intent requirement, a showing of a racially disparate impact of a 
facially neutral law or decision is insufficient without showing specific racial animus. Id. at 
318-19; see also Foster, supra note 8, at 731 n.48 (discussing Lawrence). 
354 See Boyle, supra note 69, at 963 n.l46 (citing sources). 
355 Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. 
L. REv. 839, 839 (1992). 
356 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: 
Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. 
REv. 633, 643-44 (1983). 
357 See Uf. at 644-45. 
358 Lawrence, supra note 286, at 320-21; see also Colopy, supra note 18, at 146 
(citing Lawrence). 
359 See supra notes 307-13 and accompanying text. 
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income redistribution policies designed to ameliorate market dynamics,360 
compensation schemes that internalize the social costs of pollution,361 and 
environmental policies designed to reduce the impact of hot-spots362 that 
disproportionately affect minorities will accomplish more than liberalized 
disparate impact suits. 
C. Statistical Significance and Disparate Impact Qaims 
While it is undoubtedly frustrating for plaintiffs who allege discriminatory 
siting practices to be told by a court that there are not enough facilities in a 
given area to establish statistically significant evidence of disparate impacts, 
there is a danger in applying any lesser standard for determining whether a 
pattern of inequity exists. Some critics of studies alleging racial disparities have 
questioned the quality of the evidence. For example, studies that classify an 
area as minority or poor whenever the percentage of people of color or poor in 
the community exceeds that of the population as a whole ignore the population 
density within a neighborhood. They also classify predominantly white or 
wealthy areas in which the population variance from the national distribution is 
statistically insignificant as victims of disproportionate siting.363 The National 
Law Journal study,364 which found significant racial and income disparities, 
has been challenged on two grounds: first, all of the areas the authors defined 
as minority areas included a substantial majority of white persons; and second, 
the study failed to use standard tests of statistical significance.365 In addition, 
360 See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1390-92. 
361 See supra notes 170-87 and accompanying text; infra notes 480-520 and 
accompanying text. 
362 See supra notes 28-29, 31, 49-54 and accompanying text. 
363 See BoERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 4-5; Been, Market Dynamics, supra 
note 1, at 1384 n.2, 1403 n.85 (criticizing assumption that siting is always disproportionate 
when the percentage of a minority group in a host tract is higher than the percentage in 
nonhost tracts or the city or national average). 
364 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
365 See Mary Bryant, Unequal Justice? Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics Revisited, 
SONREEL NEWS, Sept.lOct. 1993, at 3, 3 (criticizing National lAw Journal study for 
referring to populations that are at least 79% white as "minority" in nature); Lazarus, supra 
note 1, at 818 n.I25. But see Methodology, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 84. Thomas E. 
Godfrey, vice president for research at Decision Demographics, which contributed to the 
study, defended it by arguing that "'[iJn a country where residential segregation abounds, an 
area that is 80 percent white or less might be considered highly integrated in the eyes of the 
residents,''' and that for the purposes of measuring environmental inequities such areas 
"'may still be arguably indicative of "minority" populations compared to an area that is 
nearly 100 percent white in population composition.'" Id. The National lAw Journal did not 
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the National Law Journal data are not adjusted for time.366 
Professor Lazarus, an advocate of reducing environmental inequities, has 
observed that the statistical findings of the 1987 United Church of Christ 
study367 reflect a ninety percent confidence level, "which is not particularly 
high," and that the statistical methodology utilized in the study is controversial 
because the "study utilizes a 'discriminate' rather than 'regression' analysis 
technique, which is the more widely accepted basis for differentiating between 
the effect of multiple dependent variables. "368 Furthermore, he notes that the 
United Church of Christ study equates the siting of toxic sites with actual 
exposure to toxic releases and relies on present demographic data rather than 
the demographic data pertaining to the time when the initial siting decision may 
have been made.369 Professor Been has severely criticized the methodology 
used by Professor Bullard in his studies of alleged discriminatory siting in 
Houston.370 
Beyond requiring statistically significant evidence of discrimination, there 
are even more difficult problems that courts need to address in assessing claims 
of environmental inequities. Scholars have employed different definitions of 
race and ethnicity371 and have disagreed about defining the location of 
subpopulations relative to the location of the activity, condition, or impact 
report the statistical significance of any element of its study. See Bryant, supra, at 4. 
366 Because cleanup requirements have become more stringent since Congress enacted 
the 1986 Superfund Reform and Reauthorization Act, it is important to take into account 
when a cleanup occurred, but the National Law Journal study failed to do so. See Bryant, 
supra note 365, at 4. Other commentators have come to conflicting conclusions about 
whether race or class matters in determining how quickly EPA cleans up a site. Compare 
Hird, supra note 61, at 337 (finding no relationship between pace at which sites are cleaned 
up and host county's socioeconomic characteristics) with Rae Zimmerman, Sodal Equity 
and Environmental Risk, 13 RIsK ANALYSIS: lNr'L J. 649, 660-64 (1993) (finding that the 
higher the percentage of African-Americans in community, the less likely it was that 
hazardous waste sites in community had progressed to "Record of Decision" stage of 
cleanup, especially when community was also relatively poor; but finding that difference 
was primarily function of how long site had been listed on National Priorities List). 
367 See supra note 31. 
368 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 802 n.56. 
3691d. 
370 Been notes that Bullard's data are confusing and perhaps incomplete, and that her 
own finding of disproportionate siting may not be correct if Bullard's data are flawed. Been, 
Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 1400-01 n.69, 1403 n.85. But see Bullard, supra note 
57, at 60-61 (challenging Been's exclusion of sites included in his earlier study). 
371 See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 634. Some scholars have suggested that race and 
ethnicity are meaningful only when combined with other factors, such as income. See id. at 
665-66 (citing sources). 
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area.372 Scholars have strongly disagreed about the appropriateness of using 
various geographical boundaries such as counties, municipalities, zip codes, 
service areas, census tracts, block groups, and blocks.373 Because scholars 
cannot agree on how to define subpopulations or geographical areas, one must 
assess all existing empirical research with some caution.374 
Courts need to establish clear tests for defining minority and ethnic groups 
and geographical areas, but it will be difficult. Courts should distinguish 
between disparities resulting from the initial siting decision and those caused by 
subsequent events attributable to market dynamics. 
Courts should be relatively stringent in evaluating discrimination claims 
because of the stigma associated with branding a defendant as a discriminator. 
Many might argue that the threat of exposing minorities to disproportionate 
pollution is a far greater danger than the impact of a discrimination verdict 
upon a government official's career, but a legislative reform of the siting 
process that insures adequate minority representation and compensation can 
achieve more to prevent disparities and do so without the need for a finding of 
unlawful discrimination on the part of government officials. In light of the 
methodological difficulties in determining whether a particular ethnic or 
minority group has been discriminated against, it is better to use a 
compensation process to redress racial and income disparities unless a plaintiff 
can prove intentional discrimination. 
V. A COST-BENEFIT APPROACH TO COMPENSATION AND RIsK 
A. A Limited Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Management 
Professor Rodgers has argued that there are four basic approaches to using 
cost-benefit analysis for regulation: (1) cost-oblivious, which ignores cost 
because it is too hard to measure or because environmental values should be 
protected at any cost; (2) cost-effective, which takes cost into account only in 
implementing objectives or choosing means, not in setting goals or objectives; 
372 Id. 
373 William K. Reilly, then Administrator of the EPA, criticized the use of zip code 
areas in the National Law Journal study because they vary in size and their overall 
population may not reflect the immediate popUlation surrounding a facility. See Reilly, 
supra note 37, at 16. Likewise, Professor Been has argued that census tracts of 
approximately 2500 to 8000 people are a more reliable means to define a community than 
five-digit zip code areas, which may be smaller or larger than census tracts but typically are 
larger than census blocks or block groupings. See Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 1, at 
1401 n.73, 1402-03 n.84. 
374 See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 665-69. 
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(3) cost-sensitive, which takes cost into account both in setting and 
implementing policy; and (4) strict cost-benefit analysis based upon highly 
quantitative methods.375 Most federal environmental statutes that regulate 
health risks favor the second or third approach over strict cost-benefit 
analysis.376 While numerous provisions of environmental statutes require the 
EPA to consider economic factors, none explicitly requires a formal cost-
benefit analysis.377 A series of executive orders, however, require agencies 
issuing "major rules" to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that the 
benefits of a proposed regulation outweigh its costs.378 
The great difficulty in conducting a cost-benefit analysis is in measuring 
the value of nonmarket goods such as human lives or the existence of other 
species.379 For instance, existing regulations establish values ranging from 
$70,000 to $132,000,000 per life saved.380 Another problem is that cost-
benefit analysis does not address distributional issues.381 
The EPA or a state siting board or agency should perform a limited cost-
sensitive analysis to determine whether a proposed hazardous waste site poses 
an acceptable risk to a community and whether the developer's proposed 
compensation to a community is reasonable. Because there are too many 
difficulties in assessing environmental risks to apply a strict cost-benefit 
analysis, the EPA or a siting board should apply a cost-sensitive approach in 
which it considers costs, benefits, and other factors, including distributional 
375 See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of 
Health and Environmental Dedsionmaking, 4 HARv. ENVfL. L. REv. 191, 201-14 (1980) 
(addressing regulatory cost-benefit analysis but not compensation). 
376 Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 272. 
3771d. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214 (5th Cir. 1991), 
however, the EPA and Fifth Circuit independently concluded that the decisionmaking 
process should include a cost-benefit analysis even though the Toxic Substances Control 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988), does not explicitly require it. See Asbestos, Preamble 
to Fmal Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,467 (1989); Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 
254, at 272-73. 
378 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 5, at 641 (president Clinton) (cost-
benefit analysis required for any "significant" rule, that is, "a rule that may [have] an 
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way 
the economy"); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 127 (1981) (president Reagan) 
(cost-benefit analysis required for any "major" rule, that is, "any regulation that is likely to 
result in [an] annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more [or a] major increase in 
costs or prices"). 
379 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 273-74; Rodgers, supra note 
375, at 194-96. 
380 See Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 273. 
381 Rodgers, supra note 375, at 194. 
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inequities. The EPA or state agency should require higher minimum 
compensation for higher-risk facilities.382 
1. Risk Assessment: Impe1ject but Necessary 
It is difficult to estimate the health risks of a hazardous waste facility. 
Given the uncertainties of risk assessment, some environmental justice 
proponents have proposed that all such facilities be closed down, or at least that 
no new facilities be built. 383 But some new facilities are needed to replace old 
ones or address new capacity needs.384 Furthermore, there is some evidence 
suggesting that the benefits of such facilities outweigh their risks.385 
The amount of potential risk a hazardous waste site generates has not been 
established, nor has the relationship been established between such risks and 
distance from a site.386 The extent to which pollution from a facility reaches a 
given individual and reaches individual cells that are sensitive to the pollutant is 
difficult and expensive to measure.387 The EPA generally uses predictive 
models, such as the Human Exposure Model, rather than direct measurements, 
to calculate the exposure of a hypothetical maximally exposed individual.388 
Some commentators have criticized this model for being overly conservative, 
but others have defended conservative assumptions because it is better to err on 
the side of safety. 389 
To understand the relative risk of hazardous waste facilities, it would be 
helpful to compare their risks to those of other types of polluting facilities or 
substances. The EPA has already undertaken a large amount of research on 
interprogram priority setting, based upon the premise of the commensurability 
of risks.39o The EPA is currently establishing a process to set pollution 
382 See infra notes 451-55 and accompanying text. 
383 See ilifra notes 106-12 and accompanying text. 
384 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
385 See infra notes 414-28 and accompanying text. 
386 See Anderton et al., supra note 59, at 124-25. 
387 See Mank, supra note 18, at 336-37. 
388 ld. at 335 n.334. 
389 See id. (citing sources). 
390 See U.S. EPA, COMPARING RIsKS AND SETIING ENVIRONMENI'AL PRIORITIES: 
OVERVIEW OF THREE REGIONAL PROJEcrs (1989) [hereinafter EPA, COMPARING RIsKS]; 
U.S. EPA, ScIENCE ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RIsK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENI'AL PROTEcrION (1990) [hereinafter EPA, REDUCING RIsK]; U.S. EPA, 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE AssESSMENf OF ENVIRONMENI'AL PROBLEMS 
(1987) [hereinafter EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS]; see also Richard L. Andrews, Long-
Range Planning in Environmental and Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 EcoLOGY L.Q. 515, 
552-57 (1993); Applegate, supra note 239, at 349-51 (citing sources). 
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reduction and resource priorities.391 The most difficult problem is comparing 
health risks in different contexts, such as pesticides, water pollution, air 
pollution, and land disposal of toxic wastes, each of which presents different 
routes of exposure, costs and benefits, and types of risk.392 
There has been considerable scholarly debate about the EPA's basic 
premise that different types of risk are commensurable.393 Opponents of risk 
assessment often criticize attempts by experts to rate the risk of a single 
chemical based upon expected fatalities because of pervasive scientific 
uncertainties, inadequate information, and the need to consider moral, 
equitable, and distributional issues.394 In addition, critics of comparative risk 
assessment often argue (1) that society lacks sufficient information to compare 
different types of risk or health effects; (2) that the pain of dying from cancer is 
not comparable to the impact of reproductive or neurological disease; and (3) 
that comparative risk assessment does not consider the distribution of risk-
bearing and control costs, the concentration and dispersion of risks in space or 
time, or intergenerational equity.395 Professor Hornstein believes that because 
social priority setting is inescapably collective and political, proponents of 
comparative risk analysis exaggerate its scientific legitimacy. 396 
The EPA has used carcinogenicity as a common metric, but that single 
measure cannot provide scientific answers on how to compare the impact of 
391 In a December 22, 1993 memorandum, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner 
announced a new Science Policy Council and the elimination of the narrower Risk 
Assessment Council. Science Panel Set to Begin Projects on Peer Review, Risk 
Ozaracterization, [25 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 19, 19-20 (May 6, 1994). 
The Council's duties will include: "Determining priorities among issues identified by EPA 
regions, programs, the Risk Assessment Forum, Science Advisory Board, other federal 
agencies, and other major working groups and committees •.•• " Id. at 20. 
392 See Applegate, supra note 239, at 350-51. 
393 See id. at 349-51 (citing sources); Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-616 
(criticizing comparative risk assessment); Symposium, Risk Analysis and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 21 ENVrL. L. 1321 (1991); Setting Environmental 
Priorities: The Debate About Risk, 17 EPA J. (1991) (entire issue). 
394 See generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-85 (arguing for multi-
factor "public" approach to risk and against "expert" cost-benefit analysis of expected 
fatalities). 
395 See generally Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-616, 631-33 & passim; Robin 
Shifrin, Note, Not by Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 YALE LJ. 547, 
560-62 (1992) (arguing that comparative risk assessment tends to focus on aggregate risk 
reduction and largely ignores the equitable norm that all members of society should bear a 
similar average risk); see also Gillette & Krier, supra note 236, at 1071-85 (arguing for 
multi-factor "public" approach to risk and against "expert" cost-benefit analysis of expected 
fatalities) • 
396 See generally Hornstein, supra note 234, at 584-616,631-33 & passim. 
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cancer on diverse, exposed subpopulations such as children and adults, or the 
tradeoffs between using two chemicals that are more or less risky to 
farmworkers or applicators as opposed to consumers.397 Cancer research 
cannot always measure the risk of a chemical within a range of two orders of 
magnitude, a factor of 100.398 When hard data are lacking, the EPA may create 
a grossly inflated upper bound for actual cancer risk from specific pollutants or 
may create too low a bound despite conservative assumptions.399 There are 
even greater uncertainties about measuring on a single risk index the risks from 
chemicals that present dangers of such noncancer "endpoints" as birth defects, 
reproductive failure, acute poisonings, and neurological defects.4OO This author 
agrees in many respects with critics of comparative risk assessment who argue 
that it is methodologically impossible and misleading to compare carcinogens 
and noncarcinogens on a single risk index.401 
Although the numbers used by risk or cost-benefit analysis may provide a 
misleading sense of accuracy in a field based upon assumption after 
assumption, there are some meaningful differences in risk and cost that might 
be used as the basis for a rough siting evaluation and compensation process. A 
recent Harvard Lifesaving Study by the Harvard School of Public Health's 
Center for Risk Analysis found that medical care generally saves lives at less 
cost than workplace-safety or environmental measures, and that extravagantly 
large sums are spent to alleviate minor cancer tisks.402 The Harvard study 
points out some examples of pollution control requirements that are clearly 
cost-ineffective by any measure. For instance, preventing releases of 
carcinogenic chloroform at pulp mills costs an estimated $99.4 billion for each 
397 See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the 
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Refonn, 10 YALE J. ON REo. 369, 441; 
Mank, supra note 18, at 282. 
398 See Mank, supra note 18, at 281-83, 333; Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating 
Acceptable Cancer Riskfrom Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 338 
(1992). 
399 See Mank, supra note 18, at 282. 
400 See id. at 283-84, 333. 
401 See id. at 283-85 (criticizing Bush Administration's efforts to use single risk index 
for carcinogens and noncarcinogens). 
402 Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness 13 (July 7, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). According to 
the study, each year of life bought by a medical intervention costs, on average, $19,000, 
but a life-year saved by toxin control costs more than $2,700,000. ld. Outside researchers 
say that the Harvard study, begun in 1990, is more rigorous than previous studies because 
some 90% of its data were drawn from government or peer-reviewed studies in technical 
journals and because of its breadth and the number of interventions analyzed. See Stipp, 
supra note 233, atBl. 
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life-year saved.403 
Because it is unacceptable to spend biIIions of doIIars for each life-year 
saved by regulation, the EPA must refine its risk and cost-benefit analyses and 
avoid rapidly escalating costs that fail the "knee-of-the-curve" test.404 The EPA 
or state agencies, however, should stiII take into account normative reasons 
such as equity in making decisions-even if such decisions are not justified by 
a strict cost-benefit analysis, which is likely to be imperfect in light of 
pervasive scientific uncertainties and high informational costs-as long as the 
cost of reducing inequities is not too far out of line with other poIIution 
reducing priorities.405 
Some risks, however, are so remote or expensive to remediate that nothing 
should be spent on them because the money could be better spent elsewhere or 
because there are negative "income effects" leading to poorer diet or more 
unemployment, which in turn may increase the number of heart attacks or 
suicides.406 By reducing the incentives for businesses to locate in poor and 
minority areas, legislative proposals to reduce environmental inequities may 
exacerbate local problems of poverty and unemployment that are far more 
unhealthy than the minute risks associated with waste disposal facilities and 
industrial plants.407 
2. Assessing a Developer's Compensation 
It is relatively easy to measure the benefits of a proposed hazardous waste 
facility. Developers are quick to provide information in terms of new jobs, tax 
revenues, and additional compensation.408 An agency or siting board should 
verify how the developer came up with the numbers and perhaps hire a 
consulting firm to perform an independent analysis. The siting board should 
analyze both the overall benefits to a community and the distribution of benefits 
to particular individuals. 
A much more difficult task is assessing whether the compensation offered 
by a developer is sufficient to internalize the externalities that the facility wiII 
impose on surrounding residents. Because of the uncertainties in risk 
assessment, the EPA or a state agency should determine only whether the 
403 Tengs et al., supra note 402, at 50; Stipp, supra note 233, at B2. 
404 See Mank, supra note 18, at 327, 331 n.320; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 
236, at 743 n.77. 
405 See Mank, supra note 18, at 328. 
406 See BREYER, supra note 113, at 16-29. 
407 See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 13, at 6. 
408 See McDermott, supra note 1, at 698 (discussing benefits of Emelle Landfill in 
Sumter County, Alabama). 
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developer's offer meets minimum standards and then allow a community to 
negotiate a higher amount. 409 The EPA or state agency could either base 
minimum compensation on a historical examination of what developers have 
offered in the past five or ten years for a facility of similar size or risk, or rely 
upon surveys of residents who live near similar facilities to determine what 
they believe would be fair compensation.41o In formulating its 1989 benzene 
standards, the EPA used a historical survey to determine that a one-in-ten-
thousand risk to the maximally exposed person constituted an acceptable risk to 
human heaIth.411 Critics of the benzene rule have argued that use of historical 
survey data is inappropriate for setting current standards.412 Even if their 
criticism of the benzene standard is appropriate, a historical survey could be 
used to set minimum compensation standards that would serve as the starting 
point for compensating neighbors of a hazardous waste site. 
3. The Emelle Landfill Example 
One example may help in assessing the relative costs and benefits of a 
hazardous waste facility to a minority community. Chemical Waste 
Management's Emelle Landfill in rural Sumter County, Alabama is one of the 
largest hazardous waste facilities in the United States.413 Charles McDermott, 
Director of Government Affairs for WMX Technologies, the parent of 
Chemical Waste Management,414 claims that the facility provides a minimum 
of $4,200,000 in taxes to Sumter County, has a payroll of $10,000,000 and 
that sixty percent of the employees live in the county.415 The facility has 
provided in-kind services such as water supply hookups, the construction of the 
409 See infra notes 451-74 and accompanying text. 
410 See Been, supra note 77, at 796-800 (discussing surveys of residents who actually 
or potentially live near a hazardous or radioactive waste facility). 
411 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions 
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethyl Benzene Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, 
Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Products Recovery Plants, Preamble to Final 
Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,045-46 (1989) (describing how EPA selected its method for 
setting emissions standards for benzene and radionuclide categories); Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1164-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) 
(suggesting use of historical surveys in determining acceptable risk); Mank, supra note 18, 
at 270-71,276-77 (discussing benzene rule and use of historical risk survey). 
412 See Janet L. McQuaid, Note, Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pol/utants Under 
the EPA's Final Benzene Rules and the Qean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 70 TEX. L. 
REv. 427, 437 (1991). 
413 See McDermott, supra note 1, at 697. 
4141d. at 693 n.16. 
415 See id. at 698. 
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town hall, and a baseball field.416 He contends that the site was chosen because 
it was sparsely populated, had good access to transportation, was relatively 
arid, and, most importantly, was located atop the Selma chalk formation, which 
consists of several hundred square miles of dense, 700-foot-thick natural chalk, 
an ideal barrier between disposal activities and the nearest aquifer feeding a 
drinking source.417 
Environmental justice proponents Conner Bailey and Charles E. Faupel use 
the Emelle Landfill as an example of how economic considerations encourage 
the placement of environmental hazards in minority communities.418 They 
argue that the "black, rural, and poor" area of Sumter County has become 
dependent upon the Emelle Landfill for economic survival and that the county's 
depressed economy prevented citizens from organizing aggressive opposition to 
the siting of the facility in their community.419 
The EPA has ranked the relative risk posed by several different kinds of 
environmental problems and found that hazardous waste facilities permitted 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)420 pose relatively 
low risks, even though much more of the agency's budget is spent to regulate 
them than on other, more serious environmental problems.421 Similarly, the 
416 See id. 
417 See id. at 697. 
418 Bailey & Faupel, supra note 86. 
419 See id. at 140-43. 
420 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 
2795. 
421 An EPA study assessing the relative risk of 31 different environmental problems 
found that the following issues posed a high risk to human health or the environment but 
received relatively little attention or funding from the agency: indoor radon; indoor air 
pollution; ozone depletion; global warming; non-point sources; discharges to estuaries, 
coastal waters, and oceans; other pesticide risks; accidental releases of toxins; consumer 
products; and worker exposures. See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 390, at xv; 
see also U.S. EPA, A RIsK ANALYSIS OF TwENry-SIX ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS: 
SUMMARY REPoRT (1991) (ranking the relative risk of 26 different environmental problems 
ranging from ozone depletion and radon exposure to several common industrial activities 
and RCRA-permitted facilities) [hereinafter EPA, TwENrY-SIX PROBLEMS]; McDermott, 
supra note 1, at 692. Other problems posed relatively lower risks, but the EPA spent a great 
deal of resources in redressing them: active hazardous waste RCRA sites; National Priorities 
List abandoned waste sites eligible for Superfund monies; underground storage tanks; and 
municipal nonhazardous waste sites. See EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 390, at 
xv; see also EPA, TwENrY-SIX PROBLEMS, supra, at 9 (ranking RCRA-permitted facilities 
among lowest tested risks); McDermott, supra note 1, at 692 (same). The implications of 
the EPA's studies for developing risk-based priorities and for comparative risk assessment 
are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally EPA, REDUCING RIsK, supra note 390 
(qua1ifiedly endorsing risk-based prioritization and comparative risk assessment); Applegate, 
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amount of money allocated to Superfund cleanups of abandoned hazardous 
waste sites corresponds more closely to public perceptions of risk than actual 
risks, and less money is allocated to more serious problems such as pesticide 
residues because of the public's misperception of the relative risks.422 
On the other hand, Professor Hornstein and others have observed that a 
perfectly plausible equitable argument can be made that it is more important to 
eliminate highly concentrated risks from hazardous. waste sites that include the 
risk of destroying whole families or neighborhoods than greater but more 
diffuse risks such as those posed by chlorine by-products in public drinking 
water.423 A recent study found that the risks of Superfund sites to present 
populations are generally relatively low but quite substantial in many 
instances.424 For instance, Superfund sites on the National Priorities List often 
contain lead, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), benzene, or pesticides.425 
Hazardous waste sites may pose considerable risks to future generations, 
depending upon the validity of certain assumptions about future use of a site,426 
an issue addressed in Part VI(B)(2). In a world of scarce financial and 
informational resources, environmental policymaking should consider the 
relative risks of different types of problems427 and the views of those citizens 
most at risk from concentrated dangers.428 
Although it is probably impossible to fully assess the risks produced by the 
Emelle facility, in light of the relatively low risks posed by hazardous waste 
supra note 239, at 309-10 (qualifiedly endorsing risk-based prioritization); Hornstein, supra 
note 234, at 584-629 (criticizing comparative risk assessment). 
422 See EPA, UNF1NISHEDBuSINESS, supra note 390, at 77-78, 84-86,91-99; EPA, 
COMPARING RIsKS, supra note 390, at 62-65; Applegate, supra note 239, at 279; see also 
Lester B. Lave, Risk Assessment and Regulatory Priorities, 14 COUJM. J. ENVfL. L. 307, 
309-11 (1989) (discussing studies showing that regulatory expenditures do not correlate 
with greater risk). 
423 See Hornstein, supra note 235, at 593; Shifrin, supra note 395, at 561 (arguing that 
even if Superfund sites pose relatively low overall risk, they may pose concentrated risks to 
nearby residents justifying substantial expenditures on equitable grounds). 
424 Professors James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi analyzed the exposure pathways 
considered in the human health risk assessments conducted at 78 Superfund sites with 
Records of Decision signed in 1991 or 1992, and found that the risks to present populations 
were relatively low but could not be classified as trivial. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip 
VISCusi, Hwnan Health Risk Assessments for Superfond, 21 EcoLOGY L.Q. 573, 576, 608-
09 (1994). 
425 Jeffrey Spear, Comment, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA. and Our 
Responsibilities to Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENVfL. L.J. 117, 139-40 (1993). 
426 See Hamilton & Viscusi, supra note 424, at 608-09. 
427 See Applegate, supra note 239, at 282-87. 
428 See Hornstein, supra note 234, at 593; Shifrin, supra note 395, at 561. 
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facilities in general, it is not unreasonable for an agency and community to 
conclude that the overall benefits of the landfill outweigh its risks. While Bailey 
and Faupel may be right that poor blacks in rural Sumter County are more 
vulnerable to the economic inducements offered by the facility, local residents 
ought to be able to accept such a facility as long as the risk is reasonable as 
judged by technocratic experts and those most at risk in the community think 
that the benefits outweigh the costs. Environmental justice proponents are 
undoubtedly genuinely concerned about the risk of facilities such as the Emelle 
Landfill, but local residents may be making the right choice in accepting 
relatively minor risks in exchange for concrete benefits. Existing compensation 
programs, however, do not guarantee that those most at risk will have a voice 
in negotiating compensation. 
VI. SOLUTION: RIsK-BASED COMPENSATION COMMITfEES 
A national or state risk assessment process should be used to set maximum 
levels of risk within a local area to prevent exploitation of any community. The 
risk assessment process could also determine the minimum amount of 
compensation that a developer, owner, or operator must provide to compensate 
a local community. 
A risk-based siting committee would ultimately determine whether to 
accept a site and would negotiate the amount and distribution of compensation 
paid by the developer. The relative say that nearby residents, residents in a 
municipality, and regional neighbors have on a siting negotiation committee 
would depend on the relative amount of risk to which individuals are 
potentially or actually exposed, as determined by the risk assessment process. 
This siting proposal differs from previous siting proposals in that the risk 
assessment process would determine both the membership of the local siting 
committee and the minimum amount of compensation. To protect the interests 
of racial minorities and those exposed to higher risks, special voting systems 
could be used, such as weighted cumulative voting or proportional voting.429 
A. Limits on Risk: Technocratic Maximums 
If all communities are fully informed about the costs of a facility and all 
enjoy equal bargaining power, a siting will be most efficient if the facility is 
placed in the community that is willing to accept the facility for the lowest 
price, assuming that the price covers all the costs the facility imposes.430 To 
429 See supra note 349. 
430 Been, supra note 77, at 796. 
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promote such efficiency, some proposals attempt to create a competitive market 
between facility developers and communities.431 While studies have disagreed 
about whether there are widespread siting disparities,432 there is enough 
evidence to cast doubt on rosy assumptions about equal access to full 
information and bargaining power among all communities. Given the 
complexities of risk assessment,433 it would be surprising if access to full 
information was the norm among potential siting communities in the United 
States. At the very least, a siting scheme must consider inefficiencies in the 
market for siting hazardous waste facilities and the need for some government 
regulation. 
Technical experts from state or federal administrative agencies should 
determine maximum levels of allowable risk and impose moratoria on the 
construction of new disposal or polluting facilities in high-risk areas.434 A cost-
benefit and risk assessment analysis could determine if any subpopulation 
group is likely to receive substantially disproportionate harm from a proposed 
facility.435 Part VI(B)(3) discusses alternative approaches for defining the 
appropriate geographical area and the relevant class of protected persons. 
Unlike the Gore, Lewis, and Collins bills,436 however, there should be an 
opportunity to build new facilities if an equal or greater amount of risk was 
eliminated by closing an existing facility. The proposed moratoria approach 
would prevent anyone area, whether predominantly white or minority, from 
being exploited. 
There should be no attempt, however, to insure that all areas have roughly 
the same amount of risk, because in a market-based society it is too difficult to 
mandate equality of results. Attempts to use a "fair share" approach or a 
mathematical formula for allocating low-income housing have enjoyed only a 
mixed record of succesS.437 Even for a single type of locally undesirable land 
use, mathematical determinations of "fair share" involve an enormous number 
431 Seeid. 
432 See supra part ll. 
433 See supra part V.A.l. 
434 See infra notes 441-49 and accompanying text. 
435 See supra note 54 and accompanying text; infra notes 449,492 and accompanying 
text. 
436 See supra part ill.A.4. 
437 The New Jersey Supreme Court used such an approach with mixed success to 
force exclusive suburbs to open their doors to low- and moderate-income housing. See 
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 
1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Been, Fairness, supra note 
1, at 1076 (noting mixed record of success of fair share housing plans). 
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of value judgments and measurements that are likely to result in litigation.438 A 
recent proposal to have states adopt a point-system siting model that takes into 
account factors such as race, income, history of siting practices, and 
geographical fairness is likely to fail because it is too difficult to balance such 
complex and diverse technical and social factors, especially to the extent that 
incommensurable notions of equity are at stake.439 In a free-market society 
there is no way to prevent wealthy people from living in areas that are 
unsuitable for locally undesirable land uses, and therefore national or state 
attempts to impose a fair distribution of such projects on local communities are 
likely to be unsuccessful.44O Nevertheless, the process of establishing moratoria 
in high-risk areas may indirectly encourage the siting of facilities in lower risk 
locations as developers look for alternative sites.441 
The EPA and state agencies already employ a number of technical and risk 
assessment criteria to evaluate the suitability of proposed locations or the risk 
of proposed or existing sites. Most existing state siting schemes look at hard-
technical criteria including the physical and geological characteristics of the 
site, natural hazards such as earthquakes or flooding, drinking water sources, 
surrounding fragile land areas such as wetlands or shorelines, ecological 
habitats, and historic areas.442 In addition, most states examine soft-technical 
criteria such as economic development and traffic congestion.443 
Risk assessment procedures are used to evaluate the risk of existing or 
proposed sites. For example, the National Priorities List for cleaning up 
Superfund sites uses a Hazard Ranking System, a scoring system, to rate the 
438 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1075-76. 
439 See Mata, supra note 92, at 447-67 (proposing siting model based on point system 
for assessing both technical and equitable factors). See generally Hornstein, supra note 234, 
at 602. 
ld. 
In general, to the extent that incommensurable notions of equity are at stake, they 
cannot be resolved simply by combining equity "points" that might be generated even 
by a richer model of expected utility; incommensurability means that there cannot be a 
single equity scale that can generate "points" which represent meaningful conclusions 
about the equitable thing to do in any particular environmental decision. 
440 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1050. 
441 Because developers often avoid high-cost areas, to the extent the proposal increases 
the cost of locating in an already high-risk area, developers would presumably select an 
alternative, lower-risk and lower-cost location. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying 
text. 
442 See Mata, supra note 92, at 454-55. 
443 See id. at 455. 
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relative risk posed by a potential clean-up sites.444 Section 112(t) of the Clean 
Air Act requires a risk assessment of the carcinogenic danger of major sources 
emitting hazardous air pollutants in determining whether the EPA must 
promulgate residual risk standards.44S 
Both the EPA and state agencies have used risk assessments to determine 
what constitutes an unacceptable level of risk,446 often recognizing the 
uncertainties of risk assessment by looking at a range of possible risk.447 
Generally, a level of excess cancer risk greater than one-in-ten-thousand is 
unacceptable and a risk less than one-in-one-million is presumptively 
acceptable.448 The EPA needs to develop better techniques for assessing 
noncarcinogenic risks and for evaluating the risks to subpopulations whose 
dietary and work patterns differ from the national average.449 Despite its 
limitations, however, risk assessment can serve a protective function in 
preventing excessive concentrations of risk from environmental pollution. 
444 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A (1994); see also John S. Applegate, How to Save 
the National Priorities List from the D.G. Orcuit-and Itself, 9 J. NAT. REsOURCES & 
ENVrL. L. 211, 214-15 (1994); Ragna Henrichs, Supeljund's NPL: The Listing Process, 63 
ST. JOlIN'SL. REv. 717, 729-37 (1989). 
44S See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(t) (Supp. V 1993); Mank, supra note 18, at 274-76. 
446 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(t)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (using one-in-one-million 
standard to trigger residual risk provisions for hazardous air pollutants); Mank, supra note 
18, at 275-77, 309-10, 332 (discussing several statutes and regulations relating to toxic 
chemicals that use one-in-one-million standard). 
447 A risk range approach would start with a basic acceptable risk range of an excess 
cancer risk of one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-one-million. The EPA and at least one state 
currently use such ranges to guide their decisions. See Mank, supra note 18, at 332 
(discussing use of risk ranges by the EPA's Office of Solid Waste and the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection's Division of Environmental Quality). "For 
example, the EPA's Office of Solid Waste in selecting among cleanup alternatives for 
corrective action for Solid Waste Management Units at active hazardous waste facilities 
seeks to reduce lifetime cancer risks into the one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-a-million range. " 
Id. at 332 n.326 (discussing Corrective Action for Solid Waste Management Units 
(SWMUs) at Hazardous Waste Facilities, 40 C.F.R. pts. 264, 265, 270, 271 (1994)); see 
also infra notes 448, 453, 493 and accompanying text. 
448 See id. at 332 (discussing United States EPA's standards for hazardous waste 
facilities and New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's standards); Corrective 
Action for Solid Waste Management Units (SMWU's) at Hazardous Waste Facilities, 55 
Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,825-27 (1990); National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency 
Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8717-23, 8768 (1990). 
449 See Mank, supra note 18, at 281-84,336-37. 
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B. Negotiated Compensation: Technocratic Minimums and Risk-Based 
Negotiating Committees 
Membership of siting negotiation committees should be determined by a 
risk assessment process that gives proportionately increased representation to 
those who are likely to be exposed to greater risks from a proposed facility. 
The risk assessment process should establish a minimum amount of 
compensation that a developer must pay to a community, perhaps based in part 
upon how much developers of similar facilities have paid or surveys of 
residents in communities with similar facilities.45o Technical representatives 
from the EPA, a state agency, or independent consultants paid for by 
government or developer funds would assist the local citizens on the 
negotiating committee in understanding the complex risk issues. 
1. Minimum Compensation Benchmarks and Agency Expertise 
The EPA could set minimum compensation benchmarks based upon a 
scientific risk assessment process. Negotiation-based assessments of cost may 
be too low because of imperfect information or poor negotiating skills.451 
There are difficult problems in measuring the appropriate amount of 
compensation, especially for hazardous and radioactive wastes, and in 
allocating compensation among potential recipients,452 but the agency's 
minimum compensation figure would provide a starting place for negotiations. 
If the EPA found that the risk could range from an excess cancer risk of one-in-
two-hundred-fifty-thousand to a risk of one-in-one-million, it would base 
compensation on its lower assessment of risk, one-in-one-million, and then 
allow the community committee to bargain with the developer over the 
possibility that the risk is really at the high end of the agency's estimate, one-
in-two-hundred-fifty-thousand. 
For example, the EPA or a state agency could give persons exposed to 
greater than a one-in-one-hundred-thousand excess cancer risk the right to 
demand that the developer, owner, or operator buyout those persons' homes at 
the fair market value absent the facility. 453 Congress and the EPA have 
450 See supra notes 410-12 and accompanying text. 
451 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1043-44. 
452 See itI. at 1042-46; Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1212-13 (explaining that different 
modeling assumptions can produce very different results in identifying ideal facility 
locations). 
453 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1198-99 (arguing that "[p]eople within a close 
radius of the site should not be trapped; they should be offered the preproposaI value of 
their property, plus relocation costs," and discussing examples of buyouts); Mank, supra 
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authorized the buyout of property and relocation of residents when remediation 
of a site was infeasible.454 For the siting of new facilities, however, the EPA 
normally should not authorize the siting of a high-risk facility requiring 
relocation of residents unless the facility is of critical importance and there are 
no other reasonable locations. Developers should not normally have an implicit 
eminent domain authority to force a reallocation of property rights.455 
Developers enjoy some constitutional protection from unreasonable 
demands. Under Dolan v. City of Tigard,456 governmental exactions imposed 
upon a developer must be roughly proportionate to the harm the development 
imposes on a neighborhood.457 
2. Risk-Based Negotiating Committees 
Whenever a new facility is sited, the EPA or a state agency should 
establish a Community Negotiation and Compensation Committee and 
determine its membership based on technocratic risk assessment procedures. In 
selecting representatives, the EPA or a state agency should ignore political 
jurisdictions to the extent possible to prevent the "'state line syndrome' in 
which waste disposal facilities are frequently proposed for political subdivisions 
bordering another state. "458 This proposal focuses on three categories of 
members: (1) immediate neighbors or those most at risk; (2) state and local 
government officials and voters; and (3) regional residents. 
A local siting negotiation committee should be free to reject a site unless a 
state or federal agency determined that the proposed facility was critically 
needed and could not reasonably be sited in another location. The siting 
committee would negotiate both the amount and the distribution of the 
compensation. 
This proposal differs from previous compensation schemes in that those 
groups or individuals most at risk would have the largest representation on the 
note 172, at 786-91 (proposing use of buffer zones around facilities handling extremely 
hazardous chemicals liable to cause catastrophic accidents). Gerrard does not define "close 
neighbors" or "close radius." 
454 See Marianne Lavelle, Help Soughtfrom 'Green' Justice Panel, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 
31, 1994, at A16 (explaining that in 1991 Congress authorized a bill ordering the EPA to 
buyout 79 homes and a church in the Carver Terrace subdivision in Texarkana, Texas). 
455 See ManIc, supra note 172, at 803-04 (discussing buyouts of contaminated areas 
and fairness issues raised by in effect giving polluters eminent domain rights). 
456 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see also NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987). 
457 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. 
458 Wiygul et al., supra note 86, at 437-38. 
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negotiation and compensation committee. For example, if a neighborhood 
within the host municipality was exposed to an excess cancer risk of less than 
one-in-one-million, it would have relatively little representation in the siting or 
remedy selection process. If nonimmediate neighbors of the facility, those who 
live outside the host municipality, were exposed to an excess cancer risk of 
between one-in-ten-thousand and one-in-one-hundred-thousand, they would 
have greater representation than residents of the host municipality. 
The agency could also set upper limits on compensation to prevent socially 
inefficient compensation that gives neighbors no incentive to be the least cost 
avoider.459 Such an approach, however, is probably politically infeasible, 
especially in light of scientific uncertainties. Negotiation-based assessments of 
cost may be too high as a result of strategic bargaining, because people in the 
neighborhood have excessive risk perceptions, or because people believe that 
money cannot replace lost health.46o Compensation is socially inefficient when 
resources are devoted to mitigation or risk reduction measures that are not the 
most socially desirable.461 For instance, compensation may be inefficient if it 
eliminates the incentive for surrounding neighbors to take precautionary 
measures that are cheaper than those that the developer is capable of 
implementing.462 
Any attempt, however, to preempt local decisionmaking by limiting the 
amount of compensation would likely engender indirect political forces that 
would seek to block or delay a proposed project. 463 Preemptive statutes have 
not worked well in overcoming determined local opposition.464 Coercive 
preemption statutes should be limited to situations in which there is a critical 
national or regional need for a facility and there are no reasonable alternative 
459 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045-46. 
460 See id. at 1043-44. 
461 See id. at 1045 n.234; infra note 177 (discussing whether risk substitution is 
socially efficient). 
462 The facility could attempt to negotiate a level of compensation that would 
encourage the neighbors to take the precautions, but that solution creates holdout problems 
and other transaction costs. See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045-46. Numerous 
commentators have discussed the problem of developing socially efficient legal frameworks 
that encourage the least cost avoider to take action. See Wn..LIAM J. BAUMOL, 
SUPERFAIRNESS 96-104 (1986); R.H. Coase, The Problem oj Sodal Cost, 3 J.L. & BeON. 
1,31-34 (1960); Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A 
Survey, 30 J. EcoN. LIT. 675, 680-81 (1992); see also Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, CompensaJionJor Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 592-
97 (1984) (discussing potential inefficiency of analogous compensation schemes for 
governmental takings of private property). 
463 See supra notes 95,97, 101-03,218,221-22 and accompanying text. 
464 See supra notes 95,97, 101-03,218,221-22 and accompanying text. 
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sites. 
Because mediation can facilitate communication between hostile parties ,465 
voluntary mediation between the negotiating committee and the developer 
should be encouraged. Coercive, mandatory arbitration should not be used 
unless there is a critical need for a facility and there are no reasonable 
alternative sites.466 The presence of a mediator, however, is unlikely to 
eliminate unequal bargaining power caused by financial or informational 
disparities.467 It may be necessary to provide financial and technical assistance 
grants to local negotiating teams so they can bargain with developers with 
relatively equal strength.468 
The Community Negotiation and Compensation Committee would retain 
significant discretion in making choices among different types of compensation, 
such as choosing among remedial, preventive, or incentive compensation.469 
The Committee would also choose among ex ante, ongoing, and ex post 
compensation.470 Part VI(B)(3) discusses some of the problems that may arise 
in choosing among various types of compensation. 
Critics of compensation argue that minority or poor residents should not be 
placed in the position of giving up their health in a devil's bargain for cash.471 
It is paternalistic and patronizing to presume that minority groups or the poor 
cannot make rational decisions even if they are fairly represented and have 
access to technical experts to assist them in understanding and questioning the 
developer's proposal. It should be assumed that poor or minority residents are 
as capable as wealthy persons of bargaining with developers, as long as the 
process for selecting the negotiating team adequately represents high-risk and 
minority residents and the team has access to adequate technical support 
selected by the team but paid for by the government or the developer. It is not 
clear whether poor communities are more vulnerable to offers of compensation 
or whether there are more complex cultural explanations, such as a long 
tradition of hosting military-related projects, for why some communities accept 
risky projects, while others do not.472 Because poverty and unemployment 
carry significant health risks, local minority groups should be able to determine 
whether the benefits in jobs and taxes outweigh the risks of a proposed facility, 
text. 
465 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text. 
466 See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text. 
467 See ManIc, supra note 79, at 280. 
468 See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 342-43; infra note 474 and accompanying 
469 See supra part m.B.!. 
470 See supra part m.B.2. 
471 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1040-42. 
472 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1147-52, 1196-97. 
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unless an expert agency finds that the risks are unacceptable.473 The provision 
of technical assistance grants to local communities or citizen groups could 
provide a more equal bargaining environment and improve the ability of poor 
communities to assess health risks.474 
While there is some danger that certain communities will be exploited by 
accepting dangerous projects in exchange for inadequate compensation, 
probably the greater problem with this proposal is that risk-based committees in 
many cases will refuse to accept even remote risks or will demand 
compensation far in excess of any scientifically credible estimate, if they 
believe that money cannot replace lost health. This proposal could reduce 
NIMBY opposition if a community, believing that the Community Negotiation 
and Compensation Committee fairly represents its interests, accepts a facility it 
would have rejected under a different siting process. More likely, at least some 
individual residents will oppose a proposed facility even if neighborhood 
representatives strongly favor its construction.475 
Justice Breyer probably would prefer that siting decisions be made by a 
politically insulated, technocratic body rather than the general public or the 
proposed risk-based siting committee. Yet even expert agencies make mistakes, 
and at least in the American tradition of democratic society it is unrealistic to 
expect agencies to operate without public approval, even if Breyer is correct 
that public opinion is often ill-informed.476 
A risk-based representation and rights statute should not guarantee 
absolutely equal distribution of risks, but should force developers and 
potentially responsible parties to give greater attention to high-risk residents.477 
473 See supra notes 13-15,406-07,414-28 and accompanying text. 
474 See generally Mank, supra note 18, at 338-43 (discussing ways to improve public 
participation in permit-issuing process for sources of hazardous air pollutants, including 
provision of technical assistance grants). Eleven states provide such grants. Gerrard, supra 
note 75, at 1158. The provision of such grants may discourage litigation in some cases, 
although there is the danger that such grants will be used as de facto settlements to get rid of 
litigation. For example, environmental justice groups that had petitioned the EPA to address 
pollution in the New River withdrew their petition on the final day of the 90-day appeal 
period after the Agency promised to consider funding a "community empowerment grant" 
to be used by the petitioners to follow all the regulatory activities associated with the New 
River. See Environmental Justice Groups Withdraw Petition That Urged EPA to Address 
Pollution in New River, [25 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 260 (June 10, 1994). 
475 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1045. 
476 See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text. 
477 A policy that limits the number of hazardous facilities sited in any given area may 
indirectly encourage developers to site facilities in pristine areas without any hazardous 
facilities and as a result may run counter to the policy of preserving pristine areas contained, 
for example, in the Clean Air Act's prevention of significant deterioration provisions. But 
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The process of local decisionmaking and guaranteeing a minimum level of 
safety to all persons are both important. Whether a risk-based committee 
accepts or denies a proposed facility, it is most equitable that those who bear 
the greatest risks have the greatest role in the decisionmaking process, subject 
to a risk assessment process that places some limits on what risks or 
compensation is reasonable. 
From the standpoint of environmental justice, if minorities are in fact more 
often exposed to high-risk projects and pollution, a risk-based committee 
system ought to empower them and all persons at greatest risk. Additional 
reforms may be necessary to improve the effectiveness of risk-based 
committees, including the provision of technical assistance grants, better 
notification of residents through individual notice, and Spanish or other foreign 
language translations.478 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,479 the Supreme Court held that a government 
body may not put conditions on the granting of a discretionary benefit to an 
individual unless the government meets its burden in demonstrating that the 
conditions are in rough proportion to the impact of the proposed development. 
While a siting board's granting of a permit to a proposed hazardous waste 
facility will not ordinarily effect an unconstitutional taking of an adjacent 
property owner's land despite the potential for negative impacts, there ought to 
be some rough proportion between the burdens imposed by a facility and the 
benefits received by individual owners. The best way to achieve this 
proportionality is to allocate representation on a siting board according to the 
risks posed to respective groups of residents. 
3. Neighbors in the "Danger Zone" 
Professor Been argues "that compensation programs may underprotect the 
immediate neighbors of [a locally undesirable land use] because acceptance of 
the compensation is often based upon consent of the majority of the political 
jurisdiction, rather than the majority of those most seriously burdened by the 
[land use]. "480 A similar issue can arise when communities approve cleanup or 
future use plans for an abandoned waste site. 
The people who are most threatened by a site should be most heavily 
provisions preserving pristine areas are seen by some as hurting minorities and low-income 
persons living in urban areas. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
478 See generally Saleem, supra note 280, at 246-47 (arguing that current notice 
requirements are inadequate and proposing individual notice and translations for foreign 
language speakers). 
479 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994). 
480 Been, supra note 77, at 788 n.2; Uf. at 826. 
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represented on the committee that advises or decides siting or cleanup issues. 
There should be a lesser or no role for residents in a municipality or state who 
bear little or no risk. Even these simple principles, however, are very difficult 
to apply. One must consider the relative rights of future and present 
residents481 or whether residents in the area most at risk who may benefit from 
the site as a result of obtaining employment should have the same right to 
representation as others who do not receive any employment benefits. 
Moreover, it is difficult to assess risk in light of the pervasive scientific 
uncertainties and to quantify all of the benefits and risks posed by a proposed 
facility.482 Nevertheless, a risk-based approach is the fairest one possible. 
There are at least three major ways to define the affected neighborhood-
that is, who is most vulnerable. First, Congress or a state legislature could 
choose an arbitrary geographical boundary, such as a two-mile radius around 
the facility, a census tract, or a zip code.483 But the magnitude of potential risk 
generated by hazardous waste sites has not been established nor has the 
relationship between such risks and distance from a site been determined. 484 
Accordingly, a fixed distance approach is not the best way to measure risk. 
Second, Congress or a state legislature could require the developer, owner, 
or operator to conduct a site-specific risk assessment to determine which 
residents are most vulnerable.485 The EPA conducts extensive studies of the 
exposure pathways by which a population may be exposed to chemicals at, or 
originating from, each Superfund site.486 Site-specific risk assessments often 
involve a combination of physical exposure assessments and models based upon 
extrapolations of data from that source.487 The public should have an 
opportunity to challenge that assessment before a siting committee is elected. 
People living in an area with an excess cancer risk of one-in-fifty-thousand 
ought to have roughly ten times the representation of those who bear a risk of 
only one-in-five-hundred-thousand. Undoubtedly, there will be people at the 
periphery of areas that could be classified as living in either a high-risk or low-
risk area, but the proposed scheme would correspond to actual risk better than 
481 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044. 
482 Id. at 1042-43. 
483 See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
484 Anderton et al., supra note 59, at 124-25. A forthcoming study, Evaluating 
Environmental Equity: The Impacts of Industrial Hazards on Selected Social Groups in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, by Theodore Glickman at Resources for the Future, 
examines the distribution of locally undesirable land uses by risk and proximity. This study 
became available too late in the publishing process to include its results. I wish to thank 
Professor Vicki Been for alerting me to this study. 
485 See infra notes 486-89 and accompanying text. 
486 See Hamilton & VISCusi, supra note 424, at 576-77 & passim. 
487 See Mank, supra note 18, at 334-37. 
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do arbitrary geographical tests. 
One objection to using a risk assessment process to select representatives is 
cost. Courts have frequently upheld the EPA's rejection of site-specific 
variance procedures proposed by industry on the ground that they are too 
costly or bureaucratically cumbersome.488 Using actual exposure assessments 
or even models would be more expensive than relying upon arbitrary 
geographical tests,489 and there would be more possibilities for litigation 
regarding the amount of risk and representation. Nevertheless, Congress or a 
state legislature might establish criteria for when exposure assessments are 
required. One possibility would be to limit costs to one-half of one percent of 
the total cost of building a new facility or cleaning up an abandoned site, then 
using geographical tests as a default mechanism for selecting a committee. 
A third method of defining the affected neighborhood involves statistical 
averages or models. The EPA or states could predict the risk of a facility 
having particular characteristics, such as volume and toxicity of waste, based 
on studies of similar facilities or on computer models of the proposed site.49o 
While models are often used in environmentallaw,491 using statistical averages 
or profiles to predict a facility's risk and basing representation on a siting or 
compensation committee on that prediction is a new approach. 
For both individualized risk assessments and estimates based upon 
statistical averages, there will be difficulties in measuring carcinogenic risks 
and even greater difficulties in assessing the risks of noncarcinogens, especially 
for subpopulation groups whose dietary patterns differ considerably from the 
national average.492 An agency is more likely to estimate a range of risk from a 
site than to provide a single number.493 The EPA or state authorities will have 
to exercise their technocratic judgment as to conflicting risk assessments and in 
defining the geographic boundaries of the various levels of risk. 
In addition, Congress or a state legislature could provide a list of desiderata 
to help define the relevant groups most at risk. One possibility would be to 
require that racial minorities living in high-risk areas have representation 
proportionate to their numbers in that high-risk area. Another possibility would 
488 See, e.g., Leather Indus. of Am. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
489 See Mank, supra note 18, at 334-35. 
490 See ROOER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 23-24 (3d ed. Supp. 1993); see also Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth 
S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REv. 1481, 1490-96 (1992) 
(proposing use of statistical claim profiles in tort cases). 
491 See Mank, supra note 18, at 335. 
492 See supra notes 54, 449 and accompanying text. 
493 See Mank, supra note 18, at 332-34 (discussing risk range concept and use of 
"fuzzy bright line" statutes and regulations acknowledging scientific uncertainties). 
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be to require that at least one committee member be a racial minority if there is 
a certain percentage of minorities in the high-risk area. Better ways to protect 
the interests of all minority groups and ways more consistent with democratic 
theory are a cumulative voting system, in which any self-identified minority 
can cumulate all of its votes for one candidate,494 and a Hare Single 
Transferable Vote proportional voting system.495 This Article's proposal 
differs from traditional cumulative or proportional voting systems in that votes 
would be weighted to give more influence to high-risk residents. Congress or a 
state legislature might also direct the EPA or state authorities to take into 
account geographical boundaries such as census tracts or political subdivisions 
if such boundaries coincide in large part with the high-risk area and if only a 
494 See GUINIER, supra note 72, at 14-16 & passim. Guinier discusses the use of 
supermajority rules or a minority veto as voting remedies in extreme cases of majority 
domination. ld. at 16-17, 116-17, 260 n.119. Such drastic remedies should not be 
considered until cumulative voting has been shown to be ineffective at representing minority 
interests. 
495 In a Hare Single Transferable Vote proportional voting system, voters rank the 
candidates in order of preference. If a candidate has more than the minimum number of 
votes to win under the Droop formula, her "surplus" votes are transferred to her voter's 
second choice. If this transfer does not result in a winner, the candidate with the fewest 
votes is eliminated and her votes transferred to the next available preference, excluding 
winning candidates. See Inman, supra note 351, at 1999-2001; Still, supra note 351, at 
258-59. Proponents of a Single Transferable Vote proportional voting system argue that it 
is less open to manipulation than cumulative voting as a result of either strategic voting or 
the encouragement of "straw men" to waste opponents' votes. See Still, supra note 351, at 
260. A party-list proportional voting system, in which each voter votes for one party or list, 
has certain advantages compared to a Hare Single Transferable Vote system, but has 
significant drawbacks in nonpartisan elections in which the minority is a racial or ethnic 
minority rather than a political party. See id. at 262. While the formation of racial parties 
can reduce the problems that party-list systems can cause for minorities, this Article 
assumes that elections for a siting committee should be nonpartisan and that the Hare Single 
Transferable Vote system is probably a better approach for such elections. 
The Michigan Supreme Court in two old cases held that cumulative voting and single 
transferable voting violated the Michigan Constitution's right of each citizen to vote for all 
elective officers. See Wattles v. Upjohn, 179 N.W. 335, 335-42 (Mich. 1920) (single 
transferable voting); Maynard v. Board ofDist. Canvassers, 47 N.W. 756, 756-61 (Mich. 
1890) (cumulative voting). Many scholars have criticized Maynard's poor reasoning, and 
Wattles is probably no longer good law. See Bernard Grofinan, Criteria for Districting: A 
Sodal Sdence Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77, 165-66 (1985). Many courts have 
upheld the validity of cumulative or single transferable voting. See. e.g., Campbell v. Board 
of Educ., 310 F. Supp. 94, 95-106 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Moore v. Election Comm'rs, 35 
N.E.2d 222, 229-41 (Mass. 1941); Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30, 31-38 
(N.Y. 1937); Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 141 N.E. 27, 32-34 (Ohio 1923). 
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few persons would be excluded from electing representatives to, or serving as 
members of, a siting or remedy selection committee by taking into account 
such boundaries. 
There are a number of problems in apportioning representation among 
those who live or own property in a high-risk area. One problem involves 
apportioning representation among renters, resident property owners, and 
nonresident property owners.496 Professor Been states that "[r]esidents would 
claim that they bear the most immediate risk and injury. Landlords, however, 
would assert that they absorb at least some, if not all, of the tenants' damages 
through lower rents. "497 
For equitable reasons, health risks should take precedence over risks to 
property. Renters who are at high risk of developing cancer ought to have more 
representation than nonresidential property owners. Nonresidential property 
owners should have to demonstrate that they are likely to live in their homes in 
the future or to articulate what property damages they expect as a result of the 
facility.498 If the market for rent is efficient, landlords will benefit from higher 
rents if more people are willing to rent in an area that hosts a facility but 
compensates renters. Long-term residents should receive more representation 
than transient residents. For example, there could be a requirement that at least 
one representative on the siting committee have lived in the high-risk area for 
at least five years.499 
An even more difficult problem is representing future residents.soo A 
compensation committee must decide what percentage of compensation will be 
496 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044 (discussing allocation of compensation 
among residents, property owners, and the neighborhood itself). 
497/d. 
498 There is mixed evidence regarding the impact of locally undesirable land uses on 
neighboring property values. See id. at 1020-23. 
499 Proposed Superfund legislation included precatory language suggesting that it is 
"appropriate" for the President to include representation from "long-term residents who are 
members of the medical community." H.R. 3800, supra note 259, § 103. 
500 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044. See generally Farber & 
Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254 (discussing problems of discount rates and intergenerational 
effects); Roger E. Kasperson, Sodal Issues in Radioactive Waste Management: The 
National Experience, in EQUITY IssUES IN RADIOAcrIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 24, 50-52 
(Roger E. Kasperson ed., 1983); Guy Kirsch, Solidarity Between Generations: 
Intergenerational Distributional Problems in Environmental and Resource Policy, in 
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLlcrS IN ENVIRONMENfAL REsOURCE POLICY 381 (Allan Schnaigberg 
et al. eds., 1986); Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Responsibilities to Future 
Generations for the Environment, 84 AM. J. JNr'L L. 198 (1990); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, 
Note, A Ghost of Qzristmas Yet to Come: Standing to Sue for Future Generations, 1 J.L. & 
TECH. 67 (1986). 
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ex ante, ongoing, or ex post.SOl In a recent study of Superfund sites, Professors 
Hamilton and Viscusi found that "future risks account[ed] for over 90% of all 
the risk-weighted pathways for the Superfund sites in our sample. Chief among 
these future risks is the projection that future residents will reside on sites that 
are not currently residential. "502 They argue that many of these risks could be 
eliminated by land use restrictions preventing residential use of highly polluted 
sites and by containment, including fences, but that these strategies would 
require a change in the EPA's legislative mandate preferring long-term 
effectiveness and permanence in remedy selection.s03 Legislation proposed in 
1994 would have allowed the EPA to take into account the likely future use of 
a site, whether residential or industrial, and would have established Community 
Working Groups of up to twenty representatives to advise the EPA on land use 
recommendations affecting future use.504 
Siting boards and negotiating committees face conflicts in representing 
present and future interests, and typically there are no statutory or regulatory 
guidelines that address conflicting or multiple interests.505 Because present 
residents have an incentive to seek ex ante compensation, the government 
should appoint trustees to represent future residents. In traditional estates and 
trusts law, trustees often must make difficult choices between income- and 
principal-producing investments in fulfilling their duty to represent the 
conflicting interests of both present life beneficiaries and holders of future 
interests.506 Trustees should represent only future generations, and those 
residents currently most at risk should have the greatest weight in electing 
representatives to act on behalf of present interests.507 
501 See supra part m.B.2. 
502 Hamilton & VISCusi, supra note 424, at 608. 
503 See Uf. at 608-09. 
504 See H.R. 3800, supra note 259, § 102 (community working groups), § 502(2) 
(reasonably anticipated future uses of land); Douglas A. McWilliams, Comment, 
Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban 
Revitalization, 21 EcoLOGY L.Q. 705, 774-75 (1994) (discussing community work group 
proposal). 
505 See ENGLISH, supra note 270, at 73-76 (discussing fiduciary responsibility of siting 
boards). 
506 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND EsTATES 
876 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing fiduciary duty of impartiality in allocating income and 
principal). Professor Richard Epstein argues that genetic connection usually leads parents to 
protect the interests of their children if the parent as a life beneficiary of a trust has the right 
to invade principal at the expense of the remainderpersons, her children. See Richard A. 
Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1465, 1472-74 (1989). 
507 This proposal does not address discount rates or the trustee's time horizon. Another 
difficult issue is the extent of the current generation's obligations to future generations. 
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Several environmental statutes require the EPA or other government 
agencies to consider future threats to human health.50S Most notably, the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) declares that "it is the 
continuing responsibility of the federal government to use all practicable 
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to 
[ensure] ... that the Nation may ... fulfill the responsibilities of each 
generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations. "509 In 
both the Oil Pollution Act of 199OS iO and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),511 the 
[Tjhe current generation is not truly a trustee with a moral obligation to preserve the 
entire corpus for future generations. . .. [W]e think that members of the current 
generation are felt to have a more compelling obligation toward the next generation 
(and perhaps at least to young grandchildren) than to later generations. 
Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 254, at 295. 
50S The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act mentions the minimirotion of 
"present and future threat[s] to human health and the environment" in a number of 
provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (stating national policy), § 6922(b) (requiring 
generators to certify that technology in furtherance of this policy is being employed), 
§ 6925(h)(2) (likewise conditioning permit issuance on use of compatible technologies) 
(1988); Spear, supra note 425, at 118-19 n.s (1993). In defining the terms "remedy" and 
"remedial action," the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act requires that the chosen course of action "prevent or minimize the release of 
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or 
future public health or welfare or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988); Spear, 
supra note 425, at 119 n.9 & passim. Title IV of the Clean Air Act, which addresses acid 
deposition, states that "current and future generations of Americans will be adversely 
affected by delaying measures to remedy the problem." 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(5) (Supp. V 
1993). The Nuclear Waste Act states that "high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear 
fuel have become major subjects of public concern, and appropriate precautions must be 
taken to ensure that such waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect the public health and 
safety and the environment for this or future generations." Id. § 10131(a)(7). 
509 Id. § 4331(b); see Gerald M. Levine, The Rhetoric of Public Expectation: An 
Enquiry into the Cancepts of Responsiveness and Responsibility Under the Environmental 
Laws, 8 PACEENVrL. L. REv. 389, 414-16 (1991) (discussing trustee provision in NEPA); 
Timothy P. Brady, Comment, "But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:" The Public 
Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 621, 644-
45 (1990) (arguing NEPA has failed to incorporate public trust doctrine and is inadequate to 
protect future generations). 
510 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (Supp. V 1993). See generally Symposium, Oil Pollution Act 
Rulemaking, 45 BAYLORL. REv. 215 (1993). 
511 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988). See generally Anthony R. Chase, Remedying 
CERCLA ~ Natural Resource Damages Provision: Incorporation oft/Ie Public Trust Doctrine 
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President, or the authorized representative of any state, Indian tribe, or foreign 
government, may designate trustees to present a claim and recover damages to 
compensate for harm to natural resources. In theory, trustees should protect 
environmental resources for future generations,SI2 but both the Oil Pollution 
Act and CERCLA fail to specify how trustees should spend recovered damages 
in the future or where the money should be kept in the interim.SI3 NEPA's 
provisions regarding the rights of future generations are purely procedural and 
lack any substantive power.SI4 
A percentage of the seats on a Community Negotiation Compensation 
Committee should be assigned to government trustees whose sole purpose is to 
represent future generations.SIS Trustees should distinguish between those who 
will live near a facility while it is operating and those who will reside there 
only after the facility closes. Instead of making a lump sum payment to 
residents present when a facility is opened, an ongoing compensation plan 
could require annual payments to those residents present on a certain date, 
perhaps including a pro rata system for those present only part of a year.SI6 To 
protect residents after a facility is closed, a developer could create an ex post 
trust fund or put up a bond to address future issues resulting from eventual 
closure of the site, such as post-closure monitoring or implementation of 
institutional controls including signs, a fence, or local land use regulations.517 
into Natural Resources Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 353 (1992); Andrew I. 
Simons & James M. Wicks, Natural Resources Damages Under CERCLA: Here They 
Come. Ready or Not, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 801 (1989). 
512 See Levine, supra note 509, at 414-16. 
S13 Chase, supra note 511, at 380 (discussing CERCLA). 
SI4 See Brady, supra note 509, at 643-46. 
SIS The number or percentage of seats that ought to be assigned raises a number of 
complex questions related to the discounting of future harms or benefits. See generally 
Farber & Hemroersbaugh, supra note 254. Congress or a state legislature could mandate a 
fixed percentage or number of seats, or delegate this task to an administrative agency 
empowered to consider the question of discount rates. 
S16 Tooele County, Utah receives $2,000,000 in annual "mitigation fees," which have 
allowed the county to freeze its property taxes. Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1161. Efforts in 
several states to use ongoing compensation to convince residents to accept low-level 
radioactive waste facilities have failed. See Been, supra note 77, at 803-08. 
S17 Owners of hazardous waste facilities must set aside enough resources to assure site 
safety for 30 years after closure. 40 C.F.R. § 264.117(a)(1) (1994). See generally Bailey, 
supra note 75, at B3. The recent decline in demand for hazardous waste disposal has led to 
declining profits in the industry and raised questions about whether firms will be able to 
survive to fulfill postclosure requirements. Some states are requiring operators to put cash 
into trust funds to pay for postclosure monitoring. Bailey, supra note 75, at B3; see also 
Black, supra note 186, at 584 (criticizing current financial guarantee requirements for 
hazardous waste operators). 
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There is evidence that current financial responsibility requirements for 
hazardous waste operators are inadequate.sl8 Efforts to create long-term 
repositories for high-level radioactive waste raise issues about our society's 
ability to establish institutional controls for centuries or millennia.Sl9 
Ultimately, there is no perfect way to allocate seats or votes among renters and 
property owners, long-term and short-term residents, and especially among 
present and future residents, but a more representative siting system should at 
least take such factors into account. 
There are important distributional issues concerning which citizens and 
governmental bodies in a community should benefit from compensation. 
Negotiation committees should have the authority to negotiate compensation 
from developers that is paid either directly by the developer or indirectly 
through a governmental body to mitigate the harms caused to individual 
residents. There would have to be some guidelines to prevent members of the 
committee from simply rewarding themselves or their friends, and to protect 
future residents. Compensation should be subject to public disclosure and 
debate, and to review by an administrative agency and the courts. 
Remedial and preventive compensation should take precedence over simply 
providing incentives to accept a facility. It is more important to provide 
remedial compensation to persons who suffer actual health or property damage 
from a facility than to give every person in a host community $100 per year as 
an incentive to vote in favor of accepting the facility. The choice between 
providing remedial compensation to those who have suffered harm and using 
compensation to prevent future harms raises more complex issues. Ideally, a 
developer should compensate every person actually harmed, but the long 
latency periods of many diseases and the fact that there are many possible 
causes of cancer and other diseases make it difficult to determine whether the 
facility is a significant causal factor. Accordingly, it may make sense to 
concentrate on preventive measures that reduce the harmfulness of the facility. 
Another issue is whether a compensation scheme should consider the 
employment or other in-kind benefits that a resident receives from a facility in 
reducing the amount of compensation.s2o In principle, a resident should not 
receive double benefits from a facility, such as both employment and 
compensation for living near her employer. On the other hand, an employee 
might argue that the benefits of working for the facility should be discounted 
by the possibility that the employee could obtain alternative employment and 
518 See supra notes 186,517 and accompanying text. 
519 A number of critics have questioned whether the Department of Energy's attempt 
to design a 1O,OOO-year "keep out" sign at radioactive depositories is practical when no 
human institution has lasted that long. See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1133. 
520 See Been, Fairness, supra note 1, at 1044. 
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then also receive compensation. For instance, if an employee makes $25,000 
per year working at a hazardous waste facility but could make $24,500 per year 
at an alternate job, then the actual benefit of the facility to the employee is only 
$500 per year and not $25,000. Because the complexities of assessing an 
employee's substitute employment opportunities may outweigh the advantages 
of considering the benefits of employment, it may be better not to consider 
employment benefits in determining how much compensation a resident should 
receive from a facility owner or operator. 
4. Local Politicians and Political Residents 
The biggest potential losers from a scheme of risk-based compensation 
committees would be state and local politicians, who today normally have the 
greatest say in negotiating compensation from developers of risky projects, and 
residents of host communities who would benefit from compensation even if 
they were at low or no risk from the facility.521 Because it is elected officials 
who bear much of the responsibility for the decisions that have created siting 
disparities, reducing their authority is a plausible strategy for reducing such 
disparities.522 Even if elected officials are currently the best suited to make 
siting and compensation decisions, it may be better to allow others to negotiate 
with developers because many people associate elected officials with past 
discriminatory practices.523 Furthermore, elected officials may not be 
representative of the public on the issues raised by the compensation 
proposal.524 
To the extent that it is politically feasible, the Community Negotiation and 
Compensation Committees should supplant these politicians. Of course, there 
will always be some type of politics involved in any system of representation, 
but this proposal would at least reduce the role of elected politicians and 
increase the influence of those at greatest risk. Many politicians would be more 
than happy to dump divisive siting issues like a hot potato. Some politicians 
have lost re-election as a result of taking a stand on controversial siting 
issues.52S 
Residents of a state or municipality who elected local or state politicians or 
521 See id. at 1045 (noting that state or local officials generally conduct siting 
compensation negotiations). 
522 See id. 
523 Seeid. 
524 See id.; ENGLISH, supra note 270, at 76, 138. 
52S See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1052 n.9 (citing sources describing incumbents in 
Nebraska and Nevada who were defeated largely as a result of their positions on siting 
issues). 
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who have the right to vote in a referendum approving a site should lose power 
to the extent that the project does not pose a risk to them. Arguably, low-risk 
residents who receive compensation in excess of their harm from the facility 
are engaging in rent seeking, in the language of public choice theory,526 at the 
expense of higher-risk residents or possibly the facility owner. Legislatures 
should reduce the political power of low-risk residents to give more power to 
endangered neighbors, but it may be difficult to accomplish this equitable goal 
if low-risk residents are well represented in the legislature. Low-risk residents 
should not have veto power over needed facilities if high-risk residents are 
willing to accept a facility. For example, the residents in Nevada who bear little 
or no risk should not decide whether a particular locality such as Nye County, 
the home of Yucca Mountain, oUght to accept a high-level radioactive waste 
facility that is needed by the nation if local residents are willing to accept the 
risk, unless the state as a whole will bear substantial costs or risks.527 
There are important equitable reasons for giving less money and authority 
to states, local governments, or individuals that do not bear significant risks 
from building a proposed facility or cleaning up an abandoned one. 
Compensation may be used by a state or municipality for such beneficial 
purposes as "tax relief, new schools and hospitals, and more police and 
teachers. "528 To the extent that this Article's proposal redirects more money to 
those neighbors at greatest risk, there will be less money for general municipal 
or state improvement projects. It is fairest, however, to compensate those who 
are actually at risk. Comprehensive property or income tax measures are a 
better way to raise revenues than is giving compensation to an entire state or 
municipality for a project that may place risks on only a few people within that 
political division. It is even more unfair when states or communities gain 
compensation for projects that cause significant externalities for residents of 
neighboring communities, states, or even foreign nations.529 A risk-based 
representation system is fairer than relying upon existing political subdivisions 
that do not reflect the actual distribution of risks from a site. 
5. Regional Concerns 
Commentators have often argued in favor of regional political solutions to 
526 See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. 
527 See Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1161-62 ("Many residents ofNye County, Nevada, 
the home of Yucca Mountain, support the construction of [such a facility], but the state has 
vigorously fought the proposal. "). 
528 Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1199. 
529 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; infra notes 530-34, 543-44 and 
accompanying text. 
1995] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 421 
social or environmental problems because states and municipalities tend to site 
polluting facilities on their boundaries, passing external costs on to other 
communities.53o In an earlier article, this author noted the regional nature of 
pollution from waste disposal facilities and argued that "surrounding 
communities should have a greater role in negotiating compensation. "531 
Subsequently, Michael Wheeler discussed the need for regional siting 
negotiations.532 This Article's proposed risk-based siting committee differs 
from previous proposals by ignoring political subdivisions to the extent 
possible and allocating representation based on the risk that a facility presents 
to a group of persons rather than on where they live. Regional residents who 
do not live in the political subdivision hosting the facility would gain or lose 
power depending upon the actual risk posed by the site to them. 
Pollution problems often create externalities or spillover effects that do not 
respect political boundaries.533 Previous efforts to deal with interstate air 
pollution have not been effective because the EPA has been too reluctant to 
override political subdivisions for the sake of less pollution.534 Thus, it is 
important to give more representation to regional residents who are affected by 
significant spillover effects. Regional residents who are at little risk from a 
project are often the most vociferous and best organized, and such residents 
would lose influence under the proposal.535 
530 See supra note 150 and accompanying text; infra notes 531-34, 543-44 and 
accompanying text. 
531 ManIc, supra note 79, at 284. The Massachusetts negotiated compensation statute 
permits a community that "hosts" a new facility to grant surrounding communities a role in 
negotiations and possibly in compensation. Under the Massachusetts administrative code, 
the chief executive officer of a host community of a hazardous waste facility can invite up to 
four people from abutting communities to be members of a local assessment committee. See 
MAss. REGs. CODE, tit. 990, § 8.02(1)(g) (1987 & Supp. 1993); Mank, supra, note 79, at 
279 n.231, 284. 
532 See Wheeler, supra note 214, at 284-88. 
533 See ManIc, supra note 172, at 784-86. 
534 See FINDLEY & FARBER, supra note 490, at 372-75 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing the 
failure of 1970 Clean Air Act §§ 1l0(a)(2)(E) and 126 to address interstate air pollution and 
judicial deference to the EPA, which approved state implementation plans unlikely to 
resolve interstate pollution problems). 
535 Much of the opposition to the siting of a high-level radioactive waste facility at 
Yucca Mountain comes from outside Nye County, the location of the proposed facility. See 
Gerrard, supra note 75, at 1150, 1161-62. The Department of Energy has had as much 
trouble regarding the cleanup of the Hanford nuclear facility from Seattle and Portland 
groups as from local residents. Interview with John S. Applegate, chairperson of the 
Citizens Task Force for cleaning up the Fernald, Ohio Department of Energy nuclear 
facility, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Aug. 10, 1994). 
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Local sovereignty in America has often resulted in an exodus of middle 
class people and businesses from the problems of the city into suburbs and 
thereby "segregated many of America's metropolitan areas into 'two nations': 
rich and poor, white and black, expanding and contracting. "536 Professor Jerry 
Frog has argued that new forms of regional organization should be created to 
address this problem and proposed that. a regional legislature, with 
representatives elected from neighborhoods rather than from existing political 
subdivisions, should decide whether a locality may exclude a waste dump that 
the region needs.537 Even a regional government's interests, however, would 
need some broader check.538 
While Frog's proposal for regional legislatures remains a dream, three 
models of regional collaboration have been used with some degree of success: 
(1) special. fora that allow municipalities to coordinate regional policies; (2) 
systems that allow communities to shift regional mandates; and (3) pooling 
arrangements that enable communities to share the costs and benefits of 
development more equitably.539 Connecticut has adopted voluntary policy fora 
in which central cities and their suburban neighbors can negotiate "fair share 
housing compacts" regarding low-income housing.s4o New Jersey has created 
an administrative agency to determine each municipality's low-income housing 
obligations but allows authorized communities to lower their affordable housing 
burden by up to one-half if they could voluntarily negotiate with other 
municipalities to absorb more than their quota,541 Since 1971, St. Paul and 
Minneapolis, Minnesota have participated in a seven-county regional tax-base-
sharing area, which is essentially a pooling arrangement designed to reduce 
fiscal disparities between the two cities and the surrounding suburbs. Despite 
extensive discussion of the subject by academics and planners, no other major 
metropolitan area has adopted such an approach or genuine regional power 
sharing.542 
536 Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 256 (1993). 
537 See Uf. at 295-97. 
538 "As Foucault suggests, fear of sovereign power is so common that it is routinely 
converted into a subjected sovereignty, a sovereignty limited by some other sovereignty." 
Id. at 255 (discussing Michel Foucault, LANGUAGE, COUNfER-MEMORY, PRAcriCE 221 
(1977). 
539 Wheeler, supra note 214, at 284. 
540 See Uf. at 284-85. 
541 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-305(a), -312(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); 
Wheeler, supra note 216, at 285-86. 
542 See Mank, supra note 80, at 284-85 n.259 (citing sources discussing regional tax-
based sharing); Wheeler, supra note 214, at 286. 
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Wheeler proposes that all communities in a region be assessed a NIMBY 
tax, the proceeds of which would compensate communities that agreed to take 
responsibility for treatment plants, prisons, or other needed facilities.543 His 
proposal is interesting, but does not address who should serve on the 
compensation negotiation committee or direct compensation to those individuals 
at greatest risk. 
A radical transformation to regional government is not necessary. Siting 
committee representation should be based on risk even if affected individuals 
live outside the host community's political boundaries. This approach could be 
implemented by using either geographical boundaries such as a two-mile radius 
or site-specific exposure assessments or models. Either way, nearby regional 
residents would have a greater say. Those who would suffer direct economic 
injury from a physical environmental effect of a proposed site should have a 
say in selecting the community negotiating committee, but indirect and 
tangential economic injuries should be ignored.544 
543 See Wheeler, supra note 214, at 286-87. 
544 See Been, supra note n, at 826. To answer a question posed by Professor Been, in 
selecting a siting committee, not much weight should be given to a ski resort 20 miles away 
that fears a facility might stigmatize the area and discourage tourism. Similarly, the Army 
Corps of Engineers may not deny a wetlands permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act 
because of indirect socioeconomic impacts on a neighboring city unrelated to the direct 
physical impacts of a proposed suburban mall on wetlands. See Mall Properties, Inc. v. 
Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 566-67 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that Army Corps of Engineers 
may not deny wetlands permit based upon indirect socioeconomic impacts of suburban mall 
on merchants in nearby city), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.), cel1. denied sub 
nom. City of Newhaven v. Marsh, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). The National Environmental 
Policy Act distinguishes between direct socioeconomic impacts proximately caused by 
physical effects, which warrant discussion in an Environmental Impact Statement, and 
tangential social impacts, which may be omitted. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a; 
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, n3-77 (1983) 
(holding that psychological fears of nuclear accident at Three Mile Island are not a 
significant impact warranting an Environmental Impact Statement because there is not a 
reasonably close causal connection between a change in the physical environment and effect 
at issue); Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737 F.2d 1083, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that 
potential for increased tampering if agency adopts regulations allowing plastic liquor bottles 
is not an environmental consequence under National Environmental Policy Act), cel1. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984). 
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State and local governments should have a say based upon the actual risks 
or costs posed by a siting or remedy selection issue. This proposal would 
reduce the stateline problem discussed above and more accurately internalize 
the externalities caused by a project. Most likely, states or municipalities would 
fight any attempt to weaken their siting or remedy selection authority. The 
environmental justice movement, however, ~y force Congress to rethink the 
existing environmental decisionmaking framework. 
VIT. CONCLUSION 
Because the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to provide an 
adequate opportunity for political participation and representation to minority 
groups rather than to guarantee substantive fairness,545 Congress and state 
legislatures should adopt this Article's proposal for enhancing the ability of 
those residents most at risk, including racial minorities, to select a community's 
siting negotiation and compensation committee rather than expand the ability of 
minority groups to bring disparate impact suits alleging substantive unfairness. 
Siting discrimination suits at best can address only inequities in the initial siting 
decision. A compensation process allows a community to negotiate with a 
developer to provide ex ante compensation to redress harms resulting from the 
initial siting decision, and also to provide ongoing or ex post compensation to 
compensate future residents. In the absence of intentional discrimination, a 
compensation process that adequately protects the ability of minorities to 
participate can address a broader range of harms than can siting discrimination 
suits and can do so without unfairly stigmatizing government officials or 
developers.546 
This Article proposes a risk-based representation and compensation system 
in which the EPA or state agency would use its technocratic expertise to set 
upper limits on risk, establish minimum compensation, and determine 
representation on a risk-based negotiation committee. A weighted cumulative or 
proportional voting system might be used to enhance the ability of racial and 
other minorities to gain representation on the siting committee. The local risk-
545 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
546 While developers and government officials can reasonably expect to receive 
criticism for their siting decisions from various members of the public or the media, courts 
should not conclude that officials or developers have harmed minority groups unless one 
can reasonably infer conscious bias or that the siting process unreasonably excludes 
minorities from the decisionmaking process. If minorities are adequately represented and 
have reasonable access to information about a project, a siting committee oUght to be able to 
place a project in a minority community unless there is an unreasonable overall risk to that 
community as determined by the EPA or a state agency. 
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based committees would determine whether to accept a proposed facility and 
would negotiate the amount and distribution of compensation. There are a 
number of complex issues in allocating representation among future and present 
residents, renters and property owners, transient and long-term residents, and 
in selecting among remedial, preventive, and incentive remedies. These issues 
should be confronted rather than ignored because of a misplaced focus on 
discrimination suits and judicial scrutiny of substantive results.547 
547 It is important that the committee determine a fair amount of compensation because 
its settlement with the developer should normally foreclose future litigation unless the 
developer withheld important information or significantly changes the scope of its 
operations. q. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-75 (N.Y. 1970) 
(granting injunction against defendant but allowing defendant to pay permanent damages to 
private plaintiffs that will foreclose future litigation by those plaintiffs); see also Daniel A. 
Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAw AND 
LEGAL EDUCATION 7, 14-19 (peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988) (criticizing 
Boomer court's damages approach and arguing for injunctive remedies). 

